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Abstract 
 
This research will investigate whether intent plays a role in the application of Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU and, if so, whether such role is subordinate to effects or has an 
autonomous normative character. 
The methodology for answering this question will start by defining intent under EU 
competition law. It will be argued that actions by undertakings are interpreted as those 
of rational agents. This will show that the notion of ‘subjective intent’ and its separation 
from objective behaviour are misguided. The role of intent will then be analysed with 
reference to EU competition law goals. Insofar as those goals are understood as purely 
consequentialist, namely promoting or preventing certain effects, intent can only be 
used as a proxy for such effects. However, EU competition law will be shown to also 
apply non-consequentialist moral judgments. Such judgments are the source of the 
autonomous normative value of intent. 
That autonomous normative value will then be described with reference to the case law, 
namely the notions behind the different forms of collusion, restriction of competition, 
and abuse of dominance. It will be seen that the normative root of anti-competitive 
behaviour is based on intent, insofar as collusion and abuse represent intent which is 
potentially offensive to EU competition law principles. Infringements of Articles 101 
and 102 further require the application of intent or effects-based tests, represented in the 
alternative between restrictions by object or effect and in the different types of abuse. 
Thus, it will be discussed how the doctrinal emphasis on effects has failed to explain 
significant sections of the case law. 
It will be concluded that the use of intent is indicative of the normative character of EU 
competition law, namely a stable judicial system based on principles which conciliates 
moral intuitions with the paradigms of perfect competition.  
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‘A plan is a real thing, and things projected are experienced. A plan once made and 
visualized becomes reality along with other realities – never to be destroyed but 
easily to be attacked.’ 
The Pearl 
 
In the novel The Pearl, Steinbeck tells of how a poor diver named Kino finds a 
magnificent pearl. Kino plans to sell the pearl and bring his family out of poverty, but 
events conspire against him. The above quote describes how Kino formulates his 
intention, and presages how fate ends up judging such intention. In doing so, Steinbeck 
conveys how natural and significant the act of planning is. This research will be 
dedicated to how the same act of planning, when made by undertakings, is judged under 
European Union (‘EU’) competition law. The comparison is not as far-fetched as it 
might sound. The present research will set out to prove two main points. The first point 
is that understanding an undertaking’s intent is just as easy as understanding that of a 
person, like the one Kino portrays. In the novel we are privy to Kino’s thoughts, and the 
major methodological objection to interpreting an undertaking’s intent is that we would 
require similar access. This would either be impossible or overly dependent on evidence 
like internal documentation. However, the other characters in the novel also understand 
Kino: they know he is poor, they anticipate he wants to sell the pearl, and they 
comprehend his action when he tries to do so. They rely upon the assumption that Kino 
is rational, and the same happens with undertakings: their actions are rationally 
interpreted in relation to the beliefs and desires attributed to them. This is how people 
make sense of each other, in novels and in reality, and there is no reason to deviate from 
this method for undertakings. In fact, when trying to sell the pearl, Kino would be 
legally acting like an undertaking. 
Understanding the intent of undertakings is instrumental to the second main point of this 
research: undertakings’ actions can be, and often are, judged on this intent. Steinbeck 
warns at the beginning of The Pearl that, being a tale, there are only ‘black and white 
things and good and evil things and nothing in between’. Not only are Kino’s actions 
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judged, but also those of every other character. After finding the pearl, Kino tries to sell 
it in the village market, which Steinbeck described as follows: 
‘It was supposed that the pearl buyers were individuals acting alone, bidding 
against one another for the pearls the fishermen brought in. And once it had been 
so. But this was a wasteful method, for often, in the excitement of bidding for a fine 
pearl, too great a price had been paid to the fishermen. This was extravagant and 
not to be countenanced. Now there was only one pearl buyer with many hands, and 
the men who sat in their offices and waited for Kino knew what price they would 
offer, how high they would bid, and what method each one would use’. 
Kino refuses to sell the pearl at the insignificant price offered by the village market, 
leaving with his family to the city and setting off tragic events. The pearl buyers are 
therefore placed on the ‘black’ side of the tale. This goes beyond their unwitting 
contribution to the chain of events, and has everything to do with how they intentionally 
run the village market. Like any tale, The Pearl taps into the reader’s convictions, and 
Steinbeck assumes that readers will find the village market unjust. This is just an 
example of how competition is not morally neutral: market actions are judged according 
to a sense of justice. That sense of justice is just as present in reading The Pearl as it is 
in dealing with a real case of a cartel that exchanges information and fixes prices. This 
research will focus upon how these moral judgments are part of the judicial application 
of EU competition law: how they are influenced by intuitions, how their principles are 
incorporated in judicial reasoning, and how they ultimately contribute to the stability of 
the law. Real cases do not always fall in the ‘black and white’ territory of tales. 
However, the human capacity for a sense of justice has evolved and exists for real life 
purposes. Rawls warns not to underestimate our sense of justice, pointing to ‘the 
potentially infinite number and variety of judgments we are prepared to make’.1 This 
research covers one of those varieties: moral judgements of competitive activity. 
The present research question can therefore be framed as the role in the application of 
Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘Articles 
101 and 102’).2 This addresses an oversight of the established view in the doctrine, 
which considers that those provisions are only concerned about the effects of 
undertakings’ actions. For example, Jones and Sufrin comment that EU competition law 
‘is essentially an “effects-based” law’.3 Such an ‘effects-based approach’ admits that 
                                                     
1
 Rawls (1999) 41. 
2
 References to Articles in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union will be mentioned only 
by their number, as well as references to Articles in previous versions of the Treaties when, like Articles 
101 and 102, they have not been subject to significant substantive changes. 
3
 Jones and Sufrin (2014) 56.  
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intent can be used to establish collusion under Article 101, to predict or interpret the 
production of effects, and to apply an adequate sanction. Nevertheless, judging 
behaviour as anti-competitive would be reserved to effects. Even if actual effects are not 
directly demanded, behaviour would be judged based on likely effects. While 
acknowledging the substantive importance of effects, this research will argue that intent 
plays more than a subordinate role to them. As will be shown, a substantive finding of 
anti-competitive behaviour starts with judgment of intent, with the possibility of effects 
being considered at a later stage. 
There are good reasons why a substantive role of intent has so far escaped doctrinal 
attention, namely the importance attributed by authors to economic reasoning and their 
debate over the goals of EU competition law. Both can be said to be influenced by the 
‘Chicago School’ doctrine in United States (‘US’) antitrust.4 Thus, Bork inquired: 
‘What is the point of the law – what are its goals? Everything else follows from the 
answer we give. Is the antitrust judge to be guided by one value or by several? If by 
several, how is he to decide cases where a conflict in values arises? Only when the 
issue of goals has been settled is it possible to frame a coherent body of substantive 
rules’.5 
The answer to these questions, according to Bork, places particular emphasis on judicial 
adjudication and requires the judiciary to adopt methods which ‘approach the rigor of 
the descriptive models of basic economic theory’.6 As a result of this economic 
reasoning, different goals are seen as trade-offs between outcomes: more or less 
consumer welfare, small or ‘fair’ undertakings’ welfare, market concentration, media 
plurality, and so on.
7
 Even those that disagree with Bork’s conclusion that consumer 
welfare should be the sole goal have accepted this framework.
8
 In the US, the debate 
rages on whether consumer welfare should be considered strictu sensu or as total 
welfare.
9
 In the EU, the goals of market integration and consumer welfare are generally 
recognised, with controversy over how much these incorporate or should also allow for 
the consideration of goals such as strict efficiency, the competitive process in itself, 
                                                     
4
 See Jones and Sufrin (2014) 22-30. The precise boundaries of Chicago School and other US doctrinal 
currents are not relevant for the present research. What is important is the emphasis on economic analysis 
and the debate over goals, demonstrated by the fact that these were the two points addressed by Bork 
(1993) 426 in the epilogue to the second edition of the seminal The Antitrust Paradox. See also the 
description of the Chicago School by Odudu (2010) 601, focusing on goals and micro economics. 
5
 Bork (1993) 50. 
6
 Bork (1993) 72. 
7
 See Bork (1993) 79. 
8
 For example, Monti (2007) 3 argues for a plurality of goals and Townley (2009) 1 defends the 
consideration of public policy, both starting their arguments by quoting the above passage from Bork. 
9
 See Blair and Sokol (2012) 47. 
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favouring small and medium enterprises, or public policy concerns like the environment 
or employment.
10
 There is agreement across the board, however, that the debate should 
be based around economically projected outcomes. Solving the ‘uncertainty concerning 
what competition is’ would therefore depend on settling the debate on goals, as Odudu 
states, thereby avoiding the current state of the law where ‘[p]ractices with similar 
economic consequences seem to receive dissimilar treatment’.11 
In this perspective, it is easy to see why the doctrine has overlooked the role of intent: 
when similar economic consequences are treated dissimilarly, it is diagnosed as a 
mismatch of goals. Such discrepancies, of course, are not always due to intent. To the 
extent that actual incoherence in the application of the law was ironed out, the approach 
marrying goals and effects has been beneficial. Like in the US, this approach has 
revealed that competition law is a powerful instrument to achieve positive societal 
outcomes, and ignited a healthy debate on what those should be. It has further 
highlighted the consequences of enforcement and pushed administrative authorities 
towards principled, reasoned and transparent policies. Nonetheless, it is submitted that 
this approach has shown its limits in the EU. The success that it has had as a driver for 
the ‘modernisation’ of the European Commission (‘Commission’) has not been 
replicated as a device for interpreting the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU 
(‘Court’). As will be developed throughout this research, similar economic 
consequences – which should therefore raise no conflict of goals – continue to be 
treated dissimilarly. For example, the case law of the Court prompts the following 
questions (which can be sketched out leaving the corresponding judgments for more 
detailed treatment below), based on the similarity of the effects involved: 
- Why is market sharing allowed within the structure of a non-dominant 
undertaking, but not across a network of distributors? 
- Why is privately communicating a price to a competitor prohibited, but publicly 
announcing it allowed? 
- Why are cartels prohibited and oligopolies allowed, when both lead to the same 
market consequences? 
- Why are price-fixing agreements which cannot produce effects prohibited, but 
unsuccessful attempts at price-leading allowed? 
- Why are purchasing cooperatives allowed, but not buyer-side cartels? 
                                                     
10
 See Jones and Sufrin (2014) 38-52. 
11
 Odudu (2006) 3. 
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- Why can inefficient undertakings be priced out of the market, but not boycotted 
out of the market? 
- Why is a dominant undertaking prohibited from certain actions when it does not 
use its market power and therefore, in that regard, it is equal to other 
undertakings? 
- Why is the acquisition of productive infrastructure from another undertaking 
subject to merger control, but not market acquisition or internal development? 
- Why are dominant undertakings prohibited from refusing to supply competitors 
that are existing customers, but not ex novo customers? 
- Why are dominant undertakings prohibited from excluding inefficient 
competitors through below-cost prices, but not through above-cost prices? 
- Why can an undertaking refuse to market a product in a given Member State, but 
not refuse to supply distributors there in order to prevent parallel trade? 
 
As will also be seen, the established view in the doctrine that anti-competitive 
behaviour depends on effects can only provide the following two answers: either the 
situation concerns a ‘jurisdictional’ condition of Articles 101 and 102, separated from a 
substantive assessment, or the situation is tainted by ‘formalism’, whereby an undue 
presumption of effects is applied. It is argued that these answers are unsatisfactory. The 
first implies that the Court casts its net randomly, by establishing arbitrary distinctions 
in the scope of Articles 101 and 102. The second asserts that the Court does not know 
what it is fishing for, by consistently enforcing flawed presumptions. A goal-orientated 
approach would recognise that, ‘jurisdictional’ or ‘formal’ as they may be, those 
situations are not treated equally according to their economic consequences and should 
therefore be corrected accordingly. Yet, these situations remain present and visible in 
the case law of the Court. This research will hold that such situations are not exceptions 
to be corrected, but interpretations to be understood. As such, the present research will 
be mostly descriptive, showing how judgments of intent run across the different 
conditions of Articles 101 and 102. There is no normative claim that this is preferable to 
judgments of effects, which run in parallel and explain other questions of EU 
competition law, beyond the assertion that the continued role attributed to intent – in 
particular when faced with such doctrinal hostility – is necessary for the coherence and 
stability of the case law. 
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Scope, methodology and outline 
 
Due to the present research attempting a horizontal analysis of the role of intent in EU 
competition law, it is necessary to make some limitations purely in order for its scope to 
fit within administrable research limits. These limitations are expressed in the research 
sub-title of ‘the judicial assessment of anti-competitive strategies’. The first one, related 
to a judicial assessment, means that the research will focus upon the most significant 
case law of the Court on the interpretation and application of Articles 101 and 102 as of 
July 2014.
12
 The first instance case law of the General Court of the EU (‘General 
Court’) will therefore only be analysed insofar as it may contribute to the interpretation 
of the case law of the Court, otherwise being considered as yet-unconfirmed statements 
of the law.
13
 For the same reasons, the case law of courts of Member States will not be 
analysed. The decisional practice of the Commission will also not be analysed, despite 
its central importance for the practical application of Articles 101 and 102, since it 
represents no authoritative statement of the law. However, the contrast between the 
administrative and judicial assessments of anti-competitive strategies is relevant to the 
present research. Due to the already mentioned research limitations, this administrative 
assessment will be described with reference to Commission policy statements whenever 
relevant for the analysis of the case law. 
Secondly, this research will not consider the role of intent in all of the requisite 
conditions for the application of Articles 101 and 102. In particular, market definition 
and the condition of affecting trade between Member States will not be analysed due to 
their eminently objective character.
14
 Additionally, the conditions for public and private 
enforcement of those provisions will not be considered. In this regard, it must be 
underlined that the present research does not cover the so-called ‘sanctioning question’ 
governing the conditions for the attribution of liability for the infringement of Articles 
101 and 102 to concrete legal or natural persons. Notably, the reference in Article 23(1) 
and (2) of Regulation 1/2003 to fining undertakings that commit infringements 
                                                     
12
 See, in particular, the case law under Articles 263 and 266. 
13
 See Article 256. Although the absence of an appeal of General Court judgments may preclude further 
challenges to the act, no point on the interpretation of Articles 101 and 102 is ever precluded from being 
brought before the Court on another occasion. 
14
 Although, as the present research against a separation between ‘jurisdictional’ and substantive 
conditions, it is possible that the condition of affecting trade between Member States is influenced or 
influences the finding of restrictions of competition or abuses of dominance involving market integration, 
a question which this research will not be able to develop. 
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‘intentionally or negligently’ belongs to such ‘sanctioning question’.15 This research 
will only address the main substantive conditions for an infringement derived from the 
letter of Articles 101 and 102. The difference between these substantive conditions and 
the ‘sanctioning question’ can be exemplified by the fact that, as will be seen in Chapter 
I (on the concept of intent), it is irrelevant for the substantive infringement whether the 
undertaking had knowledge of illegality but such knowledge might influence whether 
the infringement is qualified as intentional or negligent. Thus it is possible to find a 
substantive infringement based on intent, but subsequently find that such infringement 
was committed negligently or even exempt it from fines based on legitimate 
expectations.
16
 To what extent the intent required for a substantive infringement is 




The scope of the present research will also be affected by methodological concerns 
stemming from the reference to authors and theory outside EU competition law, namely 
national law, legal theory, moral philosophy and psychology. These references must be 
limited to their usefulness for analysing the case law. Those domains are just as prone to 
controversy, and it is not intended to propose solutions nor make the claims of the 
present research dependent on such solutions. Therefore, only basic and relatively 
consensual positions will be referenced. When the case law might reflect an underlying 
debate, an attempt will be made to mention several perspectives on this debate. This is 
particularly the case for moral philosophy, which as mentioned below has long engaged 
in the debate on whether behaviour should be judged according to its intention or 
effects. This research will provide the same basic detail that moral philosophy provides 
when using legal examples. What will be considered important is that these references 
outside EU competition law can be easily and intuitively grasped, as this represents 
their best contribution to reading the case law. The purpose is neither to attempt a 
‘realist’ analysis of psychological judicial decision-making, namely how the intuitions 
behind the use of intent represent emotional or unconscious processes. This research is 
                                                     
15
 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty OJ L 1 4.1.2003 p.1 (‘Regulation 1/2003’). 
16
 See Case 27/76 United Brands [1978] ECR 207 298-301 and Case C-681/11 Schenker [2013] ECR nyr 
40-41. 
17
 A discrepancy would explain why the concept of intent in EU competition law does not coincide with 
national criminal law, as analysed in Chapter I (on the concept of intent), despite the fact that EU 
competition law sanctions can be classified as criminal under the European Convention on Human Rights, 
see Jones and Sufrin (2014) 934-938. There is no necessary link between a type of intent and criminal 
sanctions, as even national criminal law may adopt strict liability, see Ashworth (2009) 160-170.  
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only concerned with the interpretation of Articles 101 and 102 as expressed and 
reasoned in accepted legal forms. 
The present research can be outlined as follows. The first two chapters will set out the 
theoretical framework to be applied. Chapter I will define the concept of intent as the 
interpretation of an undertaking’s behaviour as that of a rational agent. This is necessary 
to understand the instances, outlined here and developed in subsequent chapters, where 
intent is given legal relevance. Chapter II will consider how intent is judged, 
separating the subordination to effects from the normative value attributed to intent 
under the principles of EU competition law. This chapter will be mostly descriptive, as 
judgments broader than consequentialism will be shown to exist, but will also introduce 
the normative claim of this research: that such broad judgments, based on intent, are 
essential for the stability of EU competition law. The next chapters will then apply this 
theoretical framework to three main substantive conditions of Articles 101 and 102, 
developing the descriptive claim that intent can be used to better explain the case law 
than effects. Chapter III will describe how the notion of collusion under Article 101 
represents influence over independent economic action. This shows how infringements 
of Article 101 are fundamentally based on a negative judgement of the intent to exercise 
such influence. Chapter IV will analyse the notion of restriction of competition under 
Article 101, being mainly dedicated to demonstrating that restrictions by object are 
moral judgment of intent in its context. Therefore, to the intent necessary for finding 
collusion must be added the effects captured in restrictions by effect or the intent 
corresponding to the different negative judgments of restrictions by object. Chapter V 
will describe how the notion of abuse of dominance joins these two steps, starting from 
intent which is considered different from normal competition and then applying tests of 
intent or effects under specific abuses. The Conclusion will highlight the non-
consequentialist character of EU competition law, and return to the normative claim that 
the use of intent is necessary to preserve this character.   
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CHAPTER I 
The concept of intent 
 
 
This chapter will define ‘intent’, for the purposes of EU competition law, as ‘an 
undertaking’s legally relevant decision to act on its beliefs and desires’. ‘Intent’ and 
‘intention’ are not usually distinguished, but will be so in the present research. Intent 
will be treated as a legal concept, intention as an interpretative one. Intention is 
classically understood as answering the question ‘why?’ by giving a reason for a certain 
action.
18
 Intention will be defined as ‘a decision to act on beliefs and desires’ which, as 
can be seen, differs from the definition of intent by omitting the reference to legal 
relevance. Under this logic, intent could be defined as ‘an undertaking’s legally relevant 
intention’. This means that if an intention is legally irrelevant under Articles 101 and 
102 there is no intent. Because of this, intent is only defined in relation to undertakings 
(as the only legally relevant agents in EU competition law). Moreover, because of its 
legal nature, intent requires evidence to the requisite legal standard, an issue treated 
below in some detail. Nevertheless, before questions of legal relevance are treated it is 
first necessary to interpret what is that undertakings intend, the mentioned ‘decision to 
act on beliefs and desires’. This definition represents the application of the ‘intentional 
stance’, which interprets actions as if the agent was motivated by beliefs and desires.19 It 
is empirically-confirmed that such interpretation is the way people make sense of 
everyday behaviour.
20
 This chapter will take the fact that the ‘intentional stance’ is 
applied to rational agents to argue that it can also be applied to undertakings. 
As will be seen in this chapter, many of the misgivings about intent in EU competition 
law are due to mixing the interpretation of intention, the situations where intention 
becomes legally relevant, and the evidence required for this. These misgivings are 
reflected in the doctrinal qualification of ‘subjective intent’ or ‘objective intent’ (or 
intention, since authors do not distinguish between intention and intent).
21
 As this 
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 See Anscombe (1963) 9. 
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 See Dennet (2009) 1. 
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 See Malle and Knobe (1997) 102. 
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 Some authors use the dichotomy of ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’, see Akman (2013) 4, Bavasso (2005) 
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chapter will show, such qualifications are best avoided. Although intention is 
undoubtedly ‘subjective’, this qualification is further assumed by authors to mean that 
intention is defined and exhausted in a ‘state of mind’. However, as mentioned, 
intention results from the ‘objective’ interpretation of an action under the ‘intentional 
stance’ as that of a rational agent. This interpretation naturally incorporates accounts of 
a ‘state of mind’, which must be coherent with the action or else be discarded. As such, 
there can be no ‘subjective’ intention relying solely on a ‘state of mind’ and its 
accounts. The qualifications of ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ intention are misleading, 
since ‘subjective’ is implied in intention and ‘objective’ in the interpretation. 
Furthermore, in what concerns the legal relevance of intention, it will be seen that it 
must be implemented in order to fall within the scope of Articles 101 and 102. Those 
provisions do not prohibit decisions to act that are not carried through to a significant 
degree. Intent must always manifest itself in some ‘objective’ way, namely as an 
agreement or abusive conduct capable of producing effects.
22
 Therefore, there if 
intention is ‘subjective’, in the sense of non-implemented, it is irrelevant for EU 
competition law. The distinction between ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ intention could 
perhaps be useful to differentiate between evidence of the undertakings’ behaviour, used 
to interpret actions objectively, and internal documentation and statements, as accounts 
of a ‘state of mind’. However, this risks being misread as different substantive notions 
of intent.
23
 As discussed below, all evidence goes to the objective interpretation of the 
action, including internal documentation and statements. Thus, the Court has stated that 
internal documentation is also ‘objective’.24 Furthermore, it will also be described 
below how the qualification of ‘subjective’ is used to signal beliefs and desires which 
are not legally relevant.
25
 Therefore, it is preferable to refer to external and internal 
evidence instead of ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ intention. 
This chapter will discuss how the case law has precluded such a clear definition of 
intent. First, the Court has resorted to a multitude of subjective terms without clarifying 
their meaning, such as ‘common intent’, ‘aims’, ‘purpose’, ‘intention’, ‘objectives’, 
‘subjective intention’, ‘object’ (differently from the letter of Article 101), ‘business 
                                                     
22
 All the forms of collusion stated in Article 101 will be referred to as ‘agreement’ in this chapter.  
23
 See Nazzini (2011) 58. 
24
 See Case C-202/07 P France Télécom [2009] ECR I-2369 96. 
25
 See Case C-209/07 BIDS [2008] ECR I-8637 21. 
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strategy’, ‘motives’, ‘intent’, ‘economic objective’ and ‘plan’.26 Second, the Court has 
made contradictory statements about the value of intent, namely stating that ‘subjective 
intention’ is irrelevant but then finding a restriction by object by referring multiple 
times to what was ‘intended’, or declaring that abuse of dominance is an ‘objective 
concept’ but then allowing it to be established based on ‘subjective factors’.27 Third, the 
Court’s rationalisation that intention is not necessary to find an infringement of Articles 
101 and 102, but can be ‘taken into account’, flies in the face of the demands, also 
formulated by the Court, that the ‘objectives’ of agreements and the ‘business strategy’ 
of dominant undertakings must necessarily be examined.
28
 Throughout the present 
research, and not only in the present chapter, it will be seen that flawed conceptual 
definition is the main obstacle for the doctrine’s analysis of the role of intent. It is all 
too easy for authors to read the Court’s dismissive statements literally, particularly to 
support calls for an ‘effects-based approach’ to EU competition law, while at the same 
time ignoring that intent is being used under its many terminological guises. 
The case law is a Gordian knot of multiple expressions and contradictory statements 
which can only be cut through by a conceptual definition which clearly separates the 
interpretation of intention from its legal relevance. Only after interpretation and legal 
relevance have been addressed can the true value of intent under Articles 101 and 102 
be dealt with in the corresponding chapters. As such, this chapter will first discuss 
interpretation: how the application of the ‘intentional stance’ to undertakings dispenses 
with a search for their ‘state of mind’, how economic rationality is used to interpret 
credible strategies by undertakings, and how the purpose of agreements and abusive 
conduct reflects undertakings’ intention instead of being able to be interpreted 
independently, as the case law as misguidedly done (1.). The chapter will then consider 
the legal relevance of intention: how the only general condition for such relevance is 
implementation, assessed as the capability to produce the desired effects, and how any 
particular decisions, beliefs and desires are legally relevant or irrelevant depending on 
the application of Articles 101 and 102 (2.). Once interpretation and legal relevance are 
properly dealt with, the evidentiary aspect will fall into place without requiring its own 
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analysis, with the case law that intention is not necessary but can be taken into account 




1. The interpretation of intent 
 
This section will define intent as the object of ‘folk psychology’, which is used in 
making sense of people’s everyday actions. In general, this everyday interpretation of 
intention does not differ from the one in a legal context. It will be shown that this is also 
the case with the interpretation of undertakings’ intention in EU competition law. An 
interpretation based on ‘folk psychology’ is the most important methodological fact 
about the use of intent by the case law, trumping statements about the value of intent 
and the issuing distinctions between ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ intent. A useful starting 
point for understanding such interpretation is the definition of intentional actions by 
Anscombe as those that satisfy a certain sense of the question ‘why’.30 Speaks provides 
three possible senses for Anscombe’s question: 
‘1. Evidential: “They’re serving french fries in the cafeteria.” “Why?” “That’s what 
the sign said.” 
2. Causal: “And then the lights in the house all went out.” “Why?” “We blew a 
fuse.” 
3. Reason-giving: “Suddenly, he left lecture and went back to his office.” “Why?” 
“He needed more coffee.”’.31 
Only in the last sense, of attributing a purpose, will an action be intentional. These 
examples can be adapted in order to give an idea of how they would apply to the 
interpretation of intent in EU competition law. Again, only the sense of reason-giving is 
relevant for determining intent: 
                                                     
29
 Akman (2014) 42, Melícias (2010) 578 and Posner (2001) 214 argue that evidence of intent can be 
manipulated by legally sophisticated actors, but they presuppose that intent corresponds to a ‘state of 
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 See Anscombe (1963) 9.  
31
 Speaks (2004) 5. 
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1. Evidential: ‘The cartel members all raised their prices to the same level.’ ‘Why?’ 
‘That’s what the members’ internal documentation said they would do.’ 
2. Causal: ‘The dominant undertaking’s products were offered together.’ ‘Why?’ ‘Its 
commercial department instructed sellers to do so.’ 
3. Reason-giving: ‘The dominant undertaking’s products were priced below cost.’ 
‘Why?’ ‘It wanted to harm its competitors’. 
As noted above, the Court has stated that expressions of intention, such as internal 
documentation, are not necessary to establish an infringement but can be taken into 
account. This section will show that the question ‘why?’ could just as well be answered 
evidentially without resorting to internal documentation, for example ‘the cartel 
members all met before’. As for a causal answer, the example given conveys that an 
undertaking’s internal processes are not particularly useful in interpreting its intention, 
the same way that a person’s intention is hard to describe through neural activity.32 
Therefore, the pretension to capture an undertaking’s ‘state of mind’ as a reflection of 
an internal process should be set aside. The exercise of reason-giving only requires the 
interpretation of the undertaking’s action. 
Therefore, this section will begin by describing how the expressions used by the Court 
correspond to ‘folk psychology’, which people use to identify and explain intentional 
actions in their everyday life – in other words, to answer the question ‘why’ (i). It will 
then frame this as the application of the ‘intentional stance’, which considers intention 
as an agent’s decision to act on its beliefs and desires, and confirm that it also extends to 
undertakings (ii). Next, it will develop how undertakings’ intention is interpreted using 
economic rationality, namely how their beliefs and desires are attributed and linked into 
credible strategies (iii). The case law separation between the purpose of agreements and 
abusive conduct, on the one hand, and the intention of undertakings, on the other, will 
then be described in order to conclude that such agreements and abusive conduct are 
intentionally designed by undertakings, and thus cannot be interpreted independently 
from undertakings’ beliefs and desires (iv). Finally, the reason for the separation in the 
case law will be traced to the misapplication of legal interpretation to actions by private 
parties, since the purpose of normative acts can indeed by independent from their public 
law authors (v). 
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i. ‘Folk psychology’ 
 
When the Court uses subjective expressions such as ‘aims’, ‘intention’, ‘objectives’, etc. 
with no further definition, it appears to give them the same meaning they have in 
normal, everyday situations. These so-called ‘mentalist’ expressions betray the use of 
‘folk psychology’, which is the way people understand, explain and predict the 
behaviour of other people.
33
 People distinguish between intentional and unintentional 
actions, with pervasive social consequences in relation to helping behaviour, aggression, 
relationship conflict, and judgments of responsibility, blame or punishment.
34
 ‘Folk 
psychology’ considers intention in terms of beliefs and desires, notably the desire for an 
outcome and the appropriate beliefs on how the act would lead to the outcome.
35
 The 
idea that intention is constituted by beliefs and desires has a philosophical pedigree that 
can be traced to Aristotle, its use ranging from Hume’s arguments for putting reason to 
the service of passion to the hyper-rational formulations of von Neumann and 
Morgensterns’ game-theory.36 The appeal of ‘folk psychology’ comes from the 
inescapable observation that people make sense of each other by simply observing their 
actions and conjecturing about their intention. With no more knowledge than the one we 
apparently are all provided with, each member of mankind is able (or at least does put it 
beyond his or her capabilities) to interpret another’s intention.37 As Dennet describes in 
relation to observing another person’s behaviour, ‘[s]o natural and effortless are [‘folk 
psychology’s’] interpretations that it is almost impossible to supress them’.38 
It must be underlined that ‘folk psychology’, namely the interpretation of the intention 
behind an action in terms of beliefs and desires, is an empirically-proven phenomenon. 
It has been investigated and tested when children first develop a so-called ‘theory of 
mind’, that is to say, when they attribute beliefs and desires.39 However, the relationship 
of ‘folk psychology’ to psychology and other mind sciences is ambiguous. Although it 
is certain that ‘folk psychology’ is how people make sense of each other, it is also clear 
that it is a layman’s view which does not apply the scientific method. Hence, the 
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expressions ‘aims’, ‘intention’, ‘objectives’, etc. were qualified above as ‘mentalist’ 
since they do not actually correspond to how the mind works. This is best explained by 
the comparison with ‘folk physics’.40 People have natural expectations about the 
behaviour of middle-sized objects in a normal environment, which has allowed mankind 
to keep warm, manipulate objects and avoid injuries for thousands of years without 
scientific knowledge of physics. However, ‘folk physics’ has trouble anticipating 
unintuitive phenomena (such as sailing upwind) and relies on simplifications which 
sometimes are not true (such as the ‘centre of gravity’ of objects). Therefore, ‘folk 
physics’ and ‘folk psychology’ are useful in showing how certain phenomena are 
perceived, not how they scientifically work.
41
 This is nonetheless usually sufficient – 
indeed necessary – for everyday life and therefore socially understood and accepted. 
‘Folk psychology’ is also employed whenever the law requires an interpretation of 
intention.
42
 Lawyers, judges and juries routinely attribute intentions composed of beliefs 
and desires without any scientific assistance or special behavioural training. However, 
intent has a particular importance for criminal law which does not fully correspond to 
‘folk psychology’. Because the doctrine and jurisprudence have dedicated much 
attention to the notion of intent in criminal law, such notion tends to influence other 
fields of law despite its very particular assumptions. In criminal law, intention is often 
described as a ‘state of mind’.43 Criminal law attempts to capture a precise picture of all 
the occurrences at the time when an offence is committed and, in relation to intention, 
this is seen as establishing psychological states. In the vast majority of the situations, 
‘folk psychology’ proves up to the task by acting in the usual manner of interpreting 
intention from actions.
44
 Nonetheless, criminal law’s objective of capturing an actual 
‘state of mind’ overshadows the importance of ‘folk psychology’. 
The non-scientific status of ‘folk psychology’ makes it appear as a second-best 
approach to the standard of proof required in criminal law. It is true that only 
psychology can provide a scientific description of a ‘state of mind’. Nonetheless, 
intention in criminal offences is usually described in their everyday meaning in order to 
benefit from social understanding and acceptation.
45
 Therefore, the use of psychological 
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evidence (such as expert testimony) is exceptional, and even then it must conform to the 
‘mentalist’ framework established by ‘folk psychology’. Criminal law may however 
adopt a technical conception of intention which is at odds with ‘folk psychology’. 
Notably, in some cases intention requires the certainty of a consequence when a high 
probability suffices for ‘folk psychology’.46 Criminal law also has difficulties in dealing 
with the ‘folk psychology’ attribution of intention in the ‘double effect’ situations 
discussed in Chapter II (on judging intent).
47
 Without the support of ‘folk psychology’, 
criminal law is forced to attempt to establish a ‘state of mind’ instead of simply 
interpreting an action. Those situations naturally receive a disproportionate amount of 
doctrinal and jurisprudential attention, but it must however be remembered that they 
remain exceptional. 
A conjunction of circumstances has led to the adoption by certain authors in EU 
competition law of a radical conception of intent which rejects ‘folk psychology’. It 
begins with the influence of criminal law on US antitrust, where intent is also defined as 
a ‘state of mind’.48 Thus, Akman, Melícias and Nazzini all refer to US doctrine in 
asserting that intent corresponds to a ‘state of mind’.49 However, these authors then 
reject the position of US doctrine that so-called ‘objective’ intent can be interpreted 
from the action, as ‘folk psychology’ typically does, reasoning that if intent is a ‘state of 
mind’ it can only be ‘subjective’. Melícias and Nazzini argue that interpreting intent 
from an action, in particular in light of the desire to produce certain effects, is in reality 
an inquiry into those effects.
50
 Akman goes further, and declares that ‘if external factors 
are used merely to interpret the conduct of the undertaking, this in itself would not be an 
intent inquiry’.51 For these authors, only internal documentation can reveal an 
undertaking’s ‘state of mind’.52 This is an attempt to differentiate the interpretation of 
intent from a substantive test of anti-competitive effects which, as discussed below, has 
some merit. Nonetheless, as an epistemological claim that intent cannot be interpreted 
from actions, it is patently false.
53
 It is disproved by the everyday application of ‘folk 
psychology’ and its legal application by criminal law, by US antitrust and, as developed 
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next, by EU competition law. It is worth quoting Anscombe’s position in relation to 
interpreting intention from an internal ‘state of mind’ as opposed to interpreting it from 
actions: 
‘[we may] think that if we want to know a man’s intentions it is into the contents of 
his mind, and only into these, that we must enquire; and hence, that if we wish to 
understand what intention is, we must be investigating something whose existence 
is purely in the sphere of the mind; and that although intention issues in actions, and 
the way this happens also presents interesting questions, still what physically takes 
place, i.e. what a man actually does, is the very last thing we need consider in our 
enquiry. Whereas I wish to say that it is the first’.54 
 
ii. Applying the ‘intentional stance’ to undertakings 
 
It is a well observed phenomenon that folk psychology’ is not limited to people: a 
‘theory of mind’ is also often applied to animals and inanimate objects, that is to say, 
they are attributed beliefs and desires. In other words, one may say that a dog wants a 
bone, or that a computer knows that it is turned on. There are two ways to consider this. 
The first is that these are just metaphors, since animals and objects do not possess the 
human capability to have beliefs and desires.
55
 The second is that, whether or not people 
are involved, ‘folk psychology’ applies an interpretative strategy called the ‘intentional 
stance’. According to Dennet, the ‘intentional stance’ consists in ‘interpreting the 
behaviour of an entity (person, animal, artifact, whatever) by treating it as if it were a 
rational agent who governed its choice of action by a consideration of its beliefs and 
desires’.56 This is contrasted with other interpretative strategies, the ‘physical stance’ 
and the ‘design stance’. The ‘physical stance’ is used to interpret and predict behaviour 
according to physical sciences, for example the manipulation of inanimate objects.
57
 
Resorting to physical sciences can however be bypassed by applying the ‘design 
stance’: instead of investigating how a machine works, for example, one can simply 
assume ‘that an entity is designed as I suppose it to be, and that it will operate according 
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to that design’.58 The relevant question for EU competition law purposes is whether any 
of these interpretative strategies applies to undertakings. 
It will be argued that the ‘intentional stance’ applies to an undertaking insofar as it is 
treated as an agent ‘with beliefs and desires and enough rationality to do what it ought 
to do given those beliefs and desires’.59 The advantages of the ‘intentional stance’ have 
been exemplified by Dennet with computer chess programs: the ‘physical stance’ could 
be used for their electronic functioning, or the ‘design stance’ for their lines of code, but 
it is much easier to interpret the moves of a computer chess program by treating it as a 
rational agent who knows how to play and wants to win.
60
 The ‘intentional stance’ has 
been recognised to apply to natural and legal persons, which under the case law can 
constitute undertakings if engaged in economic activity.
61
 Therefore, it is a small step to 
apply the ‘intentional stance’ also to undertakings. This does not preclude the 
application of the ‘design stance’: insofar as undertakings are defined in relation to the 
exercise of economic activity, they can be said to be ‘designed’ for this purpose.62 As 
such, the ‘design stance’ can be applied to exclude non-economic acts, like ultra vires 
acts can be struck down in company law, without pondering any beliefs or desires. The 
‘design stance’ is also instrumental in the analysis of effects of practices, as commented 
below. Nonetheless, when the focus is on the undertaking’s actions, the finer 
interpretation of the ‘intentional stance’ is required. 
That the ‘intentional stance’ applies to undertakings can be confirmed by looking at its 
defining characteristic: it abstracts from how agents arrive at their decisions. Dennet 
describes that the ‘intentional stance’ ‘is not directly a theory of the internal 
mechanisms that accomplish the roughly rational guidance thereby predicted’.63 As 
such, it does not require a psychological or neural analysis when applied to people, the 
same way it dismisses a corporate law or managerial analysis when applied to 
companies. It simply assumes that the decisions of both natural and legal persons will 
be an expression of their rationally. Undertakings are defined in relation to their 
economic activity, regardless of their legal character, in order to achieve the abstraction 
provided by the ‘intentional stance’. Therefore, once several entities are integrated 
under an undertaking, their internal relationships are irrelevant for interpreting that 
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undertaking’s behaviour (although they might be relevant, as noted above, for 
subsequently sanctioning each of these entities). 
The abstraction provided by the ‘intentional stance’ dispenses with the notion of 
intention as a literal ‘state of mind’. Akman, misled by this notion, comments that: 
‘in the case of undertakings which have no thoughts of their own but have agents 
acting on their behalf, one would have to decide on a case-by-case basis whose 
intent is the relevant intent. This would not be in line with the principle of legal 
certainty as the undertakings would not be able to know in advance whose 
expressions of intent will be considered to be the intent of the undertaking unless 
this was specifically regulated ex ante’.64 
Contrary to what Akman argues, the problem of ‘whose intent is the relevant intent’ 
does not need specific regulation because it is dealt with interpretively.
65
 Since agents 
are acting on behalf of the undertaking and are therefore part of it, they are as relevant 
as the neurons from which a person’s intention originates. Despite positing that 
undertakings have ‘no thoughts of their own’, Akman also ends up by applying the 
‘intentional stance’ when inquiring how undertakings would ‘be able to know’. As an 
interpretative strategy, the application of the ‘intentional stance’ depends on its success, 
that is to say, whether something is ‘usefully and voluminously predictable’ by using 
it.
66
 As will be seen next, treating undertakings as rational agents engaged in economic 
activity is, to all indications, the default position of case law and the doctrine. 
Through the ‘intentional stance’, an undertaking’s intention (as that of any other agent) 
can be defined as the ‘decision to act on its beliefs and desires’. The attribution beliefs 
and desires take place naturally once the relevant parameters for undertakings are 
internalised. Although this attribution can be said to follow some rules, these should not 
be seen as strict theory but as practical reasoning. In relation to beliefs, Dennet 
comments that exposure is normally the sufficient condition for knowing about 
something.
67
 If necessary, beliefs can be narrowed down by the rule which attributes ‘all 
the truths relevant to the [agent’s] interests (or desires) that [its] experience to date has 
made available’.68 As such, it is not difficult to attribute most beliefs related to an 
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undertaking’s economic activity, in particular those relevant to the markets on which it 
is active, such as its productive infrastructure, consumer preferences and competing 
offers. In TeliaSonera the Court stated that, as a rule, an undertaking knows its own 
costs but not those of its competitors, which can only be explained by not being exposed 
to the internal information of competitors.
69
 
In essence, undertakings are attributed the beliefs they ‘ought to have’, and the same 
holds true for desires.
70
 If necessary, desires can also be narrowed down by Dennet’s 
rule of attributing ‘desires for those things [an agent] believes to be good for it’.71 
Undertakings are not defined in relation to making a profit, but it is generally assumed 
that they are interested in exercising (and continuing to exercise) their economic 
activity.
72
 Desires to cover costs, to sell production and to have a favourable 
competitive position can therefore also be attributed with no difficulty. This provides a 
framework for interpreting the bulk of the market behaviour, in particular that which 
reacts to consumer demand and competitive conditions. Thus, in T-Mobile, the Court 
referred to the presumption that undertakings will take advantage of the information 
exchanged with their competitors, which equates to attributing the corresponding desire 






The present research, as stated in its Introduction, will focus on anti-competitive 
strategies, which highlight the role of (economic) rationality in the application of the 
‘intentional stance’ to undertakings. Dennet formulates a rule promoting an interplay 
between beliefs and desires which attributes ‘desires for those things [an agent] believes 
to be the best means to other ends it desires’.74 The reference to means and ends is 
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indicative of a plan or strategy, expressions which, as remarked above, the Court has 
employed in relation to intention. The notion of ‘strategy’ will as such be used in 
relation to a particular type of intent which links means to ends, either within the same 
decision or across several decisions.
75
 Interpreting a strategy requires employing 
rationality to assess these connections. 
The essence of the ‘intentional stance’ is to treat agents as rational. Considering that 
undertakings are defined in relation to their economic activity, this naturally involves 
the consideration of economic rationality. Some anti-competitive strategies may only be 
understood in light of economic rationality, not conventional rationality, for example 
the usefulness of below-cost pricing for harming competitors. This may require the use 
of economic science, the same way that criminal law resorts to psychology in order to 
establish some states of mind. However, it should be remembered that economic 
rationality is a variety of the rationality used in everyday ‘folk psychology’.76 As 
Dennet states, ‘[o]ne starts with the ideal of perfect rationality and revises downwards 
as circumstances dictate’.77 Therefore, the use lower ‘folk psychology’ in relation to the 
intention of undertakings is not precluded, since what is important is to interpret the 
decision and not assess its perfect economic rationality.
78
 
It is generally recognised that economic rationality applies to the interpretation of 
strategies in EU competition law, but this is sometimes mixed with a finding that such 
strategies are anti-competitive. Under Article 102, it has been considered whether to 
apply a ‘profit sacrifice test’ or a ‘no economic sense test’ to finding an abuse of 
dominance.
79
 The ‘profit sacrifice test’ starts by attributing the desire not to sacrifice 
profits, and attempts to rationally deduct if the decision to incur such a sacrifice is 
intended to exclude competition. The ‘no economic sense test’ asks whether any 
decision, profit sacrificing or not, can only be rationally explained by the intent to 
exclude competition. These tests have been criticised as overly broad, since they capture 
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some forms of exclusion that are pro-competitive. Akman criticises more generally that 
undertakings usually act rationally, and therefore ‘an analogy with the “reasonable 
person” and similar tests […] is not helpful in distinguishing bad intentions from good 
intentions’.80 Nevertheless, such tests have been applied by the Court and referred to by 
the Commission.
81
 This shows that they are useful in interpreting certain strategies.
82
 It 
is true that, as Nazzini also notes, the interpretation of intent should not be conflated 
with finding behaviour anti-competitive.
83
 However, this also means that the 
interpretation of intent cannot be criticised for being overly broad and capturing pro-
competitive behaviour, since what matters is the substantive test applied to intent.
84
 
The consideration of intent as a strategy to achieve certain outcomes nevertheless 
straddles the frontier with effects analysis. It is important to note that, as developed in 
Chapter II (on judging intent), the reasons for finding a strategy anti-competitive may 
be different from the ones for finding effects, even if the strategy is directed at 
achieving such effects. Thus, what is decisive is whether behaviour is considered anti-
competitive based on intent or effects. That being said, insofar as interpretation is 
concerned, a credible strategy to reach a certain outcome is similar to an effects 
analysis. To begin with, they both consider the economic and legal context. Although a 
strategy is limited to the context which an undertaking knows, as remarked above the 
majority of relevant market information can be attributed to undertakings (with the 
exception of competitors’ internal information). This explains why restrictions by object 
and effect under Article 101 both require an analysis of context, as discussed in Chapter 
IV (on restrictions of competition), even though only restrictions by object are based on 
intent. 
A credible strategy also requires the capability to produce the desired effects, which is 
often confused with effects analysis. The Court will often refer to effects in its 
reasoning, and only careful reading will show that it is referring to the purpose of the 
strategy and not investigating if effects actually take place. For example, in Consten and 
Grundig the Court appears to describe the effects of the agreement when it states that it 
‘results in the isolation of the French market and makes it possible to charge for the 
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products in question prices which are sheltered from all effective competition’.85 
Nonetheless, these considerations prove to be theoretical, since in the following 
paragraph the Court rejects analysing ‘economic data’, namely prices differences 
between Member States.
86
 Without such data there is no way of knowing if prices were 
‘sheltered from all effective competition’.87 The point of Consten and Grundig, as the 




A strategy’s capability to produce effects is assessed in light of rational expectation 
while the analysis of effects is factual. However, the differences might again not be 
substantial due to the assumptions of market knowledge. As discussed below, the 
capability to produce effects is the standard for legally relevant implementation, and 
rarely is it argued that an agreement or abusive conduct did not go according to plan and 
were incapable of producing effects. It will be argued in Chapter V (on abuse of 
dominance) that this standard of implementation can lead to confusion when the 
capability to produce effects is also adopted as the standard for anti-competitive effects 
under Article 102. Nonetheless, not all strategies capable of producing an effect actually 
desire to do so or, more importantly, go about it in the same way. The purpose of the 
interpretation of strategies is precisely to go beyond the capability to produce effects. 
Another issue concerns the integration of undertakings’ accounts into the interpretation 
of strategies. Once more, it is rationality which serves as the interpretative criteria. 
Dennet comments that, on the one hand, language enables the formulation of varied and 
highly specific desires, but on the other hand, language might also commit oneself to 
more stringent conditions than if the desires were left unexpressed.
89
 The verbalisation 
of strategies certainly provides a helpful framing device. In this line, Hutto proposes 
that ‘folk psychology’ is best viewed as ‘narrative practice’, with rationality organising 
events in order to provide the explanation of actions (which might not be available by 
logical deduction from beliefs and desires).
90
 First-person accounts are particularly 
useful, since ‘the authors of actions are uniquely well placed to explain their reasons for 
themselves’.91 This explains the importance that internal documentation and statements 
have acquired in EU competition law. Nonetheless, these must not be considered the 
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expression of an undertaking’s ‘state of mind’, as already noted above, but as putting 
forward possible decisions, beliefs and desires to be checked against undertakings’ 
actions. Hutto remarks that ‘admissions are defeasible; people lie or are self-deceived 
about why they act’, so that rationality provides ‘fairly robust methods for testing, 
questioning and challenging such testimony when it is important to do so, as in legal 
cases’.92 Therefore, if first-person accounts are not coherent with the action, under the 




iv. Intentional design 
 
The interpretative framework so far established allows us to tackle some of the Court’s 
general pronouncements on intent. What is contentious is the Court’s tendency to 
differentiate between, on the one side, undertakings’ intention, and on the other, the 
purpose of agreements and abusive conduct. This makes it appear as if agreements and 
abusive conduct do not reflect the undertakings’ intention and can therefore be 
interpreted autonomously. The result, stated at the outset, is the case law which 
establishes that intent is not a ‘necessary’ element for establishing a restriction by object 
under Articles 101 or an abuse of dominance under Article 102.
94
 This case law has 
been taken literally by the majority of the doctrine.
95
 The reality, as described next, is 
that agreements and abusive conduct can only be understood in light of undertakings’ 
intention, since they can only reflect that intention. In other words, if they are designed 
for a purpose, it is the one given by the designer. Hence, intention is indeed a necessary 
element for interpreting agreements and abusive conduct. 
Under Article 101, several judgments on restrictions by object separate the purpose of 
agreements from undertakings’ intention. The first is Compagnie Royale Asturienne des 
Mines, where one of the parties attempted to discharge responsibility for clauses which 
the other party had inserted in the contract.
96
 The Court replied that it was not necessary 
‘to verify that the parties had a common intent’, but only to examine ‘the aims pursued 
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by the agreement as such’.97 This was followed by IAZ, which dealt with a system of 
labels involving several undertakings. Some of these undertakings, but not all, had acted 
in way which made clear the intent to restrict parallel imports.
98
 The Court thus declared 
that the agreement’s ‘purpose’ was to restrict competition regardless of whether this was 
‘the intention of all the parties’.99 The same idea was also expressed by the Court in 
BIDS, albeit using distinct terminology. In BIDS, the members of a nationwide 
arrangement to reduce capacity claimed that its purpose was not to adversely affect 
competition, but to rationalise production.
100
 The Court rejected this argument, stating 
that close regard should be paid to ‘to the objectives which [the agreement] is intended 
to attain’, but that it was irrelevant whether the parties ‘acted without any subjective 
intention of restricting competition’.101 
These judgments are taken as good authority by the doctrine for the proposition that it is 
not necessary to examine the intentions of the parties when assessing restrictions by 
object.
102
 IAZ and BIDS are cited by the Court in Glaxo, where the Court examined an 
agreement setting higher prices for products set for exportation to other Member States 
than those for domestic consumption. Glaxo sets out the current case law formula 
opposing the agreement’s ‘objectives’, which must be considered, and the parties’ 
‘intention’, which ‘is not a necessary factor in determining whether an agreement is 
restrictive’, although such intention can still be taken into account.103 A similar formula 
has also been employed under Article 102. In Tomra, an appeal from a General Court 
judgment, the Court had to decide whether the consideration of subjective factors was 
precluded by the definition, in earlier case law, of abuse of dominance as ‘an objective 
concept’.104 The Court starts by stating that the Commission ‘is necessarily required to 
assess the business strategy pursued by [the dominant undertaking]’, so that the 
Commission may ‘refer to subjective factors, namely the motives underlying the 
business strategy in question’.105 The Court then states that ‘anti-competitive intent 
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constitutes only one of a number of facts which may be taken into account’, and that the 
Commission ‘is under no obligation to establish the existence of such intent’.106 
Summarising these judgments, the Court has differentiated between the purpose of the 
agreement or abusive conduct (in the form of ‘aims’, ‘objectives’ or ‘strategy’), which 
must necessarily be considered, and undertakings’ intention (‘common intent’, 
‘subjective intention’ or ‘motives’), which may be considered but is not necessary. 
Taken literally, as most doctrine has, such judgments would mean that the main task in 
applying Article 101 and 102 is to interpret the agreement or abusive conduct. The 
question is whether such interpretation can be severed from the interpretation of 
undertakings’ intention, relegating the latter to a secondary role. The answer lies with 
the interpretative ‘stance’ taken towards the agreement or abusive conduct. In her 
Opinion in T-Mobile, Advocate-General (‘AG’) Kokott compared restrictions by object 
under Article 101 with risk offences in criminal law, providing a good example of the 
application of the ‘physical stance’: 
‘in most legal systems, a person who drives a vehicle when significantly under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs is liable to a criminal or administrative penalty, 
wholly irrespective of whether, in fact, he endangered another road user or was 
even responsible for an accident. In the same vein, undertakings infringe European 
competition law and may be subject to a fine if they engage in concerted practices 
with an anti-competitive object; whether in an individual case, in fact, particular 
market participants or the general public suffer harm is irrelevant’.107 
AG Kokott’s analogy in T-Mobile is flawed in several ways, starting at the 
interpretative level. The risk offence described is established by applying the ‘physical 
stance’ to the act of driving and the consumption of alcohol or drugs, as many risks can 
be interpreted from physical activities and states. In EU competition law, the physical 
manifestations of agreements and abusive conduct – signing papers, verbal 
communications, displaying selling conditions, etc. – are meaningless in themselves. 
While the purpose of driving under influence of alcohol or drugs is irrelevant for risk 
offences, the purpose of agreements and abusive conduct is everything for EU 
competition law. Therefore, useful interpretations can only come from the ‘design 
stance’ and the ‘intentional stance’, which both consider purpose. 
Agreements and abusive practice, in particular if it involves the application of contracts, 
can be interpreted under the ‘design stance’ as designed for a certain purpose and 
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operating accordingly. Thus, in Compagnie Royale Asturienne des Mines the Court 
stated that the export clauses were ‘designed to prevent the re-export of the goods to the 
country of production so as to maintain a system of dual prices and restrict competition 
within the common market’.108 The expression of being ‘designed’ for a certain purpose 
has also been employed in relation to abusive conduct.
109
 It should be noted that the 
‘design stance’ is the basis for the analysis of anti-competitive effects, by extrapolating 
effects from the purpose of certain practices.
110
 This explains why authors defending an 
‘effects-based approach’ are comfortable with interpreting anti-competitive behaviour 
without considering undertakings’ intention.111 In this line, Akman asks why intent 
would be necessary if ‘there is already implementation on the market which is 
anticompetitive and which can be objectively established’.112 A strategy, as referred 
above, is also designed with a purpose. The question, however, is where does the 
designed purpose comes from. The answer is that it can only come from the designer.
113
 
The interpretation of agreements and abusive conduct, in particularly strategies, 
involves an ‘intentional design’: the designed purpose can only be discerned by 
applying the ‘intentional stance’.114 This can be observed, for example, in the above 
quote from Compagnie Royale Asturienne des Mines: the design might be to prevent re-
exporting, but this comes from the undertakings’ intention to ‘maintain a system of dual 
prices and restrict competition within the common market’.115 More often, the 
agreement or abusive practice is simply interpreted as a strategy under the ‘intentional 
stance’. Thus, the Court stated in IAZ that the agreement ‘clearly expresses the intention 
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of treating parallel imports less favourably than official imports with a view to 
hindering the former’.116 Equally, the Court observed in BIDS that the arrangements 
were ‘intended therefore, essentially, to enable several undertakings to implement a 
common policy’ which encouraged ‘some of them to withdraw from the market’ and 
thereby reduce ‘the overcapacity which affects their profitability’.117 None of these 
findings could have been derived by looking at the purpose of the agreement or abusive 
conduct without considering the undertakings’ beliefs and desires. 
As such, it is argued that the case law quoted as authority for undertakings’ intention 
not being a necessary factor all resort to such intention, since without it the agreement’s 
‘objectives’ would not be understandable. The ‘business strategy’ which must 
necessarily be considered according to case law naturally also reflects the dominant 
undertaking’s intention. The case law that undertakings’ intention is not necessary to 
establish an infringement of Articles 101 and 102 does not conform to interpretative 
reality. That case law can be explained by other reasons. In Compagnie Royale 
Asturienne des Mines and IAZ, the Court dismissed ‘common intent’ and ‘the intention 
of all the parties’ in order to define an agreement under Article 101 in such a way that 
departed from contract law demands, as discussed in Chapter IV (on restrictions of 
competition). In BIDS, Glaxo and Tomra, the Court rejected ‘subjective intention’, 
‘intent’ and ‘intention’ in order to signal that certain motives and the knowledge of 
illegality were not legally relevant, as examined further below. Nonetheless, considering 
the confusion that the case law has caused in relation to the value of undertakings’ 
intent, it would certainly have been better if the Court avoided such a roundabout way 
to reach these results. 
 
v. Legal interpretation 
 
The fact that the Court necessarily relies on undertakings’ intentions to interpret 
agreements and abusive conduct, as just seen, raises the question of why does the Court 
not admit to so doing. It is certainly very convenient to dismiss undertakings’ intentions 
without engaging in an in-depth reasoning, as Court does by rejecting ‘common intent’ 
and the ‘intention of all the parties’ in Compagnie Royale Asturienne des Mines and 
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IAZ, but it must be remembered that the Court also stated in Bayer that an agreement 
involves ‘an invitation to the other party, whether express or implied, to fulfil [an anti-
competitive goal] jointly’.118 It also seems contradictory that the Court states that anti-
competitive intent does not have to be established in Tomra while demanding such 
intent for predatory pricing in France Télécom.
119
 Nonetheless, these are not 
unsurmountable obstacles. The Court could have said that an agreement requires an 
undertaking’s intention but not full joint intention, as held in Chapter III (on collusion), 
or that abusive conduct can depend on intent or effects-based tests, as described in 
Chapter V (on abuse of dominance). It is submitted that the reason why the Court 
separates undertakings’ intention from the purpose of agreements and abusive conduct 
lies in an involuntary confusion between the interpretation of intent and legal 
interpretation. 
The interpretation of intent and legal interpretation are similar in their objective, but 
differ in their methodology. As Dworkin states, (non-causal) interpretation is about 
discerning the purpose of its object, so that ‘[w]e find it natural to report our 
conclusions, in each and every genre of interpretation, in the language of intention or 
purpose’.120 Nonetheless, the interpretation of intent and legal interpretation involve 
different methods. This relates to Dworkin’s distinction between ‘conversational’ and 
‘constructive’ interpretation. Conversational interpretation applies the ‘intentional 
stance’, insofar as someone listening to a conversation assigns meaning ‘in the light of 
the motives and purposes and concerns [the listener] supposes the speaker to have, 
[reporting] conclusions as statements about his “intention” in saying what he did’.121 As 
seen above, the same reasoning should apply to interpreting undertakings’ intention.122  
In contrast, constructive interpretation aims to ‘interpret something created be people as 
an entity distinct from them’.123 Under constructive interpretation, and contrary to what 
was stated above, the purpose of a ‘designed’ entity is not that of its designer. Dworkin 
describes this as ‘imposing purpose on an object or practice in order to make it the best 
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possible example of the form or genre to which it is taken to belong’.124 Legal 
interpretation is a form of constructive interpretation and, as Dworkin also observes, it 
is widely held that the purpose of legal norms does not depend on the intention of the 
historic legislator.
125
 Nonetheless, such intention may nevertheless prove useful – in 
other words, it is not necessary but may be taken into account.
126
 As described above, 
this is the method that the Court applies to undertakings’ intention. 
The Court applies legal interpretation to undertakings’ intention because it is a public 
law court used to dealing with institutional actors with normative ‘intentions’, not 
private actors with ‘mentalistic’ ones.127 The Court’s main activity consists in judging 
the conformity of Member States’ legal order with EU law, either directly, through 
infringement procedures, or indirectly, through preliminary references.
128
 When 
analysing the Member States’ legal order, it follows correct legal interpretation in 
ignoring the intention of the historic legislator. This is most evident in relation to the 
free movement provisions of the Treaty, which lead Member States to plead 
justifications not envisaged by the historic legislator but which constitute valid claims 
under EU law.
129
 The situations where the Court has to judge private behaviour under 
EU law are much more limited. The portion involving undertakings under EU 
competition law is not even dealt with directly, but within appeal procedures of 
administrative decisions.
130
 Like Member States’, the actions of the Commission are not 
interpreted as intentional, but as the normative application of EU law.
131
 It is a small 
step for the Court to adapt the method used for the majority (and most important) of its 
actors to the less frequent matters involving undertakings. 
The fact that the Court uses the same interpretative methods for undertakings and 
institutional actors comes across in the case law on ‘objective justifications’. As 
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described in more detail in Chapter IV (on restriction of competition) and Chapter V (on 
abuse of dominance), behaviour that infringes Articles 101 and 102 can be considered 
justified in certain circumstances. In doing so, the Court mixes the interpretation of 
undertakings’ intention with public interests pursued by Member States. Under Article 
101, the Court has considered that a restrictive selective distribution system can be 
justified if resellers are chosen according to objective and non-discriminatory criteria 
and this is required to ensure a product’s quality and proper use.132 This normally 
involves interpreting the purpose of the system as intended by the undertakings running 
it.
133
 Nonetheless, in Pierre Fabre the Court expressly refers to justifications accepted 
in its free movement case law in order to assess whether the selective distribution 
system could be objectively justified.
134
 This assumes that the objective justification is 
interpreted in the same manner regardless of whether it is applied by undertakings when 
restricting competition or Member States when restricting free movement. 
Nevertheless, one thing is for undertakings to pursue a policy reflecting public interests, 
another for Member State restrictions to do so. If such purpose cannot be interpreted 
from the undertakings’ agreement, there is no other source for it.135 In contrast, even if 
such purpose was not originally pursued by the Member State, it can be constructively 
interpreted from the Treaty provisions and its case law. Moreover, economic interests 
are not admitted as justification for Member State restrictions, while they are for 
undertakings.
136
 The Court again mixes these two interpretations under Article 102, by 
mentioning in Post Danmark as possible justifications both objective necessity and 
efficiencies.
137
 Efficiencies reflect the exception of Article 101(3), and again have to be 
interpreted from the practice itself.
138
 Objective necessity, as Jones and Sufrin argue, 
relates to public interests and can therefore be constructively interpreted.
139
 Objective 
necessity also contrasts with the protection of commercial interests under Article 102, 
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admitted by the Court as justification as long as it is the ‘actual purpose’ of the 
dominant undertaking.
140
 The ‘actual purpose’ pursued by a Member State is never 
inquired, since the normative purpose can come from EU law. In short, the policies 
pursued by undertakings, either motivated by public interests or commercially, must 
result from their intention since, unlike Member States, constructive legal interpretation 
is unavailable. Nonetheless, the Court treats both interpretations as the same. 
Legal interpretation is also at the origin of the definition of abuse of dominance as an 
‘objective concept’. This definition has been quoted by the Court, as stated above, for 
undertakings’ intention not being necessary for establishing an infringement of Article 
102.
141
 When the Court separates the abusive conduct from undertakings’ intentions, it 
treats it as a Member State policy. For the same reasons, State aid has also been referred 
to as an ‘objective concept’ in the case law.142 Nevertheless, while State aid can be 
legally interpreted separately from the historic legislator, the interpretation of abusive 
conduct is bound to the dominant undertaking’s intention.143 It should be mentioned 
that, despite the wrong interpretative starting point, abuse is indeed an ‘objective 
concept’. The Court first employed this definition in Hoffman La-Roche in order to 
dismiss an instrumental use of the dominant position to commit the abuse, setting both 
as separate conditions for applying Article 102.
144
 It should be noted however that the 
Court had already done the same in Continental Can without using such definition.
145
 
The ‘objective’ character lay in establishing the legal concept of abuse. 
This indicates that ‘abuse’ is a normative concept, depending on ‘objective’ legal 
interpretation and not on a subjective decision, such as those part of the Commission’s 
administrative discretion. The same nonetheless applies to all the conditions of Articles 
101 and 102, and the conditions for finding State aid also, making the qualification of 
‘objective’ somewhat pleonastic. This explains why the Court occasionally drops the 
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reference to ‘objective’ in relation to justifications.146 It also means that EU competition 
law may be applied based on subjective facts, notably undertakings’ intention, because 
the objective character is in the treatment it gives to such facts. In the Opinion in 
AstraZeneca, AG Mazak stated that requiring the intent to defraud would be contrary to 
the definition of abuse as an ‘objective concept’.147 Nonetheless, one can see that the 
concepts of ‘agreement’ and ‘restriction by object’ under Article 101 do not cease to be 
objective because they depend on the parties’ intentions.148 As long as intention can be 
objectively verifiable, as the Court declared in relation to supposedly ‘subjective’ 
internal documentation, then it is ‘objective’.149 
 
2. Legal relevance 
 
This section will define intent as the intention which is legally relevant under EU 
competition law. It was seen above that such intention should be understood as an 
undertaking’s decision to act on its beliefs and desires. This means that EU competition 
law applies by considering certain decisions, beliefs and desires as relevant (or not) for 
the production of legal effects. For example, an undertakings’ decision to set a certain 
market price can be prohibited under Article 101 or constitute legitimate competition 
depending on whether it is acting on the desire to abide by another undertakings’ 
intentions or on freely available market knowledge. The characterisation of intent will 
therefore depend on how the conditions of Article 101 and 102 are applied in the case 
law, examined in the corresponding chapters throughout the present research. It is 
nevertheless possible to outline general conditions which will always apply for intention 
to be legally relevant, or which indicate that certain intention will never be legally 
relevant. This section will examine these general conditions. It will be advanced that 
only the intention which has been implemented, and therefore is capable of producing 
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effects, is legally relevant. Otherwise, as remarked, which particular decisions, beliefs 
and desires are legally relevant is individually decided by the case law.
150
 
The conditions which are generally legally relevant or irrelevant are reflected in the 
doctrine’s definitions of intent. As seen above, definitions based on differences between 
‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ intent are inadequate. Few authors have attempted a 
definition outside that framework. In US antitrust, Stucke has proposed a definition of 
intent based on ‘state of mind’, which would be composed of ‘(1) the actor’s motive for 
undertaking the action, (2) her awareness of undertaking the action, and (3) her 
awareness of the action’s natural and probable consequences’.151 In EU competition 
law, Nazzini has also adopted a definition if intent as ‘a subjective state of mind’ 
composed of ‘general’ and ‘specific intent’: the first ‘the intent of carrying out the 
relevant conduct’, the second ‘the intent to cause the harm that the law prohibits’.152 
As described above, definitions of intent as a ‘state of mind’ are directly inspired by 
criminal law. This assumes that there is a well-defined physical conduct which indicates 
the implementation of the intent, and of which the agent must be self-aware in order to 
be legally relevant. Hence, the definitions of Stucke and Nazzini use conduct as a 
reference point to differentiate the intent over it, and its immediate consequences, from 
more remote intent in the form of ‘motives’ or ‘harm’. As discussed below, these 
assumptions do not hold. It will be seen that the implementation is based on the 
capability to produce effects, not the conduct (i). Then, it will be demonstrated that 
awareness is not legally relevant in EU competition law (ii). Finally, motives will be 




In order for intention to be legally relevant, it must be implemented in a significant 
manner. Nazzini states that in modern legal systems it is ‘uncontroversial that nobody 
can be punished purely because of his own thoughts or intentions’, and therefore 
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 As described above, an undertaking is defined by the exercise of economic activity, so that intention 
unrelated with this activity cannot be attributed to the undertaking (and therefore it is not necessary to 
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criminal law imposes a so-called ‘act requirement’.153 The application of the ‘intentional 
stance’ to undertakings in EU competition law, however, largely removes the possibility 
of punishing purely internal states by abstracting from a ‘state of mind’ and taking as its 
starting point the interpreting of an action. This means that any beliefs and desires 
which are successfully attributed must be reflected in the decision to act. As observed 
above, this also applies to expressions of a ‘state of mind’, such as internal 
documentation and statements.
154
 Under the ‘intentional stance’, the only possibility of 
intention without action is a prediction.
155
 The ‘intentional stance’ is just as useful for 
prediction as for interpretation: in the common example of driving, one can rely on the 
knowledge of traffic rules and the desire to stay alive to both understand the actions of 
drivers met today and predict their actions tomorrow.
156
 Nonetheless, as Anscombe 
notes, predictions – including expressions – are not intention: a decision to act may very 
well come, but until it does there is no intention.
157
 The action is thus, as quoted above 
from Anscombe, the ‘very first thing’ to consider for the interpretation of intention, 
which also applies to in relation to Articles 101 and 102.
158
 
Considering that an action can have different degrees of implementation, the question is 
the requisite legal standard. Eilmansberger mentions that intent must be accompanied 
by an ‘agreement or coordination of conduct’ under Article 101 or ‘evidence of relevant 
conduct’ under Article 102.159 The emphasis on material conduct presupposes, similarly 
to the example of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs in the Opinion of AG 
Kokott in T-Mobile, that a physical action can be competitively significant 
independently of its purpose. Nonetheless, as held above, material conduct itself lacks 
competitive relevance. For example, a cartel agreed upon before price regulation is set 
in place involves an agreement, and an abusive obligation imposed on its distributors on 
the eve of stocks being permanently exhausted also involves the relevant conduct. 
Nevertheless, they should not be considered implemented, since the action lacks 
competitive relevance – for EU competition law purposes, it is the same as if it was 
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purely conjectured.
160
 The requisite legal standard of implementation must therefore be 
set higher than material conduct. 
It is argued that the legal standard for implementation should be set at the capability to 
produce the intended effects.
161
 Nazzini states that ‘intent must be implemented in acts 
that are objectively capable of causing the harm in question’.162 The ‘harm’ should be 
understood in light of the anti-competitive character of the intent, discussed in Chapter 
II (on judging intent), and not be confused with anti-competitive effects. For example, 
as mentioned in Chapter IV (on restrictions of competition) and Chapter V (on abuse of 
dominance), a cartel lacking sufficient organisation and market power to operate, or 
below-cost prices by a dominant undertaking which competitors can withstand, are both 
incapable of causing anti-competitive effects.
163
 However, these are considered anti-
competitive because of their intent, namely to condition economic independence and to 
harm competitors, and are also considered implemented. This is because the capability 
to produce effects is enough to capture the situations where anti-competitive intent is 
put in action to a sufficient degree.
164
 Thus, these examples are capable of conditioning 
cartel members and to harm competitors, even if they do not lead to the desired 
outcome. In these situations, Articles 101 and 102 are applied similarly to inchoate 
offences in criminal law.
165
 Those offences are also intent-based and only require that 
the intent is implemented, even if it may not come to fruition.
166
 
The Court has adopted the standard of the capability to produce effects under Article 
101 since, as will be discussed in Chapter IV (on restrictions of competition), 
restrictions by object are based on intent. The Court stated in T-Mobile that a restriction 
by object must ‘be capable in an individual case, having regard to the specific legal and 
economic context, of resulting in the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
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competition’.167 As described above, a strategy is interpreted in abstract, according to 
economic rationality, as being capable of producing the desired effects. If a strategy is 
credible, implementation can be presumed. As will be examined in Chapter III (on 
collusion), a formalised agreement (which does not depend on the interpretation of 
behaviour) is presumed to be capable of producing the agreed effects. Equally, the 
Court stated in T-Mobile by stating that a concerted practice implies ‘subsequent 
conduct on the market’ and that, as already stated, undertakings are presumed to take 
into account the information exchanged.
168
 Hence, the capability to produce effects has 
not been applied as an added test of restrictions by object, but as a presumption 
operating on most form of collusion. This presumption will hold unless the strategy 
does not work, which is uncommon. Cartel members may argue that they have not 
implemented the agreement, but as discussed in Chapter III (on collusion) this does not 
prevent it from being capable of producing effects in relation to other members.
169
 
The Court has also applied the standard of capability to produce effects under Article 
102, but as examined in Chapter V (on abuse of dominance) it has apparently not 
limited it to intent-based abuses. Thus, in Tomra it presented such capability in 
alternative to the likelihood of producing effects, which allows effects-based abuses to 
align to the lowest threshold.
170
 In any event, in AstraZeneca the Court applied the 
standard of capability to produce effects to the intent to harm competitors, namely 
through a misleading application to extend intellectual property protection.
171
 Again, the 
capability to produce effects, and therefore implementation, is presumed from a credible 
strategy. In AstraZeneca the Court addressed a rare challenge to that implementation, as 
the dominant undertaking alleged that there was no effect on competition considering 
that the misleading applications were withdrawn before the original protection 
expired.
172
 The General Court examined whether the applications ‘were liable to lead 
the public authorities to grant the exclusive right’.173 This does not concern the 
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exclusive right’s effects on competition, which require an analysis of the market and not 
of the behaviour of the public authorities. The Court recognised that this was an issue of 
implementation, but since the extension could harm competitors (which will likely 





The awareness of committing an action is typically important for the attempt to capture 
a ‘state of mind’, and may be considered a general requirement for finding intent.175 
Thus, awareness of the action features is the second condition in Stucke’s definition.176 
Nazzini also bases the concept of ‘general intent’ (as opposed to ‘specific intent’) on 
awareness, exemplifying it with a dominant undertaking pricing at predatory cost levels 
‘neither inadvertently nor by mistake’.177 The issue of awareness is tied to physical 
conduct, in particular the very human characteristic of acting unconsciously. This 
problem, however, does not affect the application of the ‘intentional stance’ to 
undertakings. The attribution of the beliefs that undertakings ‘ought to have’ makes it 
virtually impossible for economic activity to be interpreted as conducted 
unconsciously.
178
 Nazzini’s example of inadvertently pricing below cost could never be 
interpreted rationally from the action. Even if internal documentation surfaced showing 
mistakes or ignorance of cost levels, it would be set aside in favour of the objective 
interpretation that an undertaking must know its costs in order to operate in the market. 
Ultimately, an undertaking is always in possession of cost information as long as it has 
contracted or paid such costs. Therefore, awareness of committing an action is not a 
condition for intention to be legally relevant in EU competition law. 
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In the same manner, the application of the ‘intentional stance’ to undertakings also 
prevents them from being unaware of the consequences of their actions. An action must 
be capable of producing the desired effects in order to be interpreted as a credible 
strategy, as already stated, so that the undertaking must be aware of those effects.
179
 As 
such, instead of market consequences, undertakings have more often claimed that they 
were unaware of the legal consequences of their actions. This would usually be a 
question of the adequate sanction, not establishing a substantive infringement.
180
 
However, knowledge of illegality is a substantive requirement for non-ethical offences 
(often administrative, but also criminal) in some Member States, leading undertakings 
to claim they were unaware of liability under EU competition law.
181
 Regulation 1/2003 
expressly denies the criminal law nature of EU competition law sanctions, but it has 
been accepted for some time that this is not the correct reading under the European 
Convention of Human Rights.
182
 Despite such indications, characterisations such as the 
analogy with driving the under the influence of alcohol or drugs in AG Kokott’s 
Opinion in T-Mobile have misguidedly reinforced this non-ethical view.
183
 
The Court has stated that the lack of knowledge of illegality does not prevent an 
infringement under Articles 101 and 102, which is coherent with the moral character of 
the infringement. However, rather than recognising this character, authors have 
interpreted this as another proof that intent is not necessary.
184
 In this regard, it is worth 
mentioning BIDS again, where the Court stated that whether undertakings had ‘any 
subjective intention to restrict competition’ was irrelevant.185  Although this has been 
read literally in the doctrine, the fact is that the Court found that an arrangement 
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between producers ‘intended’ to reduce capacity infringed Article 101.186 Since any 
such arrangement represents the parties’ intention, the Court’s reference to the irrelevant 
‘subjective intention to restrict competition’ must mean something else.187 The parties 
argued that their purpose was not to ‘adversely to affect competition’, indicating that 
they did not know that reducing capacity would infringe Article 101.
188
 As such, it must 
be concluded that the Court was referring to the absence of knowledge of illegality. This 
was stated more clearly in Schenker: 
‘the fact that the undertaking concerned has characterised wrongly in law its 
conduct upon which the finding of the infringement is based cannot have the effect 
of exempting it from imposition of a fine in so far as it could not be unaware of the 
anti-competitive nature of that conduct’.189 
Similarly, in Tomra the Court stated that the Commission was ‘under no obligation to 
establish the existence of [anti-competitive intent]’ under Article 102, but also stated 
that it had to examine the dominant undertaking’s ‘strategy’.190 To some extent, it is 
true that anti-competitive intent is unnecessary when, as discussed in Chapter V (on 
abuse of dominance), the specific abuse is based on effects. Nonetheless, Tomra can 
also be read, in line with the Article 101 case law, as knowledge of illegality not being 
required for finding an abuse of dominance. The Court’s statement in United Brands 
that ‘special knowledge of antitrust laws’ may come from experience in international 
trade appears to consider knowledge of EU competition law, like that of economic 
conditions, as something that the dominant undertaking ‘ought to have’.191  
Eilmansberger considers that the notion of abuse as an ‘objective concept’ should be 
read as dispensing ‘fault’, identified as ‘the firm’s awareness of the illegality of its 
conduct’.192 The lack of a ‘fault’ was indeed argued by the Commission in Hoffman-La 
Roche, but was not expressly dealt with by the Court.
193
 It will be discussed in Chapter 
II (on judging intent) that there is a negative judgment, which implies that there also is 
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‘fault’ at some level.194 What is clear is that it does not extend to the knowledge of 
illegality. Ultimately, such knowledge is a belief which EU competition law is free to 




The intention in performing an action can be differentiated from the motives for 
undertaking it. For example, an undertaking’s intention to exclude a competitor may be 
motivated by strengthening a dominant position or simply by distaste for competitors. 
Anscombe distinguishes between ‘intentional action’ and ‘intentions in acting’.195 
Intentional actions, as stated above, require that the question ‘why’ in answered in a 
non-causal manner. Anscombe argues that it is ‘intentions in acting’ which allows the 
interpretation of intentional actions, namely answering the question ‘why’ in the manner 
of providing reasons. Thus, ‘intentions in acting’ can be understood as motives. Despite 
their interpretive value, in criminal law it is usually held that motives are legally 
irrelevant: if one intends to kill, for example, the reasons for doing so (compassion, 
spite, passion, etc.) can be considered in setting the sanction but not for finding a 
murder.
196
 Therefore, criminal law separates the intent to commit the action from its 
motives. In US antitrust, Stucke also separates ‘motive for undertaking the action’ from 
the awareness of the action and its consequences, but nonetheless integrates both under 
the notion of intent.
197
 This raises the question of whether the irrelevance of motives in 
criminal law, or their relevance in US antitrust, also applies to EU competition law. 
It is argued that no general statement can be made, one way or the other, about the legal 
relevance of intentions. The distinction between intent and motives is not useful in EU 
competition law. Criminal law is concerned with physical actions, so that intent can be 
circumscribed to the described physical result. In the example of murder, all that 
appears necessary is to check if the agent was aware and intended that consequence. 
The ethical character of criminal law also favours a clear-cut rule against the taking of 
life. In EU competition law, as already remarked, physical actions have little meaning 
without considering their purpose. This means that the priority is reversed in relation to 
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criminal law: first intention is established, and then the capability of the actions to 
produce the desired effects is examined. The only intentional actions that interest EU 
competition law are the ones motivated by Anscombe’s ‘intentions in acting’, which can 
answer the question ‘why’ through reasons. 
It is also submitted that in EU competition law there is no relevant distinction between 
the immediate consequences of an agreement or abusive conduct and their motivation as 
more remote consequences. On the contrary, the importance of understanding actions in 
terms of strategies is precisely to link all consequences. Under the ‘intentional stance’, 
any intended consequence, immediate or remote, is a desire.
198
 The only requirement is 
that motives, in particular if based on internal documentation or statements, are 
effectively interpreted as being acted and not merely declared. As such, motives should 
be incorporated in the definition of intent as desires, without any criminal law-inspired 
distinction with other desired consequences of the action. Nazzini’s definition of 
‘specific intent’ does so, by exemplifying the intent in predatory pricing as both the 
immediate consequence ‘to exclude a rival’ and the motive ‘to enhance or protect [the 
dominant undertaking’s] market power’.199 
Once motives are understood in terms of beliefs and desires under the ‘intentional 
stance’, their legal relevance (or irrelevance) can be defined as needed. It should be 
noted that this may still be framed under the general irrelevance of motives, as any 
motive which is relevant can be incorporated into the characterisation of the action 
according to its purpose or as a conceptually separate justification. This happens in 
criminal law. For example, the intent to use force against property can be considered 
robbery (and not criminal damage) if it is motivated by stealing.
200
 The motivation to 
self-defend will also make all the difference in relation to the intent to commit an 
offence.
201
 It seems that one of the reasons why intent is hard to pin down in criminal 
law is due to motives not yet formalised as offences or justifications being considered as 
part of intent.
202
 EU competition law operates through notions such as ‘restriction of 
competition’ and ‘abuse of dominance’ which, as detailed in Chapter IV (on restrictions 
of competition) and Chapter V (on abuse of dominance), allow latitude in relation to 
motives with little need of formalisation. 
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Thus, the Court finds behaviour anti-competitive or justified according to its motives, 
framed as the purpose of an agreement or abusive practice, by stating that ‘intention’ 
can be relied on. Under Article 101 the Court considered in BIDS that the ‘the object of 
remedying the effects of a crisis in their sector’ was irrelevant in relation to the 
reduction of capacity.
203
 The Court then makes the general statement that ‘an agreement 
may be regarded as having a restrictive object even if it does not have the restriction of 
competition as its sole aim but also pursues other legitimate objectives’.204 This appears 
to exclude the legal relevance of motives. However, as described in Chapter IV (on 
restrictions of competition), the Court has accepted certain motives as excluding a 
restriction by object, framed doctrinally as ‘commercial ancillarity’, without formalising 
then as objective justifications.
205
 Under Article 102, the Court also stated in Tomra that 
it was legitimate to consider the ‘motives’ of business strategies.206 As discussed in 
Chapter V (on abuse of dominance), it is controversial whether the motive to harm 
competitors should be considered legally relevant. Nonetheless, as with any other belief 





This chapter showed that intent is relatively easy to conceptualise in EU competition 
law, mainly due to the economic nature of undertakings. The starting point is the 
everyday application of ‘folk psychology’ to interpret and predict a person’s intention 
as a decision to act on beliefs and desires. This is empirically proven, and extends to the 
majority of the use of intention in a legal context. Further conceptualisation under the 
‘intentional stance’ is useful to show that ‘folk psychology’ abstracts from the internal 
workings of how intention is arrived at, interpreting it directly from actions. The 
‘intentional stance’ applies to undertakings, as it does to any other agent considered 
rational. In fact, it can even be said to apply better. Due to its particularities, criminal 
law is exceptionally forced to capture a ‘state of mind’ which might be at odds with a 
rational interpretation of physical actions. The actions of undertaking under EU 
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competition law are easier to interpret, as one can readily attribute them to the beliefs 
and desires of economic activity. Under the assumption of rationality, if a strategy is not 
credibly capable to produce the desired effects, it is not a valid interpretation. 
Furthermore, the (factual) capability to produce effects is also the requisite legal 
standard of implementation, which is usually presumed and only rarely challenged. 
EU competition law has embraced the consideration of undertakings as rational 
economic actors, but has also indulged in a needless separation between such intent and 
the purpose of agreements and abusive conduct. It is apparent that when the Court states 
that an agreement’s ‘objectives’ or an abuse’s ‘business strategy’ must be necessarily be 
considered that it is referring to undertakings’ intent. Nonetheless, the Court insists that 
its interpretation is ‘objective’, as if agreements and abusive conduct had a purpose 
independent from the ‘subjective’ intent of their creators. No civil court would fail to 
recognise a contract as its parties’ intention, and no criminal court would consider the 
intent of an act apart from its agent. Only a public law court would interpret undertaking 
behaviour as if it were a State measure with an autonomous normative content. 
Agreements and abusive conduct, however, are not normative acts but the expression of 
undertakings’ intent. Thus, it will be seen in Chapter III (on collusion) and Chapter V 
(on abuse of dominance) that the infringement of Articles 101 and 102 starts with intent 
which is potentially offensive to the principles of EU competition law. 
The case law that undertakings’ intent is not necessary factor but can be taken into 
account may seem like a clever way to admit a discretionary use of intent. It has 
certainly proven useful whenever the Court wants to reject the legal relevance of certain 
intent without engaging in much reasoning. Moreover, a limited role of intent also plays 
to the tests of effects on which an infringement might depend (in addition to intent 
which is contrary to the principles of EU competition law). However, expressed as it is, 
this case law undermines the conceptual foundation of anti-competitive behaviour as 
reflecting undertakings’ intent and rationality. The reading of such case law should thus 
be limited to the (also misguided) identification between intention and internal evidence 
of a ‘state of mind’. This will also settle the debate over ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ 
intent. As detailed in the chapter corresponding to collusion, restrictions of competition 
and abuse of dominance, whenever the Court considers what undertakings agreed upon 
or how they act on the market, it can be said to look at intent.  
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CHAPTER II 
Judging behaviour based on intent 
 
 
In the previous chapter, intent was defined as an undertaking’s legally relevant decision 
to act on its beliefs and desires. The only general condition for such legal relevance is 
implementation, to the requisite standard of the capability to produce effects. 
Implementation is presumed insofar as a credible strategy requires the capability to 
produce the desired effects, but this presumption can be rebutted when factual 
developments frustrate a rational expectation. Other than this general condition, legal 
relevance will depend on the particular conditions set out in the case law. This research 
will describe how the Court has selected particular decisions, beliefs and desires as 
relevant (or not) for the production of certain legal effects. For example, in Chapter I 
(on the concept of intent) it was demonstrated that knowledge of illegality (a belief) is 
irrelevant for finding an infringement of Articles 101 and 102. Subsequent chapters will 
examine the role of intent in the main substantive conditions for the application of those 
provisions. Before doing so, however, this chapter will discuss why intent has 
normative value for those purposes – in other words, how can behaviour be judged 
based on intent. 
The normative value of intent is better understood in comparison with the alternative of 
judging behaviour based on effects. This alternative is not clearly spelled out in the 
Treaty competition provisions, which only mention effects in relation to restriction by 
object or effect under Article 101(1). Nonetheless, as developed in Chapter IV (on 
restrictions of competition), the alternative between intent and effects corresponds to the 
difference between restrictions by object or effect, since restrictions by object are based 
on the objectives of the agreement and preclude the consideration of its actual or likely 
effects.
207
 Moreover, as discussed in Chapter V (on abuse of dominance), abuses under 
Article 102 have also been found based on either intent or effects, namely through the 
tests of specific abuses. That alternative is somewhat obscured when the threshold for 
anti-competitive effects is set at the same level as for the implementation of intent (the 
capability to produce effects). As noted in Chapter I (on the concept of intent), the 
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effects required for such implementation are not the same as anti-competitive effects.
208
 
The present chapter will show that this reflects a different judgment: in one case it is the 
intent which is considered anti-competitive (even if it requires effects for 
implementation), in another the effects. 
The alternative between judging behaviour based on intent or effects has also been 
misunderstood by the trend which promotes the latter under a so-called ‘effects-based 
approach’.209 The accepted narrative goes that the Commission applied a ‘formalistic’ 
approach until its ‘modernisation’, when it began using a more economics-based 
approach directed at anti-competitive effects on consumer welfare.
210
 Such 
‘modernisation’ began with the Commission’s assessment of agreements under Article 
101 and culminated in the Enforcement Guidance on Article 102.
211
 This narrative 
sometimes overlooks that ‘modernisation’ did not greatly affect the case law of the 
Court, leading the Commission to significantly readjust its position in the Enforcement 
Guidance on Article 102.
212
 ‘Modernisation’ seems to have nonetheless captivated a 
large section of the doctrine, which as described throughout this research, both 
advocates and interprets the case law as requiring anti-competitive effects to find an 
infringement of Articles 101 and 102.
213
 As described in the present chapter, such an 
‘effects-based approach’ has proven to be the biggest obstacle to recognising the 
normative value of intent. Against this approach, Mestmäcker, speaking in relation to 
abuse of dominance, states that:  
‘[t]his discourse develops its own advocatory terminology: an economic approach 
equals mainstream economics that in turn means neoclassical welfare economics 
which equals the [Article 102] purpose of consumer harm which in turn defines the 
effects-orientated application of [Article 102]’.214 
It is thus necessary to break the doctrinal connection between economics, consumer 
welfare and effects. Any claim of an exclusive connection between an ‘effects-based 
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approach’ and economics can be easily set aside: economics is used in a similar manner 
when interpreting an undertaking’s intent. As discussed in Chapter I (on the concept of 
intent), intent presupposes economic rationality. Indeed, as also stated there, effects are 
assessed in relation to practices designed according to undertakings’ beliefs and desires. 
Intention is routinely integrated into effects analysis as the undertakings’ ‘incentives’.215 
Insofar as economics is a theory that people will act according to those incentives, it can 
be said to be a theory of intention.
216
 Hence, a more economic-based approach to EU 
competition law obviously extends to the treatment of intent. 
This chapter will address the connection between consumer welfare, and indeed the 
goals of EU competition, and the alternative if judging behaviour based on intent or 
effects. Gormsen comments that ‘[o]bjectives and methodology are sometimes 
intertwined and changing the underlying purpose of a provision may sometimes require 
a change of methodology as well’.217 The point is that different effects are relevant 
according to the different goal of EU competition law.
218
 Following an ‘effects-based 
approach’, Gormsen does not see intent as an alternative judgment, but as a proxy for 
effects in relation to the EU competition law goals  – in the case of consumer welfare, a 
flawed one.
219
 This assumes that the only normative value in EU competition law comes 
from its goals. It is true that intent can play a subordinate role by serving as a proxy for 
effects (more flexibly than Gormsen assumes). However, the present chapter will argue 
that intent also has an autonomous normative value. If effects are ‘intertwined’ with EU 
competition law goals, intent is intertwined with its values.  
In essence, this chapter will discuss how an ‘effects-based approach’ depends on the 
assumption that behaviour can only be judged on its effects, and that such assumption is 
disproven by the different judgments made by the case law when dealing with intent. 
This posits a relatively limited normative claim: no particular type of judgment is 
preferred, effects or otherwise, only a broader assessment which guarantees the stability 
of EU competition law in face of competing moral alternatives. The chapter will 
therefore start by examining the contrast between form and effects, which limits the use 
of intent to presumptions of effects and associates it with formalism (1.). It will then 
describe how the goals of EU competition all relate to outcomes, so that an ‘effects-
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based approach’ is used to discuss, advocate and prioritise such goals (2.). The chapter 
will finally analyse how behaviour is additionally subject to non-consequentialist moral 




This section will discuss how the alternative of judging behaviour based on intent or 
effects does not influence the degree of formalism of EU competition law. It is common 
in the doctrine to contrast form and effects, implying that any other substantive criterion 
but effects risks leading to formalism – with apparent negative consequences for the use 
of intent.
220
 For example, Whish and Bailey comment that:  
‘One of the most common complaints about Article 102 is that the Commission and 
the EU Courts apply it in too formalistic manner. This criticism can be articulated 
in various ways. One is the argument that some practices appear to be unlawful per 
se, but that per se rules are inappropriate for behaviour such as price cutting and 
refusals to deal which may, depending on the facts of a particular case, be pro-
competitive, anti-competitive, or neutral. Another way of voicing the same 
criticism is to argue that the Commission and the Courts often fail to demonstrate 
how a particular practice could have significant effects on the market: too often 
they fail to articulate a convincing theory of economic harm and/or to produce 
evidence that adverse effects would follow from the practice under 
investigation’.221 
Only the first of the criticisms formulated by Whish and Bailey – which does not 
mention effects – corresponds to formalism in the technical sense.222 When behaviour is 
automatically considered anti-competitive by the operation of certain rules, as the per se 
abuses referred, many facts of the particular case are by definition omitted from 
consideration. If such facts prove to be relevant for the behaviour’s competitive 
character, there is indeed formalism. This opens the discussion on whether such rules 
are appropriate (which Whish and Bailey engage in after the above quote).
223
 Their 
second criticism that there might not be ‘effects on the market’, however, does not 
technically correspond to formalism. Whether behaviour is judged based on effects is a 
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substantive choice. Behaviour could instead be judged on other criteria, such as the 
intent or the size of the undertakings involved.
224
 If these criteria ignore facts that are 
competitively relevant, as formalism does, it is because they are the wrong criteria. 
Thus, in order to consider the two criticisms as the same, Whish and Bailey must 
assume that the only right criterion is effects. 
Contrasting form to effects is therefore a rhetorical argument for an ‘effects-based 
approach’.225 If form is opposed to effects, and effects are opposed to intent, then intent 
must be formalistic. Following this logic, Nazzini argues for the use of intent but 
extensively considers the risk of ‘systemic false convictions’ and ‘systemic false 
acquittals’.226 Such errors of over- and under-inclusion, however, are not particular to 
intent or any other substantive criterion. As developed below, they are commonly 
associated with the distinction between rules and standards. By assuming that the only 
relevant criterion is effects, an ‘effects-based approach’ also admits to the use of effects-
based rules. Hence, such rules can lead to formalism of the first sort described by Whish 
and Bailey, as discussed below in relation to the example they give of abusive rebates. 
This shows that formalism is not an obstacle to judging behaviour based on intent. This 
section will start by examining the distinction between rules and standards, and its 
relation to optimal level of enforcement (i). It will then consider how the contrast 
between ‘form or effects’ is in reality the opposition between a standard of actual or 
likely effects and presumptions of effects (ii). 
 
i. Rules and standards 
 
The distinction between rules and standards is well developed in legal technique.
227
 
Kaplow defines this distinction based on ‘the extent to which efforts to give content to 
the law are undertaken before or after individuals act’: a rule determines the factors on 
which it can be relied on ex ante, while a standard leaves factors to be considered by the 
adjudicator ex post.
228
 Thus, rules may ignore certain facts of a particular case if they 
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are not among those predefined, as stated by Whish and Bailey above, while a standard 
may adjust to integrate such facts if it finds them relevant. Rules, however, are easier for 
individuals to anticipate and adjust their behaviour accordingly.
229
 Other aspects should 
be highlighted in relation to this distinction. First, rules and standard are considered in 
their pure form but this does not correspond to reality, as legal provisions almost always 
mix the two.
230
 As discussed below for Articles 101 and 102, a rule might operate based 
on concepts defined by standards, and certain factors considered by standards might be 
subject to rules. Second, the application of binding precedent may turn standards into 
rules.
231
 The present research focusing on judicial assessment, rules and standards will 
be considered as the Court’s decision to interpret the conditions of Articles 101 and 102 
as such. 
Rules and standards are commonly associated with errors of over- and under-
inclusion.
232
 Often referred to as false positives and negatives in EU competition law, 
errors of over-inclusion would disregard factors showing the pro-competitive or neutral 
character of behaviour, while errors of under-inclusion would not consider factors 
relevant for the anti-competitive character of behaviour.
233
 One way to look at such 
errors is that they are exclusive to rules, and a reason against their introduction, since 
standards can be adjusted to avoid them. This would involve a trade-off between the 
flexibility and the correctness of standards against the legal certainty and ease of 
administration of rules. As Posner describes: 
‘A rule singles out one or a few facts and makes it or them legally determinative. A 
standard allows a more open-ended inquiry. Rules are generally simpler and 
cheaper to enforce than standards and provide clearer guidance both to the people 
subject to them and to the courts that administer them. But they are often either 
underinclusive or overinclusive, and sometimes they are both at the same time’.234 
Under this view, rules are by definition over- and under-inclusive. Formalism, in the 
technical sense, would consist in an overreliance on rules to the point where the gains of 
legal certainty and ease of administration would no longer compensate those errors. The 
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frequency and importance of such errors would therefore serve as a barometer for the 
appropriateness of employing rules instead of standards. 
Another view is that those errors are unrelated to the distinction between rules and 
standards. Kaplow points out that considering that rules are under- or over-inclusive in 
relation to standards assumes that rules are simple, operating based on few factors, and 
standards are complex, considering multiple factors.
235
 The correct comparison, 
however, would be between rules and standards of the same complexity: standards 
which are de facto or conceptually based on the same number of factors as rules. 
Kaplow then challenges the assumption that rules tend to be systematically simpler than 
standards.
236
 Thus, contrary to normal characterisation of rules and standards, complex 
rules would be applied to frequent behaviour with recurring characteristics and simple 
standards to infrequent behaviour with varying characteristics. Kaplow concludes that 
the choice between rules and standards, and the errors deriving from their respective 
complexity, are determined by the frequency of the underlying behaviour.
237
 This 
conclusion is useful to understand certain aspects of EU competition law, notably the 
preference for the use of standards by the Court (infrequent judgments, particular 
characteristics) and of the Commission for regulatory rules (frequent cases, recurring 
characteristics). Nonetheless, insofar as it is limited to judicial assessment, as discussed 
next, it is legitimate to hold that rules tend to be simpler and therefore lead to errors of 
under and over-inclusiveness in relation to standards. 
The point to take from Kaplow’s analysis is that standards may be as limited as rules 
and not always cover all the relevant factors. Moreover, as Monti observes, the risk of 
error in applying standards is not eliminated because information is always imperfect.
238
 
This allows considering errors of over- and under-inclusion beyond rules and standards, 
and in relation to the optimal level of enforcement of EU competition law overall. Thus, 
Jones and Sufrin do not mention rules in relation to such errors, but simply the presence 
or absence of competitive harm.
239
 It is appropriate to speak of error of over- and under-
inclusion when one type of error is more important than another. That is the case of 
criminal law, where the presumption of innocence expresses a concern to avoid errors of 
over-inclusion.
240
 This concern is also present in US antitrust, where wrong applications 
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are feared to chill competition.
241
 Although it is unclear if the same concern has been 
formalised in EU competition law (beyond criminal law guarantees), its soundness is 
generally acknowledged.
242
 What is clear is that it is not useful to speak of formalism in 
relation to the optimal enforcement of EU competition law. If both rules and standards 
lead to errors of enforcement, it is because they are substantively misaligned. Errors of 
substance must not be confused with errors of form. Hence, formalism is best reserved 
for the technical sense, described above, of simple rules that are excessively over or 
under-inclusive in relation to complex standards based on the same substantive 
criterion. 
 
ii. Form or effects 
 
Since the choice between rules and standards does not reflect the underlying substantive 
criterion, any combination with intent and effects is possible. As Posner states, ‘the 
domain of the rule may depend on the same factors that would determine legality under 
a standard’.243 This logically means that effects are just as prone to formalism as any 
other substantive criterion. Such a conclusion must inform the reading of doctrinal 
statements contrasting ‘form or effects’.244 Form would signify ‘the form that the 
agreement or conduct takes, or the size or similar characteristic of parties to a 
merger’.245 Formalism would result from undue presumptions that these factors ‘are 
bound to have an anti-competitive effect’.246 As with any rule, formalism results from 
the comparison with a standard. This standard would be ‘actual or likely anti-
competitive effects’, what is described in the doctrine as an ‘effects-based approach’.247 
However, one can observe that ‘effects-based approach’ is a misnomer if limited to the 
referred standard. These authors oppose rules presuming effects to a standard of actual 
or likely effects. Both depend on the same substantive criterion: effects. Therefore, both 
fall under an ‘effects-based approach’. These authors are not contrasting ‘form or 
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effects’: they are referring to the distinction between rules and standards under the 
substantive criterion of effects. 
Some authors, inspired by US antitrust, have applied this distinction to restrictions by 
object and effect under Article 101(1).
248
 Under US antitrust, per se violations 
correspond to rules and the ‘rule of reason’ (confusingly) to a standard.249 If applied to 
Article 101, this would clear the way for an ‘effects-based approach’. It is assumed that 
since restrictions by effect involve a standard, restrictions by object must involve 
rules.
250
 However, this assumption does not hold. The case law on Article 101(1) does 
not include a typology of prohibited agreements similar to per se violations in US 
antitrust. The Court defines restrictions by object as injurious to normal competition ‘by 
their very nature’ – a clear standard.251 The Court has further stated that in order to find 
a restriction by object ‘regard must be had to the content of its provisions, its objectives 
and the economic and legal context’ – also standards.252 The reference to ‘objectives’, 
as discussed in Chapter I (on the concept of intent), represents the intent of 
undertakings. It is possible to identify certain types of intent which have been 
considered restrictive by object, framed by Whish and Bailey under an ‘object box’.253 
Precedent can turn standards into rules. Nonetheless, as detailed in Chapter IV (on 
restrictions of competition), the Court has not let the case law solidify around types of 
intent, like price-fixing and market-sharing, by also including many instances where 
such objectives were not decisive in light of the certain economic and legal context. 
Since context is determined ex post, the Court has preserved restrictions by object as 
intent-based standards. 
Claims of formalism under Article 101 do not reflect the Court’s case law, and can 
instead be traced to Commission practice. Pre-‘modernisation’, the Commission applied 
a wide criteria to find an infringement of Article 101(1). As Jones and Sufrin describe, 
the Commission considered any limitation of the parties’ freedom or interference with 
market integration as restrictive by object.
254
 Post-‘modernisation’, the Commission has 
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considered that restrictions by object are certain agreements presumed to have anti-
competitive effects.
255
 This change appears to be the origin of the contrast between 
‘form and effects’, with previous practice deemed formalistic.256 However, it was 
precisely against such practice that the Court established the above referred standard for 
restriction by object. Furthermore, it is doubtful if that practice could even be qualified 
as formalist in the technical sense. ‘Modernisation’ appears to have changed the 
substantive criterion employed by the Commission to effects, and not changed a rule 
into a standard.
257
 On its face, the Commission’s current position is more formalist, 
since it openly employs presumptions of effects. As discussed in Chapter IV (on 
restrictions of competition), if such presumptions were applied by the Court it would 
not consider the economic and legal context. Nonetheless, those presumptions remain as 
unrepresented in the case law as the Commission’s pre-‘modernisation’ practice was. 
The issue of formalism in relation to effects is more acutely felt under Article 102. 
Contrary to the case law under Article 101, the Court has developed a typology of 
specific abuses of dominance. As set out in Chapter V (on abuse of dominance), the 
tests of specific abuses are either intent or effects-based. Some of these tests include 
rules, and therefore by definition are open to accusations of formalism. It is interesting 
to note is that such claims have been levelled, not at the use of intent, but of effects. 
Thus, Whish and Bailey illustrate the existence of per se abuses with the case law on 
rebates.
258
 The case law is described as having ‘developed along formalistic lines’.259 
Hence, the per se abuse would be over-inclusive, and capture pro-competitive effects.
260
 
However, as discussed in Chapter V (on abuse of dominance), the case law on rebates is 
expressly built around ‘exclusionary effect’.261 The Court does presume such effects, 
but not even then does it consider the intent of dominant undertaking.
262
 The case law 
analyses the effects on the freedom of choice of distributors, and then extrapolates this 
into exclusionary effects. Rebates are effects-based per se abuses. Yet, Whish and 
Bailey contrast them to an ‘effects analysis’ exemplified by the Commission’s position 
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in the Enforcement Guidance on Article 102 of focusing on practices ‘likely to have 
seriously anti-competitive effects’.263 As such, as with the ‘form or effects’ discussed 
above, Whish and Bailey are in reality contrasting rules presuming effects to a standard 
of actually likely effects. 
The case law on Articles 101 and 102 thus shows that formalism does not stem from the 
absence of an ‘effects-based approach’, but from the use of rules within that approach. 
Those rules can use intent as their trigger, as would be the case if agreements like price-
fixing or market-sharing were presumed to be restrictive by object (as seen above, they 
are not). They can however rely on other triggers, like the size of undertakings in 
mergers or even other effects in abusive rebates. What is important in rules is not their 
trigger, but the substantive criterion they attempt to capture. It is this criterion that 
allows rules to be compared with standards in order to assess the frequency and 
importance of errors of over- or under-inclusion. Thus, the doctrine rightly compares 
presumptions of effects with actual or likely effects. An issue arises, however, when the 
case law employs other substantive criteria. When the Commission used limitation of 
the freedom of the parties to extend the scope of Article 101, this was considered 
formalistic in comparison with effects. In the same manner, Bavasso considers that the 
use of intent might lead to errors of over- or under-inclusion under Article 102 in 
comparison with the ‘likelihood of competitive harm’.264 In those situations, the 
doctrine is comparing apples with pears. Supposed errors of under and over-inclusion 
are the result of purposely using a different substantive criterion. 
The contrast between ‘form or effects’ says more about the doctrine than it says about 
the case law. Two aspects stand out. The first is that authors assume that the only valid 
substantive criterion is effects, since the other option is ‘form’ understood as the 
presumption of anti-competitive effects. However, as discussed in Chapter IV (on 
restrictions of competition) and Chapter V (on abuse of dominance), both restrictions by 
object and certain types of abuse are based on intent without involving any presumption 
or risk of anti-competitive effects. The second is the preference given by authors to 
standards over rules, to the point where the standard of actual or likely anti-competitive 
effects is synonymous with ‘effects’. Whish and Bailey comment that there is ‘an 
increasing intellectual consensus against the application of per se rules’ under Article 
102.
265
 This willingly abdicates from the legal certainty and ease of application that 
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rules provide. Posner has stated in relation to US antitrust that ‘no responsible person 
favours a legal regime of just rules or just standards, but there is a large middle range in 
which the choice of a rule over a standard depends on a policy judgment rather than an 
exercise of logic’.266 The doctrine in EU competition law, however, appears to disagree. 
 
2. The goals of EU competition law 
 
This section will analyse the connection between the goals of EU competition law and 
an ‘effects-based approach’. Under such approach, as just seen in the previous section, 
authors assume that behaviour must be judged based on anti-competitive effects and 
that assessing those effects through a standard is preferable to presuming them through 
rules. This ‘effects-based approach’ has been the foil of intent in EU competition law. 
Under it, intent can only serve as a proxy for effects – and an imperfect one at that. 
Hence, the doctrinal debate on intent has been limited to admitting it in situations where 
it is safe to presume anti-competitive effects or rejecting it as either misleading or 
unnecessary for that purpose.
267
 Without rejecting that intent is sometimes used as a 
proxy for effects, it is somewhat surprising that authors have not considered that it may 
also be used to judged behaviour autonomously. Other fields of law do so, in particular 
criminal law in relation to inchoate offences.
268
 This oversight could result from the 
misconception, described in Chapter I (on the concept of intent), that undertakings’ 
intent is different from the purpose of agreements and abusive conduct. However, such 
purpose could also be judged independently of effects. A discriminatory purpose of a 
Member State measure is enough to offend free movement provisions.
269
 Even so, 
finding an abuse of dominance based on the intent to prevent parallel trade has been 
criticised for not taking effects into account.
270
 
This section will show that the doctrine’s fixation on effects can be traced to the goals 
of EU competition. Those goals will be considered without taking a position on which 
are valid or should be given priority. As remarked in the introduction to this research, 
this runs largely counter to the approach followed in the doctrine. The legacy of the 
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Chicago School is the always-present concern that competition law needs to define or 
correct its goals or else lead to unacceptable errors of over-inclusion. That discussion is 
not the object of the present research. It may seem that little could be said without 
engaging in it; however that is not the case.
271
 Whatever the goal – market integration, 
consumer welfare, efficiency, the competitive process or public policy concerns –, it 
will be shown below to have been interpreted as attempting to achieve or favour a 
certain outcome. The connection with effects is evident.
272
 Judging behaviour according 
to effects is judging it against a goal, and choosing the relevant effects is awarding 
priority or balancing goals. 
EU competition law can therefore be said to be ‘consequentialist’, that is to say, to make 
its normative properties depend on outcomes.
273
 Consequentialism is a philosophical 
current that developed by relaxing the claims of classic utilitarianism of Bentham and 
Mills, notably that outcomes should be assessed in hedonistic terms (of pleasure and 
pain).
274
 Thus, consequentialism includes all welfare criteria employed by the several 
modern versions of utilitarianism. The concern of consequentialism for real outcomes, 
instead of those intended (foreseen or desired), drives the wedge between the use of 
intent and an ‘effects-based approach’. As such, this section will start by showing that 
the goals of market integration, improving consumer welfare and preserving the 
competitive process have been defined in consequentialist terms, and that public policy 
concerns have been discussed in the same way (i). It will then examine the reasons why 
the doctrine has adopted an ‘effects-based approach’, including the preference of 
assessing effects through a standard and not rules (ii). 
 
i. Consequentialist goals 
 
The first goal to be considered is that of market integration. Article 1 of the Treaty on 
the EU (‘TEU’) declares that Member States confer competences on the EU in order ‘to 
attain objectives they have in common’. Thus, the EU project is defined in relation to 
achieving certain outcomes. The aim of the EU, as stated by Article 3(1) TEU, is ‘to 
promote peace, its values and the well-being of its people’. Competition law is 
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particularly concerned with the objective, stated in definite terms in Article 3(3) TEU, 
that the EU ‘shall establish an Internal Market’.275 The case law has always considered 
that competition law is necessary for the functioning of the internal market, and has 
continued to do so under the TEU.
276
 For present purposes, it is enough to mention the 
instrumental role generally acknowledged to competition law in achieving market 
integration.
277
 Insofar as the Internal Market is an outcome, the goal of market 
integration can be understood as consequentialism.
278
 As Whish and Bailey describe, 
EU competition law prevents the isolation of national markets and encourage trade by 
‘levelling the playing field’.279 This is similar to the market access guaranteed by the 
Treaty’s free movement provisions.280 The case law is thus interpreted as prohibiting 
behaviour preventing the objective of ‘achieving the integration of national markets’.281 
Another natural fit with consequentialism is the goal of improving consumer welfare. 
This goal can be seen as EU competition law’s contribution to the ‘well-being’ stated in 
Article 3(3) TEU.
282
 The Commission has privileged the goal of consumer welfare in its 
‘modernisation’.283 The Court provided little support for this move, notably stating in 
Glaxo that the aims of EU competition law are wider and that, as such, a negative effect 
on consumers was not required to find a restriction by object under Article 101.
284
 
Nevertheless, the reasoning of the Court has been that the protection of the competitive 
process ultimately leads to improving consumer welfare, and under that reasoning the 
Court has made several references to consumer welfare in its case law on Article 101 
and 102.
285
 There is a heated debate on what to understand by ‘consumer welfare’: 
consumer surplus, efficiency, total welfare, or societal benefit.
286
 The notion of 
consumer welfare can be placed anywhere between a direct, narrow, short-term benefit 
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and an indirect, wide, long-term improvement.
287
 Nevertheless, whatever the notion of 
consumer welfare, it is clear that it aims to achieve a certain outcome. Therefore, 
consumer welfare falls under consequentialism – a notion used precisely to cover 
several notions of welfare. 
The protection of the competitive process can also be understood as a separate goal 
different from the indirect consumer welfare. The Court has stated that the Treaty 
competition provisions aim to protect ‘the structure of the market and, in so doing, 
competition as such’.288 The Court’s reasoning is that this is an indirect means to 
improve consumer welfare, as already noted, with the case law contrasting direct and 
indirect damage to consumers.
289
 However, other times the case law makes no such 
connection, opening the way to a particular interpretation that competition is being 
protected as ‘an institution’ – the expression used by AG Kokott in the Opinion in 
British Airways.
290
 This has been associated with the notion of freedom of competition 
under ‘Ordoliberalism’.291 Korah comments that: 
‘The Ordoliberals accepted the view that one of the functions of competition is to 
produce an efficient allocation of resources for the benefit of consumers. In contrast 
to many economists today and recent statements form the Commission, however, 
the Ordoliberals did not accept that “good outcomes” were the sole purpose of 
competition law. They were concerned also about the accumulation of political 
power by the state and private firms, which they feared would result from 
inadequate competition’.292 
The issue of historic and actual Ordoliberal influence over EU law is a contentious 
point.
293
 For the present purposes, however, it is only necessary to analyse whether the 
protection of the competitive process deviates from consequentialism. Ordoliberalism is 
useful in this regard because it eschewed prioritising ‘good outcomes’ of efficiency and 
welfare (since it rejected the central planning of the economy) and placed an emphasis 
on freedom of competition.
294
 This can be compared with the protection of the 
competitive process in EU competition law regardless of any actual influence of 
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Ordoliberalism. First, the objective of Ordoliberalism was to preserve freedom of 
competition as an instrument against economic power. This is considered 
consequentialist by Lianos, as it aims to safeguard well defined outcomes: non-
concentrated markets and economic democracy.
295
 Second, Ordoliberalism advanced 
the notion of an ‘economic constitution’. At one level, this notion promoted a set of 
rules for the competitive process which economic agents could rely on as not being 
conditional upon an individual analysis of each case.
296
 This, however, merely signals a 
preference for rules over standards. At another level, the ‘economic constitution’ 
included private law rights. Such rights can be said not to be consequentialist, since 
their exercise is not linked to any outcome. Hence, the most useful question to be drawn 
from Ordoliberalism is whether EU competition law protects the competitive process by 
granting similar rights to market participants. 
Some authors have discussed whether freedom of competition leads to rights in relation 
to competitive process. Mestmäcker holds that freedom of competition concerns the 
rights of property, contractual freedom and ‘free access to professional and business 
activities against legislative or administrative interference’.297 Competition law governs 
the exercise of those rights in order to ‘participate in competition’, but Mestmäcker does 
not mention rights-based claims in relation to the competitive process. In contrast, 
Nazzini formulates a ‘right to participate in the market, as a consumer or as a 
competitor’.298 For Nazzini, this is another facet of the ‘right not to suffer any limitation 
of market opportunities resulting from anti-competitive behaviour’.299 However, there is 
a procedural and substantive difference. Undertakings have the right to adequate 
remedies against anti-competitive behaviour, as well as several rights in associated 
administrative procedures.
300
 A different issue is undertakings having a substantive 
claim under EU competition law such as the right to participate in the market as a 
competitor. Gormsen goes even further, by stating that the case law has ‘characterised 
free competition as a fundamental right’.301 
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The crucial difference in relation to freedom of competition is between the notions of 
right and interest. The case law quoted by Gormsen does not mention a freedom of 
competition as a fundamental right, but as a ‘fundamental principle’.302 It is true that 
some principles recognised by the Court have led to rights, such as the fundamental 
freedoms and fundamental rights.
303
 However, the Court appears to have carefully 
avoided the same for freedom of competition. Its status as a principle is sufficient to 
influence the interpretation of Articles 101 and 102, as described below. No 
infringement of those provisions has however relied on a right to participate in the 
market. As the Court has repeatedly stated, such provisions protect the ‘interests’ of 
competitors.
304
 This means that access to the market may be guaranteed in the interest 
of competitors, for example by prohibiting rebates foreclosing access to distributors or 
refusals to deal indispensable inputs. However, as described in Chapter V (on abuse of 
dominance), this is connected to particular anti-competitive effects. Undertakings do not 
have the right to participate in the market stated by Nazzini, notably of forcing 
incumbents to lower market barriers. Similarly, in merger control the interest of third 
parties is served if a higher market concentration is avoided, but there is no right to a 
market which is not concentrated. As such, even if it is not understood as indirectly 
pursuing consumer welfare, the goal of protecting the competitive process can still be 
considered consequentialist insofar as it pursues outcomes such as rivalry and low 
market barriers in the interest of competitors. 
Whether public policy concerns are integrated in the goals of EU competition law also 
depends on the definition of consumer welfare.
305
 If they are, it is also enough for the 
present purposes to confirm that they follow the same consequentialist framework as the 
goals of market integration and consumer welfare. For example, environmental 
protection is understood as a goal, namely that of preventing or reducing environmental 
damage.
306
 Townley argues that for such public policy concerns to be considered they 
have to be balanced against their ‘impact upon competition’.307 In addition, Townley 
considers that ‘public policy effects’ should be ‘costed in some way, or at least be 
supported by some widely accepted theoretical mode’.308 Although it is not excluded 
that public policy concerns may go beyond consequentialism, their consideration under 
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EU competition law appears to imply that they are assessed in relation to their 
outcomes.
309
 Thus, there appears to be some consensus about the consequentialism of 
EU competition law goals regardless of the particular goals. 
 
ii. The advantages of an ‘effects-based approach’ 
 
Understanding the goals of EU competition law as consequentialist provides a solid 
explanation of why the doctrine follows an ‘effects-based approach’. If the concern is to 
promote ‘good outcomes’, as Korah mentions, this naturally leads to ‘probable effects 
on the market as the sole criterion of competition’.310 It is beyond question that such an 
approach works for large swathes of EU competition law. Under Article 101(1), 
restrictions by effect are naturally judged on effects. The exemption provided by Article 
101(3) requires the pro-competitive effects therein. Certain abuses under Article 102 
include exclusionary effects in their tests, as seen above in relation to rebates. The test 
in merger control, to ‘significantly impede effective competition’, is also based on 
effects.
311
 In all those situations intent is subordinate to effects, and the only possible 
discussion is whether it constitutes an adequate proxy for them. It makes sense that it 
does, as discussed in Chapter I (on the concept of intent), since effects are assessed in 
relation to practices designed according to undertakings’ intention. Instead of having to 
establish a causal link for each and every effect, market consequences can be assigned 
to the practice investigated as long as they fit with its purpose. Intent may be used to 
interpret actual effects and to predict likely effects.
312
 However, it may also be that such 
effects are also unintended. The present research will not discuss this subordinate role in 
detail, since it is a mere practical application of an ‘effects-based approach’. 
Consequentialist goals provide the reason for generalising an ‘effects-based approach’ 
to all EU competition law, and not just the referred issues expressly based on effects. As 
remarked above, some authors assume that effects are the only substantive criterion 
when contrasting ‘form or effects’, since they equate ‘form’ with presumptions of 
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effects and ‘effects’ with the standard of actual or likely effects. Such authors present no 
substantive alternatives to effects. Consequentialist goals would vindicate this claim 
insofar as EU competition law would only be concerned with outcomes. Therefore, even 
if effects are not always expressly stated, they would have to be presumed as the 
underlying reasoning for judging any behaviour as anti-competitive. This explains the 
doctrinal references to ‘formalism’ beyond its technical meaning (of errors of over- and 
under-inclusion by rules in comparison with standards): the use of substantive criteria 
unrelated to effects would be normatively vacuous. That use could only be attributed to 
an unwarranted side-effect of the procedural necessities of a legal system, such as pre-
‘modernisation’ restrictions to contractual freedom in order to bring the maximum 
number of agreements within the scope of Article 101. Hence the concern expressed by 
Odudu, also noted in the introduction to the present research, of keeping such 
‘jurisdictional’ issues separated from ‘substantive’ questions.313 
If consequentialist goals clearly explain an ‘effects-based approach’, they do not 
immediately explain the preference for the standard of actual or likely effects over rules. 
Philosophically, consequentialists are divided between ‘act’ and ‘rules’ 
consequentialists.
314
 As such, rules consequentialists recognise that certain outcomes 
should not be pursued under a standard. An important factor is the recognition that it is 
often impossible to assess the consequences of particular acts.
315
 This factor is 
integrated in Hayek’s conception of competition as a process of factual discovery, 
which argues that an economy should not be directed to achieve pre-ordained goals.
316
 
Yet, in EU competition law, an ‘effects-based approach’ shows great conviction in 
being able to judge behaviour according to the standard of its actual or likely effects.
317
 
Notably, there appears to be no support at all for per se abuses under Article 102.
318
 
This preference is even more striking by being limited to judicial assessment, as the 
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extensive rule-making which accompanied the Commission’s ‘modernisation’ is not 
subject to the same bias.
319
 
The reason for the preference for a standard of actual or likely effects is doctrinal, and 
does not reflect a substantive concern. On the side of substantive concerns, it could be 
argued that it is important to avoid false positives caused by rules in order not to chill 
competition, which is a sensible concern. However, as noted above what is relevant in 
this regard is the overall enforcement of EU competition law, not the comparison 
between rules and standards, since standards can lead to the same false positives by 
being ill defined or applied.
320
 Another sensible argument is that in the past 
presumptions of effects have shown not to be sophisticated enough or plain wrong.
321
 
Nevertheless, it is not impossible to formulate adequate rules. For example, above- and 
below-cost price rules are generally viewed favourably in relation to effects on 
efficiency.
322
 The limitations of those rules derive from the fact that the rules actually 
established by the Court do not support the interpretation that they only protect as-
efficient competitors from exclusion.
323
 That is the reason why the doctrine prefers a 
standard over rules: it provides a more flexible framework to argue and advocate a 
particular goal by avoiding the formalisation of other substantive criteria under rules. 
Lianos observes that: 
‘[t]he choice of the interpretive strategy is thus of little value other than the 
realization of the end-state sought, once the goal(s) have been determined. From 
this perspective, providing the adjudicator the widest margin of discretion is the 
prevailing strategy, as in any case, the adjudicator should guide the legal process to 
the “optimal” solution. It is not a surprise that authors advancing the goal of 
consumer welfare or that of the protection of the consumer and those arguing for a 
total welfare approach and economic efficiency agree on the rule of reason and 
different forms of balancing as their preferred strategy for implementing 
competition law’.324 
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As discussed above, the difference of standard in relation to rules is the definition of the 
relevant factors ex post. This makes standards easier to change, since the relevant 
factors can be adapted to the prevalent view at the time of their application.
325
 It is the 
doctrine that sets this view. Thus, an ‘effects-based approach’ is more than a position 
which is theoretically coherent with consequentialist goals: it is an active program for 
the doctrine to influence practical adjudication. This can be observed by how the goal of 
consumer welfare featured in the doctrinal debate, notably on the side of Bork and the 
Chicago School, well before it was appropriated by the Commission’s 
‘modernisation’.326 An ‘effects-based approach’ allowed the Commission to do so 
without changing its formal application of EU competition law. All that was necessary 
was to start assessing actual or likely effects on consumer welfare. Those that favour 
other goals merely propose that the Commission does likewise, as seen above in relation 
to public policy concerns, but in relation to other effects. 
This perspective sheds light on the judicial reaction to the Commission’s stated change 
of goal in ‘modernisation’. Since restrictions by object involve a standard of anti-
competitive nature, as discussed above, it was easy for the General Court to support this 
change of goal in Glaxo. In contrast, per se abuses do not lend themselves to this re-
interpretation, hence their doctrinal rejection and the Commission’s application of a 
standard of ‘anti-competitive foreclosure’ in the Enforcement Guidance on Article 
102.
327
 The Court resisted both of these changes, as detailed in Chapter IV (on 
restrictions of competition) and Chapter V (on abuse of dominance). The answer of the 
doctrine, as noted above, is to attribute this to formalism. However, as the doctrine has 
convincingly argued, under an ‘effects-based approach’ there is no benefit to such 
formalism. If the Court were to pursue consequentialist goals it would be at the 
forefront in accepting a standard of actual or likely effects.
328
 The use of substantive 
criteria other than effects is normatively puzzling. An ‘effects-based approach’ provides 
a coherent explanation of the normative character of EU competition law and a plan to 
advance it. However, it is unable to provide an explanation for the deviations from that 
plan which patently occur. 
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3. Moral judgments of intent 
 
This chapter will link the normative role of intent in EU competition law to moral 
judgments. For the purposes of the present research, the expression ‘moral’ reflects the 
questions engaged by moral philosophy, namely those dealt with by its branch of 
normative ethics: why actions are considered right or wrong. This is naturally limited by 
the scope of the present research, so that the moral judgments concerned are the judicial 
assessments of whether competitive behaviour is right or wrong in light of EU 
competition law.
 
It is not, as stated in the introduction to this research, an attempt to 
formulate a moral theory of judicial decision-making. The purpose is simply to use the 
contributions of moral philosophy in order to better understand the case law. Some, like 
Posner, see this as a weakness by importing another set of controversies.
329
 However, as 
also set out in the introduction, it is possible to avoid this by keeping to larger trends 
and their salient features. The usefulness of this approach has already been proven by 
allowing EU competition law goals to be framed as consequentialist, since 
consequentialism is one of the main approaches to normative ethics.
330
 What those goals 
allow is to judge behaviour as right or wrong according to the resulting outcome. In that 
situation normativity lies with effects and intent can only play a subordinate role. This 
section will consider the situations where behaviour is judged according to intent, 
granting it an autonomous normative value. 
Although the EU sets out to achieve certain aims, including those represented by EU 
competition law goals, it is also governed by values. Article 3(1) EU refers to values 
together with well-being, and those values are stated in Article 2 EU as including 
freedom and equality. Rather than attempting to interpret these values directly into EU 
competition law, what is important is to take an ethical background which is wider than 
consequentialism. An ethical background is sometimes associated with the notion of 
‘fairness’, omitted from the goals of EU competition law above despite sometimes 
being referred to in that capacity.
331
 Fairness can indeed be understood as 
consequentialist insofar as it pursues public policies such as the protection of small 
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undertakings or the redistribution of income.
332
 However, fairness can also involve a 
non-consequentialist judgement of intent. Stucke describes how price gouging is 
considered unfair, for example a raise in the price of snow-shovels after a snowstorm, 
while similar outcomes of consumer loss are admitted in normal situations of increased 
demand.
333
 Although this can be rationalised as the intent to profit from exceptional 
unfavourable situations being unfair, in other situations unfairness is used as non-
sequitur for the kind of intuitive judgments addressed below. Hence, the many 
connotations of fairness – including, in addition, the field of law of unfair competition 
and the reference in Article 101(3) to a ‘fair share’ – do not recommend its use in the 
present research, which will try to avoid it. 
A better notion for the moral judgment analysed in this section is Dworkin’s notion of 
‘principles’, which he contrasts with ‘policies’.334 A policy ‘sets out a goal to be 
reached, generally an improvement in some economic, political, or social feature of the 
community (though some goals are negative, in that they stipulate that some present 
feature is to be protected from adverse change)’.335 This corresponds to the 
consequentialist goals of EU competition law as described above. In contrast, a 
principle ‘is to be observed, not because it will advance or secure an economic, 
political, or social situation deemed desirable, but because it is a requirement of justice 
or fairness or some other dimension of morality’.336 This corresponds to the judgments 
of intent which will be examined below. Dworkin associates the judicial function more 
to principles than policies, of which the Court’s case law is a good example: the 
discourse is one of principles previous established, not desirable outcomes.
337
 
This section’s role is part descriptive, part normative. It will start by describing to two 
other major approaches to normative ethics besides consequentialism – deontology and 
virtue ethics – and show how certain principles applied by the case law reflect them (i). 
This description will extend to how the ‘doctrine of double effect’ uses intent to limit 
the application of consequentialism to harm to competitors and collusion (ii). This will 
lead to the normative part, starting with how the notion of ‘reflective equilibrium’ is 
desirable for the stability of the case law (iii). The section will then conclude that the 
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normative value of intent is guaranteed by the ‘reflective equilibrium’ between 
competitive intuitions and paradigms representing the plurality of normative views of 
EU competition law (iv). 
 
i. Deontology and virtue ethics 
 
While the goals of EU competition law allow much of the Court’s case law to be 
interpreted from a consequentialist perspective, namely standards of actual or likely 
effects and rules that presume effects, such a perspective proves unsatisfactory in 
relation to other important aspects. Instead of dismissing such aspects as ‘formalism’, as 
an ‘effects-based approach’ was shown to do above, it is worth investigating if they 
apply principles involving a non-consequentialist moral judgment. A first possible 
alternative in terms of normative ethics is deontology. Deontology judges behaviour 
according to moral norms (independently of the outcomes that the behaviour may lead 
to).
338
 Therefore, what is decisive is the agent’s intent to follow the moral norm.339 The 
quintessential deontological approach is that of Kant, namely by praising good will as 
unqualified good, by censoring using others as a means to an end, and by judging 
behaviour according to norms capable of being willed as universal laws.
340
 Kantian 
philosophy has been associated with Ordoliberalism.
341
 It was seen above that, although 
freedom of competition has been recognised as principle, the protection of the 
competitive process does not grant a right to participate in the market. If such a right 
existed, the duty to respect it would be deontological, as are the duties to respect to 
respect the private law rights which Ordoliberals frame under an ‘economic 
constitution’. This does however not exclude that there are other duties in relation to the 
competitive process which do not rely on those rights. 
The case law on parallel trade provides a good example of deontological duty. As 
detailed in Chapters IV (on restrictions of competition) and Chapter V (on abuse of 
dominance), the aim to prevent parallel trade is enough to find a restriction by object 
under Article 101 or an abuse under Article 102.
342
 These correspond to a moral 
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judgment of intent. It was stated above that market integration could be interpreted as 
consequentialist goal, in the sense of achieving the Internal Market. It is true that 
restrictions to market integration can be assessed through effects, namely obstacles to 
trade between Member States. Nonetheless, market integration also constitutes a 
principle which allows judging behaviour with the aim to prevent parallel trade. It could 
be said that this also involves a presumption of effects. However, the case law has 
upheld the finding of anti-competitive intent even if it leads to the result, contrary to 
market integration, of deepening the differences between Member States.
343
 Faced with 
parallel trade which they cannot restrict, undertakings might choose not to invest in the 
exporting Member State.
344
 If market integration were only consequentialist, this 
outcome should save the behaviour: it is better to have regional price differences than 
differences in product availability. Under an effects-based reasoning, Monti qualifies 
the case law as ‘irrational’.345 However, because the principle of market integration is 
predominantly deontological, behaviour is judged on its intent.
346
 In other words, there 
is an intent-based rule that aiming to restrict parallel trading is simply wrong. 
The second alternative to consequentialism is virtue ethics. Instead of judging an action 
on its outcome or conformity with moral norms, virtue ethics judges it as an expression 
of a character trait.
347
 The most iconic formulation of virtue ethics is that of Aristotle, 
grounded on excellence, practical wisdom and living well.
348
 The guidance that virtue 
ethics provides is harder to codify than the norms of deontology, but there is great 
potential in judging intent with reference to virtues and vices.
349
 Stucke adopts this 
approach when defining morality, for the purposes of applying it to US antitrust, as 
‘rules of conduct associated with certain distinctive psychological and social attributes, 
such that a person complies with the conduct to achieve virtue and avoid vices’.350 One 
area of the case law which is hard to interpret as consequentialist but expresses virtue 
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ethics is exploitative abuses of dominance, insofar as ‘exploitative’ involves a judgment 
of the character of the dominant undertaking as expressed by its intent. 
As also referred in Chapter V (on abuse of dominance), the case law on exploitative 
abuses does not reflect the economic notion of consumer harm, since a dominant 
position is defined by the possibility to charge such a supra-competitive margin and this 
would equal prohibiting dominance itself. Although a deontological rule could be 
formulated against prices above economic value, which the case law also mentions, this 
appears to only come into play after the price is considered disproportionate.
351
 This 
shifts the judgment to the dominant undertaking’s intent, namely whether it is justified 
in intending to charge such prices. There is an indication that prices above economic 
value are allowed according to circumstances.
352
 Therefore, the case law on exploitative 
prices and contractual conditions is better explained as a principle prohibiting dominant 
undertakings from being greedy, unfair or unreasonable, expressions (vices) that 
incorporate a proportionality judgment.
353
 
Once deontology and virtue ethics have proven useful in interpreting case law which 
cannot be explained by consequentialism, it is possible to start investigating if they 
provide a better explanation when consequentialism is also a possibility. The 
interpretation of market integration as deontological is particularly important for this, 
since it shows that the Court’s teleological interpretation is not limited to 
consequentialism. Lianos has remarked that one of the reasons allowing the ‘goal-
oriented approach of legal interpretation to thrive’ is the Court’s teleological 
interpretation.
354
 However, teleological interpretation can also be employed in relation 
to principles, namely working towards the generally applicability of a moral norm or the 
furthering of certain virtues. The Court’s most iconic teleological interpretations have 
been on the Internal Market and, assuming that these methods have been transposed to 
EU competition law, the predominance of restrictions by object – and not restrictions by 
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effect – on issues of market integration signals that the Court prefers to employ 
teleological interpretation to principles and not policies.
355
 
The inability of market integration and exploitation to be fully explained by 
consequentialist goals has not gone unnoticed in the doctrine, leading to their 
classification as exceptions to an ‘effects-based approach’. First, a ‘single market 
imperative’ is either presented as exceptional due to the character of the EU project or 
subject to some conciliatory effort with a more clearly consequentialist goal.
356
 Second, 
it is held that application of Article 102 should be centred on exclusionary abuses, not 
exploitative ones, in order to prevent the market power that allows exploitation.
357
 A 
conception of EU competition law that frames judgements like Consten and Grundig 
and United Brands as exceptional is debatable. Nonetheless, it is true that the normative 
value of intent under a non-consequentialist approach can only be truly expressed if 
proven in relation to the core of EU competition law issues of harm to competitors and 
collusion. This will be addressed in the next section. 
 
ii. The ‘doctrine of double effect’ 
 
The main question of competition law can be said to be: what are undertakings able to 
do in their pursuit of market power.
358
 Under Article 101, that question involves 
undertakings’ ability to cooperate. Under Article 102, it mainly involves a dominant 
undertaking’s ability to cause harm to competitors. It has been seen that behaviour can 
be judged based on either its intent or effects. In order to assess whether that distinction 
is useful in relation to harm to competitors, it is worth quoting the following parable by 
Dworkin on ‘competition and injury’: 
‘Here are two sad stories. (1) You are hiking in the Arizona desert with a stranger, 
you are both bitten by rattlesnakes, and you both see a vial of antidote lying in the 
scrabble. Both race for it, but you are nearer and grab it. He pleads for it, but you 
open and swallow it yourself. You live and he dies. (2) As before, but this time he 
is closer to the antidote, and he grabs it. You plead for it, but he refuses and is about 
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to open and swallow it. You have a gun; you shoot him dead and take the antidote 
yourself. You live and he dies’.359 
Dworkin uses this parable to attack consequentialism: the outcome of both stories is 
ostensibly the same, so consequentialism treats them no differently.
360
 Dworkin argues 
that there is a difference: taking the antidote for oneself is justified, but not killing the 
stranger. The difference is between killing and letting die. 
Dworkin takes inspiration in Kantian philosophy to claim that one has a responsibility 
for one’s own life, and must recognise a parallel responsibility in others.361 The only 
way to reconcile these parallel responsibilities is to distinguish between ‘competition 
harm’ and ‘deliberate harm’. In order to illustrate this, Dworkin provides another 
parable of swimmers competing in the game of life.
362
 Competition harm cannot be 
prohibited, since one swimmer will get ‘the blue ribbon or the job or the lover or the 
house on the hill that another wants’.363 Each swimmer concentrates on his own lane 
aware that, if he or she wins, others must lose. Another thing is for a swimmer to cross 
the lanes to deliberately hurt another swimmer. Dworkin concludes that ‘[w]e need the 
right to compete to lead our own lives, but we do not need the right deliberately to 
injure others’.364 On the contrary, responsibility for our own lives requires ‘a moral 
immunity from deliberate harm by others’.365 With these arguments, Dworkin sketches 
a convincing deontological defence for the case law on Article 102, examined in 
Chapter V (on abuse of dominance), that it is abusive for undertakings to intend to harm 
competitors. 
In contrast, the intent to harm competitors should be irrelevant under a consequentialist 
view. For the goals of consumer welfare or efficiency, inefficient competitors should be 
excluded and efficient competitors thrive no matter if the harm is deliberate or from 
competition. Roughly speaking, the concern under these goals would be anti-
competitive effects on consumers and as-efficient competitors. There might be more 
sympathy for inefficient competitors under the goal of protecting the competitive 
process, but competition and deliberate harm are not distinguished within such process. 
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The concern is whether rivalry is preserved and barriers stay low. In defence of 
consequentialism, it could be argued that Dworkin’s parables do not get competition 
between undertakings right. Such competition does not take place in separate lanes – it 
is more akin to having a knife fight for the antidote. In US antitrust, Easterbrook has 
stated that: 
‘Wanting harm, even bankruptcy, to come to one’s business rivals is not actionable; 
hatred is a spur to competition, which serves consumers’ interests. Entrepreneurs 
are privileged to compete because any effort to separate pure from impure motives 
would in the end undercut the power of rivalry to promote consumers’ welfare’.366 
Stucke comments that, in stating so, Easterbrook assumes it is not possible to 
distinguish between good and bad intent.
367
 This is an issue in US antitrust, as intent 
must be considered under a ‘rule of reason’.368 In EU competition law, however, it 
would be possible to bypass intent and focus on goals. A consequentialist could thus 
argue that Dworkin’s examples are inadequate because the harm of one undertaking is 
not considered against the benefit of another. Such harm, regardless of being deliberate 
or from competition, would result in an improvement to consumer welfare, efficiency or 
the competitive process. 
In order to explain how intent matters in situations where harm is used to achieve a 
good, such as harm to competitors benefiting consumer welfare or efficiency, it is useful 
to take a much debated case in moral philosophy dubbed the ‘trolley problem’.369 The 
‘trolley problem’ starts by a first situation where the mentioned trolley loses its breaks 
and careers uncontrollably towards five people further down the track. One onlooker 
stands close to a switch which can send the trolley to a side track. However, on that side 
track is another person. None of these people have any chance of escaping death if hit 
by the trolley. The question is whether the onlooker should switch the trolley to the side 
track. 
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The answer given by moral philosophers is then compared to a second situation. As in 
the first, a runaway trolley heads towards five people. However, instead of a side track, 
there is a bridge overlooking the trolley. On that bridge stands an onlooker and a fat 
person with just the right volume to stop the trolley, but who would not survive the 
impact. The question is whether the onlooker should push the fat person on to the track. 
 
Although these situations are clearly manufactured, they have the advantage of eliciting 
intuitive reactions which have been able to be empirically tested on a large number of 
people.
370
 From a consequentialist point of view, there is again no difference between 
these situations: five lives can be saved at the price of one. However, most people have 
answered that it is permissible for the onlooker to switch the track but not to push the fat 
person. Mikhail observes that these judgments are ‘principled’: they are stable, stringent 
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and highly predictable.
371
 However, when asked to justify these judgements, most 
people are unable to provide a coherent reasoning.
372
 The prevalent explanation is that, 
in the first situation, by switching the track the onlooker intends to save five people but 
not kill the one. That death is an unintended consequence. In contrast, in the second 
situation, the onlooker intends to kill the fat person as a means to save the five people. 
The reasoning of the ‘trolley problem’ can be transposed to EU competition law. If one 
considers saving the five people as any good goal (consumer welfare, efficiency or the 
competitive process), it is possible to see how the intent to harm (an undertaking) can be 
relevant even if that harm is necessary to achieve such goal. 
Both Dworkin’s parables and the ‘trolley problem’ fall under the ‘doctrine of double 
effect’. This doctrine states that sometimes it is permissible to cause harm as a side 
effect (or ‘double effect’) of bringing about a good result even though it would not be 
permissible to cause such a harm as a means to bringing about the same good end.
373
 In 
the first situation provided the harm is merely foreseen (the stranger dying because there 
is not enough antidote, swimmers not getting a reward because another won, the person 
being hit by trolley because the track was changed), while in the second it is intentional 
(the stranger being shot, the swimmer being assaulted in his lane, the fat person being 
pushed). Although the examples given so far are constructed, the ‘doctrine of double 
effect’ has always been considered of significant practical importance, from collateral 
damage in war to medical proceedings with potentially dangerous consequences.
374
 Its 
philosophical tradition goes back to Aquinas, but fell into some disuse as the notion of 
intention as a ‘state of mind’, discussed in Chapter I (on the concept of intent), took 
hold: in order not to be considered morally responsible, one would only have to ‘direct’ 
his or her mind away from the consequences.
375
 It was against this development that 
Anscombe formulated the objective notion of intention, also discussed in Chapter I (on 
the concept of intent), as answering the question ‘why?’ by giving reasons. 
As can be seen from all the above examples, the ‘doctrine of double effect’ is directly 
opposed to consequentialism. It was Anscombe that coined the expression 
‘consequentialism’, based precisely on the lack of distinction between foreseen and 
intended consequences.
376
 Competition law can easily fall into this approach in relation 
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to harm to competitors since, as Easterbrook comments, ‘[y]ou cannot be a sensible 
business executive without understanding the link among prices, your firm’s success, 
and other firms’ distress’.377 This link can be understood as knowing that competitors 
will be harmed by normal competition, and therefore normal competition being the 
same thing as intending such harm. It is also at the basis of the error, noted in Chapter I 
(on the concept of intent), of understanding all strategies that lead to a certain foreseen 
effect as being equal. The ‘doctrine of double effect’ does not disprove 
consequentialism: it may be that competition is better if undertakings are allowed to 
deliberately harm competitors, or that EU competition law should only consider effects 
in relation to its goals.
378
 This question is dealt with below. For the moment, the 
purpose of the ‘doctrine of double effect’ is only to recognise that explains part of the 
case law on harm to competitors under Article 102 which consequentialism does not. 
The doctrine of double effect thus provides an answer to two of the central problems of 
EU competition law: when undertakings are allowed to harm competitors, and when are 
they allowed to cooperate. Thus, as developed in Chapter V (on abuse of dominance), 
judging the intent to harm competitors as abusive under Article 102 is grounded on a 
sound distinction between such intent and knowing competitors will be harmed through 
normal competition – either by considering undertakings in relation to each other, as 
Dworkin does, or in relation to the goals of EU competition law. The ‘doctrine of 
double effect’ is also applied to collusion, the other main issue of EU competition law. 
As described in Chapter III (on collusion), undertakings influence each other equally 
through market action, particularly in oligopolistic markets, and agreements. A 
consequentialist approach acknowledges no difference, and views any as the result of 
formalism.
379
 The solution under an ‘effects-based approach’, as already remarked, is to 
distinguish collusion and other ‘jurisdictional’ questions from the ‘substantive’ harm. It 
will be argued in Chapter III (on collusion) that such collusion already involves a pre-
                                                     
377
 A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1401-02 (7th Cir. 1989), quoted by 
Stucke (2012) 818. 
378
 For example, criminal law often does not follow the ‘doctrine of double effect’. As stated by Ashworth 
(2009) 172, foresight is considered as intention in some situations. This is due to the adoption of the 
notion of intention as a ‘state of mind’, which as remarked would allow to easily escaping responsibility 
without such correction. However, in doing so criminal law adopts a notion of intention which, as 
Ashworth notes, does not correspond to the everyday meaning, namely by differentiating different types 
of foresight (in order not to make intention too broad). It is interesting to note that Ashworth quotes 
Bentham (a consequentialist) in admitting ‘oblique intent’. As discussed in Chapter I (on concept of 
intent), EU competition law adopts an objective and everyday (‘folk psychology) notion of intention 
which evades this problem, allowing the use of the ‘double effect doctrine’.  
379
 For example, Motta (2007) 189 considers that the reason for distinguishing explicit and implicit 
(oligopolistic) collusion is the (current) unavailability of econometric techniques to separate collusion 
from regular competition. 
- 83 - 
substantive analysis. In agreements the substantive harm is intended, whereas in parallel 
behaviour it is a foreseen side-effect of each undertaking acting independently. 
Therefore, the ‘doctrine of double effect’ is essential in establishing an intent contrary to 
the principles of EU competition law, namely collusion and competition which is not 
‘on the merits’, which as described below is the starting base for infringements of 
Articles 101 and 102. 
 
iii. Reflective equilibrium 
 
The issue of moral intuitions, which among others support the ‘doctrine of double 
effect’, is particularly relevant for judicial assessment which the present research 
focuses on. As both a judge and a legal pragmatic (and therefore close to 
consequentialism), Posner admits to and argues for judicial use of intuitions.
380
 Moral 
intuitions are implicit in virtue ethics, but have received the most systematic treatment 
by Rawls as a ‘sense of justice’. Rawls’ theory of justice is better known for the 
arguments of the ‘original position’ and ‘justice as fairness’, but it also argues that a 
conception of justice must be ‘stable’.381 Stability means that norms are wilfully 
respected and there is a sanctioning system, but also requires a ‘sense of justice’.382 This 
‘sense of justice’ can be defined as a normally developed moral capacity to judge 
matters just and unjust, as well as a desire to act in accordance to those judgments and 
an expectation others will do the same.
383
 Like Dworkin, Rawls distinguishes the ‘sense 
of justice’ from the desire for outcomes described by natural or social sciences.384 The 
‘sense of justice’ depends on normative principles, which are of higher order and 
regulate the pursuit of those desires.
385
 As Rawls describes: 
‘what is required is a formulation of a set of principles which, when conjoined to 
our beliefs and knowledge of the circumstances, would lead us to make these 
judgments with their supporting reasons were we to apply these principles 
conscientiously and intelligently. A conception of justice characterizes our moral 
sensibility when the everyday judgements we do make are in accordance with its 
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principles. These principles can serve as part of the premises of an argument which 
arrives at the matching judgments. We do not understand our sense of justice until 
we know in some systematic way covering a wide range of cases what these 
principles are’.386 
The present research attempts to determine the normative principles that apply when EU 
competition law makes a judgment of behaviour based on intent. As set out in the 
introduction to this research, it is not necessary to discuss how far the Court’s judicial 
decision making represents such intuitions. What matters is whether the interpretation 
of the case law, making it the ‘best it can be’ under Dworkin’s conception described in 
Chapter I (on the concept of intent), involves moral judgments of intent. Rawls provides 
a framework on how to incorporate intuitions into moral judgments through the notion 
of ‘reflective equilibrium’.387 Under this notion, a ‘sense of justice’ confronts moral 
intuitions with moral conceptions such as the ones provided by the different theories of 
normative ethics. An equilibrium is reached ‘after a person has weighed various 
proposed conceptions and he has either revised his judgments to accord with one of 
them or held fast to his initial convictions (and the corresponding conception)’.388 
The notion of ‘reflective equilibrium’ has been opposed under a consequentialist 
approach. Singer, a utilitarian, has argued that if moral intuitions do not fit moral 
theory, they should be discarded instead of attempting to change the theory.
389
 For 
example, the ‘trolley problem’ might reflect the fact that evolution has made us averse 
to forms of killing that involve personal contact, explaining the difference between 
switching the track and pushing the fat person.
390
 Therefore, for Singer, saving five 
lives at the cost of one is justified in both switching the track and pushing the fat person. 
Singer is aware that this also represents an intuition about the greater good, indeed the 
one at the essence of the utilitarianism that he defends – the same which leads people to 
consider permissible changing the track.
391
 Singer therefore distinguishes between 
‘reasoned conclusions’ and those that result from our evolutionary and cultural 
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history.
392
 This represents a ‘constructivist’ approach akin, to Kant’s formulation of 
moral norms by reason alone, which Rawls and Anscombe have argued against in 
favour of a ‘realist’ moral philosophy.393 
Without entering into a controversy in the domain of meta-ethics, it is submitted that 
Rawls’ ‘sense of justice’ can be used for interpreting the judicial assessment object of 
the present research. It was already seen that the case law represents moral intuitions, 
such as the ‘doctrine of double effect’, and that principles involve considering moral 
convictions. Several reasons recommend attempting to achieve a ‘reflective 
equilibrium’ between the two. First, this equilibrium does not exclude consequentialist 
moral convictions, like the ones expressed in EU competition law goals.
394
 Therefore, if 
these give reason to revise the intuitions such as the ‘doctrine of double effect’, this can 
be done. Second, the stability which Rawls attempts to achieve through a ‘sense of 
justice’ is also important for the Court’s case law. If the case law goes against moral 
intuitions that cannot be revised, it is likely to lead to errors even if a rational approach 
is genuinely attempted: of the Court in its application, and of interpreters in their 
understanding. Finally, Singer’s approach requires a distinction between the rational 
and the cultural or evolutionary. The example of the ‘trolley problem’ shows how 
difficult this is. On the one hand, there are several rationalisations of its results, such as 
Dworkin’s above. On the other, Singer’s evolutionary explanation hardly applies to the 
fact that undertakings are, like the fat person, protected from deliberate harm. Rather 
than centring the discussion to the cause of this intuition, it is better to confront it with 
moral convictions and see if equilibrium is possible. 
 
iv. The normative value of intent 
 
The notions of moral judgment and ‘reflective equilibrium’ examined above are the 
foundation for the normative value of intent in EU competition law. This value must be 
distinguished from the consensual value also attributed to effects. The doctrinal 
attention given to the goals of EU competition law is the natural recognition that certain 
outcomes are normatively desirable. Insofar as intent is used in subordination to effects, 
namely to interpret or predict them, it shares this normative value. This subordinate role 
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was admitted above but also excluded from the present research. Only an autonomous 
normative value is relevant for the present purposes. Without it, the examples given 
above of intent’s role in analysing restrictions to parallel imports, exploitative abuses, 
harm to competitors or collusion risk being classified as normatively incoherent and a 
target for legal reform – as developed in the respective chapters below, this is how they 
are treated by many authors. That is somewhat logical, since those examples cannot be 
understood under the consequentialist approach that the goals of EU competition law 
embody. An autonomous normative value depends on considering those examples as 
applying principles based on a moral judgment of intent. 
It should first be stated how the different normative values of intent and effects make 
this debate particularly difficult. For example, it could be held, against the mainstream 
view that ‘competition, not competitors’ should be protected, that it is logical to protect 
competitors from deliberate harm because even inefficient competitors may contribute 
to consumer welfare, or that new entrants might require a lead to catch up on the 
incumbent’s efficiency, or that this will result in less concentrated markets or socially 
desirable small undertakings.
395
 Those arguments, no matter how true, will nevertheless 
play to a corresponding goal. Depending on different results according to each goal 
(including errors of over- and under-inclusion if rules are employed), those arguments 
would culminate in a balancing exercise. Despite such arguments not being associated 
with an ‘effects-based approach’, that is what they represent. Another thing is to argue 
that competitors are protected from deliberate harm because that corresponds to a 
deontological rule or to virtuous competition. Philosophers have been debating similar 
moral alternatives for centuries. Indeed, many authors appear to be attracted to 
competition law because the use of economics implies an acceptance of 
consequentialism. The present research, on the contrary, makes no claim whatsoever 
that any moral view is preferable. 
What the present research argues is that, contrary to an ‘effects-based approach’, 
behaviour should be judged solely on one substantive criterion. It is clear that behaviour 
is judged on effects in the several situations described above. Indeed, the onus is on an 
‘effects-based approach’ to explain every standard and every rule as capturing effects. 
As will be developed in the chapters below, it fails to do so. A broader normative 
outlook is also hinted by the fact that EU law, particularly the provisions on free 
movement, also consider purpose – though not strictly intent, as stated in Chapter I (on 
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the concept of intent) – in alternative to effects. It is hard to ignore the influence of 
those judicial methods in EU competition law.
396
 Finally, judging intent establishes a 
normative connection with the intended effects. It is perfectly compatible with finding 
those effects as normatively undesirable. An ‘effects-based approach’, on the other 
hand, attempts to cut the connection with intent. It considers that an undertaking’s intent 
should be normatively irrelevant beyond its causal function. This goes against the moral 
intuition, formalised in many fields of law, that some intent is indeed censorable. 
It is further argued that the normative value of intent represents a ‘reflective 
equilibrium’ in EU competition law, and the stability which it provides is the reason 
why such value must be recognised. In contrast, an ‘effects-based approach’ which 
denies normative value to intent is neither implemented nor can it reach such 
equilibrium without fundamentally changing the nature of EU competition law. This is 
not because the moral intuition of distinguishing between intended and foreseen effects 
cannot be revised by consequentialist reasons. The history of competition law includes 
revisions of moral intuitions, such as considering cartels illegal instead of gentlemanly 
agreements or the discrediting of the idea of ‘cut-throat competition’.397 Moral 
intuitions are shaped by culture, as Singer points out, and as economic notions become 
generally accepted they are integrated into such intuitions. For example, in the present 
day efficiency might be counted as virtue.
398
 What safeguards the normative value of 
intent is that there is no need for such revision, insofar as the use of intent is admitted as 
part of ‘paradigms’ shared by all moral convictions. 
‘Paradigms’ are interpretative devices which allow circumventing disagreements about 
moral concepts. Dworkin describes how we agree that certain concepts are moral, but 
disagree about their precise character and the correct reaction.
399
 This does not prevent 
that ‘we agree sufficiently about what we take to be paradigm instances of the concept, 
and paradigm cases of appropriate reactions about those instances’.400 As seen so far, 
there is disagreement on how to judge behaviour as anti-competitive, both within the 
consequentialist goals of EU competition law, and in relation to other normative ethics. 
There is some agreement, however, on what behaviour is not anti-competitive: the one 
that corresponds to perfectly competitive markets. In their ideal form, perfectly 
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competitive markets lead to consumer welfare and efficiency, follow moral norms that 
are generally accepted, and are constituted by virtuous participants. From perfectly 
competitive markets, the case law has extracted two paradigms: independence of 
economic action and competition on the merits. These have been established as 
principles of EU competition law which, as described throughout the present research, 
influence all the conditions of Articles 101 and 102. 
The principle of independence of economic action roughly consists in what the Court 
stated in T-Mobile as ‘the notion inherent in the Treaty provisions on competition, 
according to which each economic operator must determine independently the policy 
which he intends to adopt’.401 This corresponds to the paradigm of undertakings 
determining their behaviour relying solely on the conditions set by the market. In doing 
so, as discussed in Chapter III (on collusion), it excludes from the scope of Article 101 
the situations where an undertaking reacts to freely available market information. All 
moral conceptions support this principle. For deontology, it is a norm which allows 
undertakings to act freely. For virtue ethics, undertakings do not take any unfair 
advantage. For consequentialism, acting on market information causes the best 
outcomes.
402
 As Lianos describes: 
‘If competition law perceives collusion with more suspicion than unilateral 
conduct, it is because competition law is based on the assumption that the free 
market system where firms will be price takers and will independently decide their 
commercial strategy according to their own costs and to their own estimates of 
consumer preferences, constitutes the default organizational structure in modern 
economy. This is in conformity with the assumptions of the perfect competition 
model, which still constitutes the intellectual backbone of competition law’.403 
The principle of independence of economic action sets the scope of normative relevance 
under Article 101, as also described in Chapter III (on collusion), allowing adjudication 
in the grey area where undertakings make indirect contact through the market. Once the 
principle is breached, the normative consensus ends. Therefore, after collusion has been 
found, an infringement of Article 101 requires a restriction by object or effect. Chapter 
IV (on restrictions of competition) will discuss how restrictions by object are judgments 
of intent under deontology or virtue ethics (such as the already mentioned restrictions of 
parallel trade or the restrictions allowed to certain types of undertakings), while 
restrictions by effects represent the consequentialist goals of EU competition law. 
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The same happens in relation to the principle of competition on the merits. As described 
in Chapter V (on abuse of dominance), the Court stated in Post Danmark that 
competition on the merits may ‘lead to the departure from the market or the 
marginalisation of competitors that are less efficient and so less attractive to consumers 
from the point of view of, among other things, price, choice, quality or innovation’.404 
This corresponds to the paradigm of market success being determined by 
(unconstrained) consumer choice. Such paradigm allows dominant undertakings to 
harm competitors indirectly. Again, all moral conceptions support this principle. 
Deontology does not recognise a right to participate in the market protected from this 
harm, as noted above. Consumer choice will reflect the undertakings’ virtues. 
Consequentialism also accepts consumer choice as the key to the competitive process, 
improving consumer welfare and efficiency.
405
 The principle of competition on the 
merits signals the behaviour which is normatively relevant under Article 102. Gerber 
states that it ‘is not a “test” for actually determining that conduct distorts competition; it 
is rather an indication of potential distortion’.406 Once there is such indication, tests of 
abuse apply that can be based on either intent or effects, reflecting the different 
normative ethics employed. Hence, as detailed in Chapter V (on abuse of dominance), 
after competition on the merits has been dismissed an infringement of Article 102 
further requires specific abuses, which can represent the intent to harm competitors or 
the effects of indirect harm. 
Despite branching off into intent or effects once they are breached, both the principle of 
independent economic action and competition on the merits are based on intent. This is 
because they do not correspond to sufficiently precise effects. It is recognised that the 
effects of independent economic action can be the same as those of collusion in terms of 
manifesting market power.
407
 Thus, the solution is to examine whether the 
undertakings’ intent is a decision to act on market-provided beliefs. Competition on the 
merits would seem to correspond to certain effects, such as the availability of efficient 
choices and the marginalisation of inefficient ones. However, this discounts the role of 
luck and irrationality, something which the US Supreme Court admitted by stating that 
market success can come as ‘a consequence of superior product, business acumen, or 
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historic accident’.408 Moreover, competition on the merits is limited to indirect harm, 
caused by the choices of consumers. It does not cover direct harm, caused by the 
interaction between the dominant undertaking and its competitors. Hence, the harm to 
inefficient competitors is the same in permissible competition on the merits and 
potentially abusive direct harm. The solution is again to focus on the intent of the 
dominant undertaking, as discussed in Chapter V (on abuse of dominance), namely 
whether it uses ‘methods different from normal competition’. 
The autonomous normative value of intent is guaranteed by its integration in such 
principles, and by the fact that they are in ‘reflective equilibrium’. The intent-based tests 
that apply after those principles are breached are also the object of the present research, 
since they have their own normative value, but they can always be revised by the Court 
into effects-based tests (and vice-versa). The same cannot be said of these principles, 
since the alternatives have already been contemplated and rejected. Parallel behaviour 
might lead to undesirable outcomes in oligopolistic markets, so that an ‘effects-based 
approach’ would justify finding collusion under Article 101. As discussed in Chapter III 
(on collusion), this has not happened because parallel behaviour cannot be distinguished 
from the paradigm of independent economic behaviour. Similarly, a full ‘effects-based 
approach’ would consider any action that leads to an undesirable effect, namely an 
increase in market power, as potentially abusive under Article 102. As observed in 
Chapter V (on abuse of dominance), the Court did so in Continental Can, but has since 
retreated by only considering abusive ‘methods different from normal competition’. In 
essence, the Court has rejected using effects to determine normative relevance under 
Articles 101 and 102, limiting them to tests to be applied after. The use of intent with 
normative relevance has proven stable because the intuitions of the ‘double effect 
doctrine’ are in ‘reflective equilibrium’ with the paradigms that the principles of 




This chapter discussed how behaviour can be judged based on intent. Although this was 
presented as an alternative to a judgment based on anti-competitive effects, it was 
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necessary to address the claim by advocates an ‘effects-based approach’ that EU 
competition law should only employ the latter (with intent merely serving as a proxy for 
effects). An ‘effects-based approach’ draws from the normative value of the goals of EU 
competition law: insofar as these goals are related to outcomes, it makes sense to use 
effects as a substantive criterion. This approach provides a method to deal with the 
plurality of goals, by using the selection of relevant effects to balance or prioritise them, 
and a program to change EU competition law as these goals evolve, by preferring a 
standard of effects which is not pinned down to previous balancing formalised into 
rules. It also provides a way to dismiss the use of other substantive criteria, either as 
formalistic errors caused by the application of rules or as ‘jurisdictional’ elements to be 
separated from ‘substantive’ ones. Although internally coherent, an ‘effects-based 
approach’ must be measured by its success in explaining the case law. 
Some instances of the case law cannot be explained under the consequentialist view 
embodied in the goals of EU competition law. The values of the EU open the door to 
alternative normative views, namely deontology and virtue ethics. In particular, the 
consequentialist assimilation between intended are foreseen effects runs counter to the 
notions of intentional collusion and harm to competitors under the ‘double effect 
doctrine’. The normative value of intent corresponds to a ‘sense of justice’, as defined 
by Rawls, insofar as it provides a ‘reflective equilibrium’ between the moral intuitions 
of the ‘double effect doctrine’ and the different moral convictions, including 
consequentialism. Some normative consensus is possible in relation to the paradigms of 
independence of economic action and competition on the merits. Those paradigms are 
based on intent and are stable principles. An ‘effects-based approach’ would not be able 
to achieve the same equilibrium, since it would both go against these intuitions and have 
to depart from these paradigms. 
Although sporting analogies are overused in competition law, the following description 
(to be taken loosely) might make this framework easier to understand. Sporting rules are 
usually meant to achieve certain objectives (consequentialism), notably the benefit of 
the audience (consumer welfare) and the improvement of the players (efficiency), taking 
into consideration the beneficial impact on society (public policy). This can be done 
indirectly, by concentrating on having the best match possible (competitive process). 
Such objectives lead to a set of rules which are easy to administrate by examining what 
is before the referee: the playing field, team composition, live play, scoring, etc. 
(outcomes). It can also sometimes lead to disagreements: for example, how long should 
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the referee interrupt play for assisting injured players, knowing it is detrimental to the 
audience but might be beneficial for the player and the match. The solution is to 
consider the consequences for the different objectives (‘effects-based approach’). 
Other sporting rules, however, do not appear to be fully explained by these objectives. 
Players are banned from acts of aggression (deontology) and are expected to act with 
‘fair play’ (virtue ethics), regardless of how entertaining this is or how much it would 
improve matches. It is however generally accepted (paradigm) that players cannot be 
distracted by adversaries (independence) or impeded from playing (harm). Because 
distraction and harm are part of normal play, the referee has to decide if words said or 
player contact was intentional (‘double effect doctrine’). After deciding if there is a 
foul, the referee has to further the context to give disciplinary action or to wave play on 
(intent and effects tests). The referee has to rely on his intuition and knowledge of the 
rules (‘sense of justice’). As many games are played, it becomes apparent whether 
referees are easily fooled or not, or whether other criteria are needed to deal with 
ambiguous or new situations (reflective equilibrium). Disciplinary action may become 
mandatory, regardless of intention, when there are serious consequences for the match 
or player health (‘effects-based approach’ again). The fact, however, is that awarding 
the basic foul continues to be done based on intention (stability). 
  





Chapters I (on the concept of intent) and Chapter II (on judging intent) established the 
framework of the present research. From the present chapter onwards, this framework 
will be applied to the three main substantive conditions of Articles 101 and 102. This 
chapter will discuss the first of these conditions, the notion of collusion as embodied in 
the different forms referred to in Article 101: agreements, decisions by associations of 
undertakings and concerted practices. Collusion is expressly based on intent, as the case 
law has referred to intention in defining both agreements and concerted practices. The 
Court has stated that an agreement: 
‘centres on the existence of a concurrence of wills between at least two parties, the 
form in which it is manifested being unimportant so long as it constitutes the 
faithful expression of the parties’ intention’.409 
The Court has also emphasised knowledge – which, as seen in Chapter I (on the concept 
of intent), is part of the characterisation of intent – in the definition of concerted 
practices as: 
‘a form of coordination between undertakings which, without having reached the 
stage where an agreement properly so-called has been concluded, knowingly 
substitutes practical cooperation between them for the risks of competition’.410  
The issue therefore is not the use of intent, but whether it has substantive value under 
the principles of EU competition law or it is merely ‘jurisdictional’ and lacking 
substantive value. As mentioned in Chapter II (on judging intent), framing collusion as 
‘jurisdictional’ is particularly important for an ‘effects-based approach’, since it is the 
only explanation for parallel behaviour having the same legal consequences as cartels 
when it may have the exact same effects. Hence, the doctrine has conceptualised 
agreements under an offer-acceptance model inspired in contract law but without any 
substantive competitive concerns, with concerted practices serving to overcome an 
evidentiary burden by focusing on contact.
411
 Authors have discussed further 
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refinements of these concepts.
412
 There is nevertheless a limit to such refinement, as the 
Court has established that a precise characterisation as a particular form of collusion is 
unnecessary.
413
 As such, there has been an effort to develop a unitary ‘jurisdictional’ 
explanation for all the forms of collusion. Arguing that defining concerted practices as 
common intent overlaps with agreements, Odudu holds that collusion can be defined as 
a reduction of uncertainty.
414
 Such reduction of uncertainty would be achieved by 
common intention in an agreement or by a communication in a concerted practice. As 
developed below, this would significantly broaden the scope of EU competition law. 
Odudu freely admits to this, arguing that collusion must lose its pejorative sense.
415
 This 
sense only leads to collusion and restriction of competition becoming confused, when 
the ‘jurisdictional and substantive questions are, and ought to remain, separate’.416 
This chapter will argue to the contrary that collusion is indeed linked to judging 
competitive as anti-competitive. This can be called a pre-substantive analysis of intent, 
insofar as intent is attributed normative value for deciding whether behaviour is anti-
competitive in advance to the substantive condition analysed in Chapter IV (on 
restrictions of competition). This implies that certain normative choices are made within 
the notion of collusion, going against its supposedly neutral ‘jurisdictional’ character. In 
this vein, Lianos criticises ‘the mirage of “the jurisdictional function”’, arguing that ‘it 
is generally substantive policy concerns that have framed the concept of agreement’.417 
The confirmation that substantive criteria are at play comes from the fact that (as Odudu 
also notes to have happened) collusion has been rejected by applying the same language 
used to judge the existence of a restriction.
418
 The Court stated in Suiker that: 
‘The criteria of coordination and cooperation laid down by the case-law of the 
Court, which in no way require the working out of an actual plan, must be 
understood in the light of the concept inherent in the provisions of the Treaty 
relating to competition that each economic operator must determine independently 
the policy which he intends to adopt’.419 
This statement is applicable both to the concerted practices found in Suiker and to 
judging them as anti-competitive. As such, after finding an agreement in BIDS, the 
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Court considered it restrictive by object repeating the same language.
420
 The reference 
to ‘each economic operator [determining] independently the policy which he intends to 
adopt’ is the foundation of the principle of independence of economic action, as already 
mentioned in Chapter II (on judging intent). 
This chapter will describe how the intent behind the concepts of agreement and 
concerted practice is judged in light of the principle of independence of economic 
action. Namely, the ‘doctrine of double effect’ allows distinguishing between actions 
intended to influence the independence of undertakings and those that merely have that 
foreseen side-effect. After collusion has been found the substantive value of the intent to 
influence might vary. As will be discussed in Chapter IV (on restrictions of 
competition), this value can range from the irrelevance in restrictions by effect to the 
pre-substantive analysis of intent being transposed directly into the restriction by object 
based on the same principle of independence of economic action. As such, if an 
undertaking is found to have influenced the independence of competitors in setting the 
parameters of competition (price, output, distribution, etc.) it is very likely to also be 
considered a restriction by object. A restriction by object will however be shown to 
ultimately depend on context, and the same reasoning applies to collusion. Thus, after 
finding intent which is contrary to the principle of independence of economic action, in 
the form of direct or indirect influence of an undertaking behaviour, it will be seen how 
certain types of influence are considered normatively accepted. This normative 
judgment is, under the view argued in this chapter, the main distinction between 
collusion and instances of acceptable intended influence such as contacts within a 
distribution network or publicly released information.  
This chapter will therefore describe how the doctrinally accepted view of collusion as a 
‘jurisdictional’ condition, namely the assimilation of agreements to contractual offer-
acceptance and concerted practices to contact, fails to provide a coherent explanation of 
the case law. Even if some judgments can be read in that light in order to further an 
‘effects-based approach’, only the principle of independence of economic action can 
satisfactorily explains agreements which do not correspond to offer-acceptance and 
instances of contact which do lead to concerted practices. The chapter will start by 
discussing a unitary notion of collusion, confronting a ‘jurisdictional’ reduction of 
uncertainty with substantive conceptions of independence of economic action (1.). It 
will then examine the specific forms of collusion, namely the characterisation of 
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agreements as ‘offer-acceptance’ and concerted practices as contact or as varieties of 
common intent to produce a collusive outcome (2.). The chapter will not specifically 
cover decisions by associations of undertakings, since they involve the intent of 
agreements and concerted practices, namely influencing independence through beliefs 




1. A unitary notion of collusion 
 
This section will discuss a unitary notion of collusion applying to all forms of collusion 
referred to in Article 101. The doctrine has focused on these forms, as already stated, 
since the leading judgments on collusion have hinged the existence of an infringement 
on their boundaries. Notably, the notion of agreement discussed below has been used to 
differentiate collusion from unilateral action. As also discussed, the borders between 
each form have been given less importance, with the Court accepting that the 
Commission characterises an infringement as an ‘agreement or concerted practice’.422 
This means that, no matter how specific their definition, the notions of agreement, 
concerted practice and decisions by associations of undertakings must retain a common 
root. This section will compare the two main alternatives for a unitary notion of 
collusion: a neutral ‘jurisdictional’ concept, according to Odudu’s notion of reduction of 
uncertainty (i), and a ‘pre-substantive’ analysis, based either on the ‘effects-based 
approach’ argued by Lianos or on the principle of independence of economic action 
argued by the present research (ii). 
 
i. Neutral ‘jurisdictional’ concept 
 
The reduction of uncertainty can serve as a neutral ‘jurisdictional’ concept insofar as it 
delegates to the notion of restriction of competition whether the reduction leads to any 
anti-competitive effect. In order to arrive at this notion, Odudu asks ‘why undertakings 
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enter into agreements or engage in concerted practices’.423 The answer given is that 
‘legally enforceable agreements reduce uncertainty’, while concerted practices are 
‘conduct which reduces uncertainty’.424 This approach would rely on the case law 
references to collusion as ‘substitut[ing] practical cooperation between undertakings for 
the risks of competition’.425 According to Odudu, the risks of competition ‘are that an 
undertaking does not know how competitors, trading partners, and customers will act in 
the future’, and is that uncertainty which provides competitive impetus.426 As already 
discussed, this approach deflects any arguments that harmless behaviour is 
‘jurisdictionally’ caught by leaving that to the ‘substantive’ question. A ‘jurisdictional’ 
concept would also explain the distinction with parallel behaviour in oligopoly: an 
outcome ‘as if’ there was collusion is not prohibited without evidence of an agreement 
or communication of information under a concerted practice.
427
 
The notion of collusion as a reduction of uncertainty does not however correspond to 
the theoretical and practical framework of competition. The greatest ‘risk of 
competition’ for undertakings is their exclusion by more efficient competitors, a fact 
which is usually unclouded by any uncertainty. A perfectly competitive market is 
characterised by perfect information, each participant knowing at any moment what 
competitors and consumers will do.
428
 Real markets are not as transparent, but, as 
referred in Chapter I (on the concept of intent), it is normal to assume that undertakings 
are aware of competing offers and consumer preferences. What holds true in both 
perfect and real markets is that, with no market power, undertakings have no possibility 
to escape competitive market forces of which they are only too well aware. As Motta 
states for horizontal relationships, ‘[c]ollusive practices allow firms to exert market 
power they would not otherwise have’.429 When undertakings gain market power, they 
produce uncertainty: no longer bound by the market, their range of actions expands. 
This is well understood in the economic study of oligopolies – where, as Jones and 
Sufrin quote from economists, ‘virtually anything can happen’.430 
This makes the reduction of uncertainty a poor fit for a unitary notion of collusion, since 
it is not represented in many agreements and concerted practices. Monti observes that ‘it 
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is only in oligopoly markets that a concerted practice can serve to reduce 
uncertainty’.431 As such, it is exchanges of information in oligopolies that Odudu has in 
mind, where the increase in transparency does reduce the uncertainty created by market 
power – exactly because market forces then step in to rule out certain behaviour as 
irrational.
432
 This corresponds to the notion of concerted practice as disclosure of 
information discussed below. However, Odudu goes further by considering this 
analogous to the gains of certainty originated by a contract, under an interpretation of 
agreements under contractual law, also discussed below. It is submitted that these 
conceptions of economic and contractual certainty do not match. An agreement with 
exclusionary effects might set out the parties’ actions, but by increasing concentration it 
will lead to more economic uncertainty; a cartel might reduce oligopolistic uncertainty, 
but it creates new strategic possibilities of contractual deviation.
433
 More importantly, 
many agreements represent competitive situations in which the supposed gains in 
contractual certainty do not correspond to the economic reality. For example, vertical 
relationships usually do not lead to the creation of market power.
434
 Hence, the terms of 
the vertical agreement might be set by the market and, therefore, deviation is irrational 
because it will only lead to the finding of another partner. Such agreements simply 
regulate the terms of a collaboration from which no guarantee against uncertainty is 
sought, given or needed. 
The difficulties of basing collusion on the reduction of uncertainty represent the 
problems with a ‘jurisdictional’ concept. As previously discussed, a ‘jurisdictional’ 
concept attempts to formulate a neutral notion of collusion in order to delegate the 
substantive assessment for the condition of restriction of competition. However, in 
defining collusion Odudu cannot help but to be orientated by whether collusion is 
‘capable of causing the substantive harm [Article 101] seeks to guard against’ – hence 
the economic reduction of uncertainty caught by exchanges of information. Regardless 
of whether this capability translates into actual harm, there is no question that it is 
substantively inspired. In order to be truly ‘jurisdictional’, collusion has to have no 
relation to the harm – such as the limitation of contractual freedom in relation to 
restrictions of competition which, as referred in Chapter II (on judging intent), the 
Commission employed pre-‘modernisation’ to bring as many agreements within the 
                                                     
431
 Monti (2007) 328. 
432
 See Odudu (2006) 82, quoting ICI (fn. 493) 101. 
433
 See Jones and Sufrin (2014) 660-663. 
434
 See Whish and Bailey (2012) 624. 
- 99 - 
need of an Article 101(3) exemption.
435
 Odudu attempts to do so by expanding the 
reduction of uncertainty into – truly neutral – contractual considerations, but then 
foregoes a coherent unitary notion of collusion. However, without substantive influence 
relevant under EU competition law, neutral ‘jurisdictional’ concepts become arbitrary. 
 
ii. ‘Pre-substantive’ analysis 
 
These problems with a ‘jurisdictional’ concept are avoided if collusion is indeed 
orientated by the substantive harm that Article 101 seeks to avoid. This is what Lianos 
does by rejecting a ‘jurisdictional’ concept, as noted above, and arguing that ‘the 
concept of antitrust agreement should not be isolated from the meaning ascribed to the 
other elements of [Article 101], in particular the concept of restriction of 
competition’.436 While this coincides with what is argued in this chapter in relation to 
the substantive value of intent, Lianos differs by arguing for an ‘effects-based 
approach’. Hence, the pre-substantive analysis in collusion would represent the 
likelihood of anti-competitive effects. Lianos starts by noting that in economics 
collusion relates to supra-competitive prices, regardless of the behaviour at their 
origin.
437
 Therefore, collusion would need ‘to be treated less like the contract law idea 
of an “agreement” and more in keeping with the economics and the objectives of 
competition policy itself’.438 Lianos remarks that converging interests in horizontal 
agreements lead to combined market power, while divergent interests in vertical 
agreements prevent it.
439
 However, Lianos notes that, contrary to what the different 
interests would suggest, the notion of collusion is the same for horizontal and vertical 
agreements in the case law.
440
 This is attributed to a ‘formalistic’ interpretation of the 
notion of agreement based on intent, coherently to how an ‘effects-based approach’ 
explains the Court’s deviations from this standard.441 If the effects on consumer welfare 
due to market power were taken in consideration, Lianos claims, horizontal agreements 
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should be defined broadly while vertical agreement should be defined restrictively 
(namely based on coercion or induction).
442
 
The use of an ‘effects-based approach’ for collusion, however, shows why those that 
argue for such an approach prefer to consider collusion ‘jurisdictional’. The fact is that, 
as Lianos admits, the Court does not differentiate between establishing a horizontal and 
vertical agreement.
443
 It will be seen below that such difference is only made in relation 
to concerted practices, and not because of market power considerations. By so clearly 
disregarding market power, as Lianos convincingly argues, the case law cannot be said 
to follow an ‘effects-based approach’. Equally important, if such an approach were 
followed then the next step would be to consider parallel behaviour as collusive. The 
economic view which Lianos adopts does not distinguish between tacit and explicit 
collusion. It is precisely because of following an ‘effects-based approach’ that Odudu 
must consider collusion as a ‘jurisdictional’ concept, despite the above stated problems. 
An ‘effects-based approach’ can only justify that effects which are no different from a 
cartel escape Article 101 if they are precluded by a neutral ‘jurisdictional’ concept. If 
the pre-substantive analysis suggested by Lianos were adopted, this argument would no 
longer be available. This would require a re-working of the case law on parallel 
behaviour in addition to that on vertical agreements. This strays too far from the actual 
case law to provide a useful interpretation of Article 101. 
It is argued that a unitary notion of collusion grounded on the principle of independence 
of economic action avoids the problems remarked so far.
444
 Such notion of collusion 
would represent a substantive influence of the notion of restriction which, as Lianos 
argues in principle, would allow a coherent interpretation of Article 101. This does not 
apply to the ‘effects-based approach’ argued by Lianos only because, as developed in 
Chapter IV (on restrictions of competition), the restrictions by object concerned also fail 
to follow such an approach – like collusion, restriction by object disregard market 
power. Moreover, as Odudu’s notion of reduction of uncertainty attempts to provide, the 
principle of independence of economic action allows a unitary notion of collusion 
which can be distinguished from parallel behaviour. As discussed in Chapter II (on 
judging intent), the ‘double effect doctrine’ explains that certain outcomes can be 
prohibited if intended but allowed if foreseen as a side-effect. That is the case when 
influencing other undertaking’s economic independence. The notion of collusion under 
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Article 101 consists in such influence, either reflected in an undertaking’s desires 
(agreements) or knowledge (concerted practices). As discussed in the next section, the 
principle of independence of economic action judges which influence is prohibited and 
which is accepted as part of normal market conditions. 
Parallel behaviour is not caught under Article 101 because, as also discussed in Chapter 
II (on judging intent), it corresponds to the paradigm of undertakings acting 
independently. This is as much the case of undertakings following the market price in 
competitive markets as it is with members of an oligopoly adapting to a supra-
competitive price. There is however one important characteristic of oligopolies: parallel 
behaviour might be an unintended side-effect of their operation, as undertakings use 
their market power to adapt to changing conditions, but might also be intended by 
undertakings through strategic action. In the latter case there is intent according to the 
‘doctrine of double effect’, and therefore could potentially fall under Article 101. It is 
useful in this regard to consider the notion of collusion proposed by Kaplow in US 
antitrust.
445
 Kaplow advances a ‘subjective’ notion which considers that oligopoly 
members can coordinate as effectively as if they communicated between themselves, 
communication being required by the ‘objective’ notion prevalent in US antitrust.446 
This is inspired by game theory, but veers into unwittingly applying the ‘doctrine of 
double effect’. Thus, Kaplow argues that a practice making it easier for rivals to 
coordinate will only be considered collusive if that is its primary purpose.
447
 Therefore, 
practices which only produce coordination as a side-effect, even if foreseeable, are 
excluded under Kaplow’s notion.448 This notion could be applicable to EU competition 
law which, contrary to US antitrust, is intent-based and follows the ‘doctrine of double 
effect’. 
However, the case law appears to reject strategic action by undertakings in an oligopoly 
should be considered as collusion. In Suiker the Court made a broad allowance for 
undertakings’ ‘right to adapt themselves intelligently to the existing and anticipated 
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conduct of their competitors’ must be read carefully, considering that the same right 
under Article 102 does not always allow a dominant undertaking to make such basic 
adaptations as matching the price of competitors.
449
 Contrary to what Odudu assumes, 
this is not related to acting rationally.
450
 As stated in Chapter I (on the concept of 
intent), the assumption of rationality underlies the interpretation of undertakings’ 
actions. The rationality of reacting to a price communicated in advance is the same as 
reacting to a price set by the market. Ultimately, it is the principle of independence of 
economic action which determines which type of influence is normatively accepted.
451
 
The Court has thus decided to allow strategic action by undertakings to influence each 
other in oligopolies. This is normatively coherent with the limited application of 
exploitative abuses under Article 102 noted in Chapter II (on judging intent); indeed, it 
would only become a problem if an ‘effects-based approach’ were followed, as already 
remarked. More importantly, it is not an isolated instance but an example of normative 
decision being made under the principle of independence of economic action, like 
several others detailed below which include or exclude certain types of intended 
influence. All that it requires is that the Court considers that strategic competition is 




2. Specific forms of collusion 
 
Agreements, concerted practices and decisions by an association of undertakings are all 
situations where the independent economic action of an undertaking has been 
influenced by other undertakings or their association. This can be referred to as 
‘common intent’, but as Black notes intention can only refer to one’s own actions.453 
Therefore, in order to find collusion it is first necessary to first examine an 
undertaking’s intent and consider the origin of its beliefs and desires. If an undertaking 
acts on beliefs and desires which are the influence of another undertaking, there is 
collusion. The forms of collusion represent different types of influence: agreements on 
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desires, concerted practices on beliefs (with associations of undertakings, as stated 
above, being differentiated on the associative background of the influence). This is 
captured in the Court’s statement in Suiker that: 
‘[the] requirement of independence […] strictly preclude[s] any direct or indirect 
contact between such operators, the object or effect whereof is either to influence 
the conduct on the market of an actual or potential competitor or to disclose to such 
a competitor the course of conduct which they themselves have decided to adopt or 
contemplate adopting on the market’.454 
The Court refers to both direct ‘influence’ and indirect one by disclosing ‘the course of 
conduct’ on the market. Agreements constitute direct influence, by setting out desires 
on how undertakings should act. Concerted practices represent indirect influence, by 
disclosing information which is integrated as beliefs on which undertakings act. The 
case law that a strict characterisation is unnecessary reflects the fact that the two are 
often mixed. For example, a concerted practice is motivated by the desire that 
undertakings act on the information exchanged, while an agreement to exchange 
information involves such disclosure. Any agreement will involve its set of beliefs and 
concerted practice its underlying desires. The characterisation of collusion as any of 
these forms relies on whether beliefs or desires are more important for the influence to 
be exerted. This characterisation does not correspond to any degree of influence of the 
collusion itself: as developed below, agreements may either be automatically considered 
binding or they may require examining compliance, while concerted practices sit in the 
middle under a rebuttable presumption of subsequent behaviour on the market. 
Once influence is found, it is subject to a ‘pre-substantive’ analysis under the principle 
of independence of economic action. The above reference in Suiker to the ‘object or 
effect’ indicates how the finding of collusion is similar to that of a restriction of 
competition. Despite the case law not developing this distinction, some influence can be 
said to be by ‘object’, meaning intentional and implemented (capable of producing 
effects), while other influence is by ‘effects’, meaning actual or likely influence 
(regardless of intention).
455
 For these purposes, in another similarity with restrictions of 
competition, it is necessary to assess the degree of influence taking the aims, the 
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undertakings and the economic and legal context into account.
456
 This substantive 
judgement based on the principle of independence of economic action is the difference 
with ‘jurisdictional’ approach of connecting agreements with offer-acceptance and 
concerted practices with contact which is generally accepted by the doctrine. Thus, as 
developed below, agreements are defined as a ‘concurrence of wills’ but involve other 
instances of influence judged negatively (i), while concerted practice nominally cover 
any type of contact but do not apply to many such instances where influence is not 




As quoted from Bayer above, agreements are defined as a ‘concurrence of wills’ which, 
regardless of form, expresses the parties’ intention’.457 Although intention can be 
defined in relation to both beliefs and desires, as discussed in Chapter I (on the concept 
of intent), the reference to ‘will’ indicates that agreements are concerned with desires. 
This does not require reciprocal desires on both parties: it is enough for an agreement if 
a single undertaking’s desires are influenced by another undertaking. What matters is 
whether the desire is the result of such influence, and not a mere coincidence of both 
undertakings’ motivations.458 Contracts are the paradigmatic agreements, where 
undertakings formalise their influence through enforceable legal obligations.
459
 
Implementation appears to be subject to a legal presumption in contracts, namely that 
they are in any event capable of influencing undertaking’s desires.460 Other situations 
which have been considered agreements under Article 101 – cartels, ‘gentleman’s 
agreements’, simple understandings, protocols, expired agreements, partial agreements, 
guidelines, circulars, etc. – all relate to a finding of influence: it is clear how 
undertakings are intended to act or that effect is caused. In Bayer the Court described 
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the process of intentional influence as ‘an invitation to the other party, whether express 
or implied, to fulfil [an anti-competitive] goal jointly’.461 
The case law on agreements has been mostly dedicated to demonstrating this influence 
in situations where it is not formalised. If an undertaking’s intent is interpreted as acting 
on a desire which it should not normally have, namely going against its interests, it can 
be attributed to another undertaking’s influence. However, influence can also be felt 
when undertakings’ interests match, as horizontal agreements best demonstrate. The 
difficulty lies in distinguishing what appears to be unilateral action within an existing 
relationship from the influence which such relationship involves.
462
 The case law has 
assumed such influence if the matter falls within the terms of the relationship, while 
new terms have to be expressly accepted or tacitly interpreted from actions.
463
 In AEG, 
the Court considered as part of a selective distribution agreement the refusal to supply 
price-cutting distributors.
464
 Despite this not being expressly stipulated in the 
agreement, it was considered to fall within the relationship since it was in the interest of 
all the participants. In Ford, the Court considered as part of a distribution agreement the 
refusal to supply distributors which could re-sell into other areas.
465
 Even though the 
refusal harmed those distributors, the existence of an agreement (the contractual 
relationship) was not disputed.
466
 Finally, in Bayer distributors also had their quantities 
limited in order to prevent re-selling into other Member States. The Court inquired 
whether the supplier had influenced the distributors, as quoted above, and if the latter 
‘shared the intention […] to prevent parallel imports’.467 The Court concluded that the 
distributor’s actions could not be interpreted under the desire to restrict parallel trade, 
which in any event the supplier had not sought to influence.
468
 
The case law shows that the existence of acceptance, tacit or not, is a matter of evidence 
of influence and not a substantive requirement. Bayer did not stray from this 
framework: it simply involved contradictory evidence, namely distributors which 
continued in a relationship even though they were not influenced in relation to their 
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parallel trade. This means that if the Court had reached the opposite result, judging that 
an agreement existed from an interpretation of the relationship, this would have also 
have been coherent with that framework. Indeed, that is what happened in the 
subsequent Activision, where the Court found that the influence to restrict parallel trade 
was compatible with covert sales by distributors.
469
 However, the doctrine has 
considered that Bayer pins down the notion of agreement to an offer-acceptance model 
of contract law. Odudu has considered offer-acceptance as a ‘jurisdictional’ concept. As 
contract law requires ‘a definite offer by one party, and an equally definite acceptance 
of that offer by another party’, so would EU competition require ‘communication (offer) 
and commitment (acceptance)’.470 Black has also argued that agreements ‘are best 
understood in terms familiar from the law of contract’, namely offer-acceptance.471 
Black grounds this view on the linguistic meaning of agreement, of which contract law 
would constitute the paradigm and which ‘concurrence of will’ would constitute a 
‘clumsy’ expression.472 Even Lianos, despite criticising Bayer, states that the Court 
adopted a ‘formalistic definition of the concept of agreement as the meeting of an offer 
with an acceptance’.473 
The doctrine has nonetheless been too quick to draw a notion of agreement requiring 
offer-acceptance, as this notion does not fit with the whole of the case law. The link 
with contract law, although important for neutral ‘jurisdictional’ purposes, leads to the 
already encountered problem of delegating to another field of law choices which are 
substantively important for EU competition law. As Lianos comments, ‘because the 
aims of competition law are not similar to those of contract law, the requirement of 
concurrence of wills or mutual consent fulfils a different objective and should therefore 
be interpreted differently from contract law’.474 It is true that the existence of a contract 
is sufficient to find an agreement, as non-legally binding ‘gentleman agreements’ are. 
However, this must not lead into a false sense of familiarity. The Court has warned in 
BNIC that ‘the legal framework within which […] agreements are made and such 
decisions are taken and the classification given to that framework by the various 
national legal systems are irrelevant’.475 A contractual model cannot frame many of the 
types of agreement established in the case law without gross distortion of what is 
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‘offered’ or ‘accepted’. For example, a partially negotiated contract is only accepted 
under the condition of its full conclusion (or else there would be a regular contract 
already); abiding by contracts that have expired, even if accepted, is never formally 
offered. Odudu’s reference to ‘communication (offer)’ is simply evidence of influence, 
while ‘commitment (acceptance)’ is just one interpretation of an undertaking’s 
behaviour as acting on a desire which is influenced. 
The limitations of an offer-acceptance model become particularly clear when dealing 
with agreements under Article 101 which are considered unintended under contract law. 
First, ‘mental reservation’ is a way to withhold acceptance, for example participating in 
a meeting but not abiding by the resulting agreement, yet it is no obstacle to finding an 
agreement under Article 101.
476
 There is no question that ‘mental reservation’ does not 
prevent influence.
477
 Second, it is established case law that coercion is no defence for 
the existence of an agreement under Article 101.
478
 Black notes the contradiction 
between the case law on coercion and an offer-acceptance model, but does not resolve 
it.
479
 Odudu claims that ‘coercion does not vitiate acceptance; it does not matter why an 
offer is accepted, just that it is accepted – even if unwillingly’.480 However, the concept 
of ‘unwilling acceptance’ is paradoxical (and difficult to separate from the reaction to 
unilateral action). It is one thing for an undertaking to consider advantages and 
(threatened) disadvantages, and it is another for an undertaking to be coerced into acting 
with no reasonable possibility of refusing. EU competition law does find an agreement 
like Odudu describes, but not because there is any acceptance. As Lianos points out, 
such acceptance is ruled out by the contract law from which Odudu draws the 
concept.
481




The substantive judgment involved in the interpretation of the notion of agreement 
confirms that it does not follow a ‘jurisdictional’ concept of offer-acceptance. Contrary 
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to what Lianos holds, the case law has not ‘emphasized the jurisdictional character of 
the concept of agreement’.483 This interpretation stems from an ‘effects-based approach’ 
that doubts whether ‘a test focusing on the intention of the parties, as defined by a 
declaration of will or a pattern of conduct’ can relate to consumer harm.484 Hence, the 
use of intent can only be ‘formalistic’.485 However, Lianos also argues that the notion of 
agreement had been ‘instrumental’ to the goal of market integration, and attributes 
Bayer to a shift in policy.
486
 If so, then Bayer would be a continuation of a ‘pre-
substantive analysis’, since a ‘jurisdictional’ concept does not contemplate policy shifts. 
In any event, this shows the instability of reading of the case law under an ‘effects-
based approach’, which has to posit outcomes not explicitly reasoned by the Court. As 
held above, a ‘pre-substantive analysis’ has indeed been followed but in relation to the 
principle of independence of economic action, which provides the normative connection 




ii. Concerted practices 
 
It was quoted above that concerted practices are defined as a form of collusion by which 
undertakings ‘knowingly substitut[e] practical cooperation between them for the risks of 
competition’.488 By referring to ‘knowingly’, the Court indicates that the intent behind 
concerted practices involves beliefs, as opposed to the desires that orientate agreements. 
As such, undertakings act on their own desires in concerted practices, but based on 
beliefs which are the influence of other undertakings. This corresponds to the indirect 
influence described in Suiker of disclosing ‘the course of conduct which [undertakings] 
have decided to adopt or contemplate adopting on the market’.489 The same logic 
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applies to other information, such as cost structures or changes in productive assets. 
What is relevant is that the undertaking acquires the information by virtue of influence 
of other undertakings, thereby interfering with its independence of economic action. 
Concerted practices have additionally been defined based on subsequent behaviour in 
the market, but such behaviour is presumed once influence has been found.
490
 As seen 
above, subsequent behaviour is also required in agreements lacking sufficient 
formalisation of influence, and presumed if there is one. Without a similar clear 
reference, concerted practices have come to depend on contact between undertakings as 
proof of influence, relying on the Court’s statement in Suiker that independence of 
economic action ‘strictly preclude[s] any direct or indirect contact’.491 
The case law reference to ‘any direct or indirect contact’ has also been incorporated in a 
‘jurisdictional’ notion of collusion based on the reduction of uncertainty. As discussed 
above, Odudu proposes such a notion as an alternative to agreements and concerted 
practices both expressing common intent. However, as is also discussed above, 
reduction of uncertainty proves a poor fit for agreements in competitive markets, in 
particular vertical relationships. Most of Odudu’s treatment of reduction of uncertainty 
is therefore dedicated to concerted practices.
492
 Disclosure of information does indeed 
reduce economic uncertainty in oligopolies, but this shows a ‘pre-substantive analysis’: 
when such a concerted practice is found, it also constitutes a restriction of competition. 
For example, in Hüls the Court considered the only defence by the undertakings 
involved in an exchange of information was to show that their behaviour had not been 
affected – if not, the existence of a restriction by object was unavoidable.493 In order to 
get around this, Odudu is forced to first tie concerted practices to contact, and then 
define contact broadly enough so as to include competitively neutral situations. As to 
the first, it is stated that ‘[c]ommunication reduces uncertainty and evidence of 
communication seems sufficient to establish a concerted practice’.494 As to the second, 
Odudu quotes Suiker in order to reject any limitation based on whether the information 
                                                     
490
 See T-Mobile (fn. 73) 52 and Jones and Sufrin (2014) 166-167. As discussed in Chapter I (on the 
concept of intent), this relates to the interpretation of actions of based on the beliefs and desires allocated 
to undertakings, in this case those acquired through collusion. 
491
 Suiker (fn. 419) 174. As stated, decisions by associations of undertaking might involve the indirect 
influence of concerted practices, in which case such influence is formalised. 
492
 See Odudu (2006) 81-86.  
493
 See Case C-199/92 P Hüls ECR I-4287 162-167. 
494
 Odudu (2006) 84. 
- 110 - 
was sought or accepted.
495
 According to Odudu, ‘[a]ll communication should evidence 
concerted practice if the jurisdictional function of the collusive terms is accepted’.496 
It is important to underline how wide the scope is of a ‘jurisdictional’ conception 
relying on ‘all communication’. To begin with, it does not consider whether uncertainty 
would exist absent the communication, or whether the type of information is likely to 
lead to anti-competitive harm, since those are substantive issues – all that matters is that 
some information is communicated.
497
 This covers any information which is released to 
customers, sales agents and press, since it can find its way to competitors.
498
 In Wood 
pulp the Court considered that disclosing this information did not constitute a concerted 
practice.
499
 However, according to Odudu, this was a (substantive) issue of causality: no 
matter what could be done, customers would always reveal their deals in order to obtain 
better conditions.
500
 Information was undoubtedly disclosed, so Wood pulp would be 
explained by ‘[t]he absence of causation, rather than the absence of collusion’.501 
Moreover, the context in which information is disclosed would according to Odudu also 
be a substantive issue.
502
 This means that whether the communication is made in a 
horizontal or vertical relationship would be irrelevant, treating meetings with 
competitors in the same manner as meeting with customers.
503
 Odudu admits that all 
this ‘perhaps casts the net too wide, enabling undertakings to unwittingly become party 
to a concerted practice’. However, Odudu reasons, undertakings are also unwittingly 
caught in coerced agreements.
504
 
It is argued that a ‘jurisdictional’ conception of concerted practices is out of touch with 
the case law and practical needs. If contact were widened to the extent proposed by 
Odudu, collusion would lose its function as a distinctive condition. The premise that ‘all 
communication should evidence concerted practice’ would make it practically 
impossible to escape Article 101. Undertakings are not economic islands, and they 
continually broadcast information on their offers, acquisitions and strategies to their 
customers, partners and investors. In Odudu’s conception, only information kept 
internally would escape being considered collusive. Even if this wide scope is embraced 
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 See Odudu (2006) 86. 
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 Odudu (2006) 90. 
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 See Odudu (2006) 87-88. 
498
 See Odudu (2006) 88. 
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 See Cases C-89, 104, 114, 116-117 and 125-129/85 Wood Pulp [1993] ECR I-1307 175-197. 
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by a ‘jurisdictional’ perspective, it would wreak havoc in separating collusion from 
unilateral action under Article 102 TFEU. A dominant undertaking’s strategies are 
usually communicated in some way to its customers or the press. The strategy followed 
in Bayer of limiting supplies was undoubtedly communicated to distributers, and 
according to Odudu this contact would be enough to establish collusion. If this were 
true, the efforts by the Court to define the notion of agreement would turn out to be 
pointless. As Lianos comments, ‘it does not make much sense to develop a restrictive 
and legalistic definition of the concept of agreement while expanding, at the same time, 
the concept of concerted practice’.505 
More important than not corresponding to the case law, it is further submitted that a 
‘jurisdictional’ conception fails to grasp the case law’s normative significance. The 
above stated argument by Odudu, justifying the wide scope of concerted practices on 
undertakings also being caught in coerced agreements, is exemplary. Those two 
situations can only be understood by considering them as normatively opposite. In 
coerced agreements, the Court is forced to step out of the definition of agreements as 
‘concurrence of wills’ in order to encompass situations which are judged negatively. In 
concerted practices, the Court limits the definition of concerted practices as involving 
‘any direct or indirect contact’ in order to exempt public announcements and 
communications with customers because it judges them positively.
506
 Even if these 
naturally influence competitors, they are part of the paradigm of a competitive market 
on which the principle of independence of economic action is grounded (as well as 
being necessary for competition on the merits).
507
 If this ‘pre-substantive’ analysis was 
abandoned, and a ‘jurisdictional’ concept adopted, coerced agreements would escape an 
offer-acceptance model (which as seen above is incompatible with ‘unwilling 
acceptance’) while parallel behaviour would be caught as indirect contact (since it is the 
product of strategic communications to the market). Vertical relationships would lose 
the more favourable treatment that they currently enjoy from a restrictive notion of 
agreement accompanied by a restrictive application of concerted practices.
508
 Despite 
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 Lianos (2008) 1051. 
506
 Odudu’s argument that these would be excluded through causality is hardly compatible with the 
presumption of subsequent market behaviour established in T-Mobile and, in any event, would not apply 
to the situations of parallel behaviour which is effectively caused by strategic communications. 
507
 These communications are not exempted in themselves, but because under the ‘double effect doctrine’ 
their influence is considered as a foreseen side-effect. If an undertaking were to intend such influence, for 
example by making a public announcement solely to signal competitors, the definition of concerted 
practices as ‘indirect contact’ would apply. 
508
 The conclusion by Lianos (2008) 1035 that the concept of collusion is the same for horizontal and 
vertical relationship focuses excessively on agreements. 
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the claims that a ‘jurisdictional’ concept of collusion should have no substantive impact, 




This chapter discussed how the notion of collusion applies the principle of 
independence of economic action to judgments of intent. The alternative proposed by 
some authors is to consider collusion as a neutral ‘jurisdictional’ concept separated from 
the substantive analysis under the condition of restriction of competition. This is 
particularly important for an ‘effects-based approach’: the only possibility to justify that 
parallel behaviour is not caught under Article 101, having the exact same effects as 
cartels, is to exclude such behaviour before any substantive analysis is engaged. 
However, when defining such a notion of collusion, authors cannot avoid but to use 
some substantive criteria related to the possibility of competitive harm, otherwise the 
‘jurisdictional’ concept becomes arbitrary and disconnected from EU competition law. 
This results in mixing contradictory elements, such as the reduction of economic and 
contractual uncertainty, or the plain recognition that the case law on collusion does not 
follow an effects-based criterion of harm – which, as is developed in Chapter IV (on 
restrictions of competition), is coherent with the application of restrictions by object. In 
contrast, a ‘pre-substantive’ analysis under the principle of independence of economic 
action provides a coherent notion of collusion. Collusion is intended to influence 
independence of economic action, while such influence in parallel behaviour is usually 
a side-effect of an oligopoly context. Economics does not differentiate between these 
two situations, but EU competition law does according to whether influence is intended 
or merely foreseen. 
The specific forms of collusion, in turn, correspond to different types of influence. 
Agreements are direct influence, whereby undertaking act according to desires which 
are influenced by other undertakings. This covers the formalisation of influence under 
contracts or the interpretation of behaviour under informal influence, such as that of a 
business relationship. Concerted practices are indirect influence, whereby undertakings 
act on information disclosed by other undertakings which is presumed to influence 
them. These notions provide a better normative explanation of the case law than the 
‘jurisdictional’ concepts, generally accepted in the doctrine, of agreements as offer-
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acceptance akin to contract law and concerted practices as any communication between 
undertakings. Offer-acceptance can hardly explain situations of coerced agreements, 
which are particularly important as exercises of market power. Capturing any 
communication is too wide, covering several aspects of normal competition such as 
public announcements and meetings with customers. Those situations, in turn, are 
compatible with a normative judgment on the type of influence exercised: negative in 
the case of coercion, positive in the case of public announcements and meetings with 
customers. Because there is no ‘jurisdictional’ separation, the finding of collusion might 
have important consequences for the finding of a restriction of competition. Those 
consequences, however, are normatively consistent across the conditions of Article 101. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Restrictions of competition 
 
 
The previous chapter examined the notion of collusion, which determines which 
behaviour falls within the scope of Article 101 by judging the intent to influence under 
the principle of independence of economic action. The present chapter will turn to the 
role of intent in determining whether collusive behaviour is anti-competitive.
509
 Article 
101(1) refers to different forms of collusion having ‘as their object or effect the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market’, which 
will simply be referred to as restrictions by object or effect.
510
 While intent is always 
relevant when establishing collusion, its normative value varies according to the type of 
restriction. As stated in Chapter II (on judging intent), intent may aid interpreting or 
predicting the effects necessary for restrictions by effect. Because the normative value 
of intent in that case is subordinate to effects, it will not be discussed. The present 
chapter will focus on restrictions by object, and the subordinated role also attributed to 
intent by an ‘effects-based approach’: certain types of agreement (defined by intent) 
would lead to a presumption of anti-competitive effects, and restrictions by object 
would be based on the risk of such effects. This chapter will argue, to the contrary, that 
restrictions by object are based on a moral judgment of intent. This judgment does not 
depend on a typology of agreements, but tests intent in its legal and economic context. 
Such judgment might be a continuation of the ‘pre-substantive’ analysis of 
independence of economic action used to find collusion, or involve the further 
consideration of the principles of market integration or competition on the merits. 
The Court has long defined restrictions by object in alternative to restrictions by 
effect.
511
 As observed in Chapter II (on judging intent), an ‘effects-based approach’ has 
understood this as an alternative between effects-based rules and a standard. 
                                                     
509
 This is commonly associated with use, by the Commission and the Courts of the EU, of internal 
documentation and undertakings’ statements. As discussed in Chapter I (on the concept of intent), this so-
called ‘subjective intent’ does not correspond to the notion of intent, and is simply evidence which may 
be used to prove intent for the purposes of establishing a restriction. 
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  The distinction between the different forms of collusion will not, in principle, be relevant for the 
present chapter. Hence, ‘agreement’ may be used for all those forms, considering that most of the case 
law and doctrine quoted refers to agreements. 
511
 See Glaxo (fn. 28) 55 and BIDS (fn. 25) 15. 
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Restrictions by object would presume effects, while restrictions by effect would apply a 
standard of actual or likely effects.
512
 This understanding has been reinforced by the 
Opinion of AG Kokott in T-Mobile, which states in relation to restrictions by object: 
‘The per se prohibition of such practices recognised as having harmful 
consequences for society creates legal certainty and allows all market participants 
to adapt their conduct accordingly. Moreover, it sensibly conserves resources of 
competition authorities and the justice system’.513 
As discussed in Chapter II (on judging intent), the advantages of legal certainty and ease 
of application are associated with the application of rules. Therefore, authors argue, the 
advantages attributed by AG Kokott would come from presuming effects and not 
having to prove them to the standard of restrictions by effect.
514
 For example, Bailey 
states that ‘[i]f an agreement is likely to be harmful to competition, there is little to be 
gained for the law to insist on the competition authority (or claimant) proving that 
outcome’.515 This, however, assumes that the stated advantages can only be explained 
by the presence of rules. The case law definition of restrictions by object refers to no 
such rules: 
‘certain forms of collusion between undertakings can be regarded, by their very 
nature, as being injurious to the proper functioning of normal competition’.516 
Restrictions by object apply a standard of what is ‘injurious to the proper functioning of 
normal competition’, which requires the moral judgment of intent. The advantages of 
restrictions by object come from this moral judgment, not from a presumption of 
effects. As developed below, the presumptions of effects argued by an ‘effects-based 
approach’ are associated with price-fixing and market-sharing.517 It is cartels that 
authors have in mind when speaking of the advantages of restrictions by object, not the 
other agreements which Bailey calls ‘divisive’.518 However, it is to cartels that a ‘pre-
substantive’ analysis described in Chapter III (on collusion) applies more aptly: once 
collusion has been found, a restriction by object always follows. That is what happened 
in T-Mobile: an exchange of information was considered a concerted practice and a 
                                                     
512
 In reality restrictions by effect depend heavily on rules, from economic and intent-based presumptions 
of effects to the exclusion of an innumerable number of situations as de minimis, see Commission Notice 
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OJ C 368, 22/12/2001, p. 13 (‘De minimis Notice’) 3 and 7, but this is will not be covered. 
513
 Opinion T-Mobile (fn. 73) 43. 
514
 See Whish and Bailey (2012) 119. 
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restriction by object, and undertakings were left with rebutting the presumption that 
their behaviour had not been affected.
519
 These offences to the principle of 
independence of economic action lead to legal certainty and ease of application because 
they are intuitive and morally consensual.
520
 The case law dispenses with effects 
because intent is enough to judge them anti-competitive.
521
 
The supposed advantage of restrictions by object not having to prove effects is circular: 
if object and effect are a true alternative, then there is as much of an advantage in not 
having to prove effects as there is in not having to prove object. Any advantage rests on 
the assumption that finding one is easier than another. Although restrictions by effect 
may involve difficult evidence, notably in relation to ‘complex economic assessments’ 
which are subject to limited judicial review, conceptually they are simple.
522
 As 
described in Chapter II (on judging intent), an ‘effects-based approach’ provides a way 
to determine which effects are relevant and how to balance them with reference to the 
goals of EU competition law. Restrictions by object would indeed be easier to apply if 
they relied on presumptions of effects which formalised previous balancing exercises. 
However, for such presumptions to operate they would need to be consistently triggered 
by the same factors. An ‘effects-based approach’ assumes that this happens with 
qualifying agreements as certain types, such as price-fixing or market-sharing. 
However, as described below, the Court has insisted that the intent of the agreement 
must always be considered in its context, and backed that with instances where even 
price-fixing or market-sharing have not been considered restrictive. Those instances 
cannot be explained by rebutting a presumption of effects, which is nowhere established 
by the case law, or by the risk of such effects. 
Only moral judgments can differentiate the instances where price-fixing or market-
sharing have not been considered restrictive from the situations to which restrictions by 
object so easily apply. This chapter will, therefore, start by discussing how the moral 
judgments of intent interact with a typology of restrictive agreements (1.). It will then 
analyse the doctrinal view that restrictions by object are based on the risk of anti-
competitive effects (2.). The rejection of an ‘effects-based approach’ in favour of a 
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 See T-Mobile (fn. 73) 61. 
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moral judgement will then be confirmed in a more detailed examination of the case law 
(3.). A table with the case law examined will also be presented (4.). 
 
1. The moral judgment of intent 
 
This section will examine how restrictions by object judge intent under the principles of 
independence of economic action, of market integration and of competition on the 
merits. This judgment will be confronted with an ‘effects-based approach’ that holds 
that restrictions by object involve a presumption of the same anti-competitive effects 
which fall under restrictions by effect.
523
 For example, Odudu states that ‘[b]oth the 
object and the effect assessment share a single conception of restriction of 
competition’.524 This approach relies on the Commission’s stated position post-
‘modernisation’ that: 
‘Restrictions of competition by object are those that by their very nature have the 
potential of restricting competition. These are restrictions which in light of the 
objectives pursued by the Community competition rules have such a high potential 
of negative effects on competition that it is unnecessary for the purposes of 
applying [Article 101(1)] to demonstrate any actual effects on the market. This 
presumption is based on the serious nature of the restriction and on experience 
showing that restrictions of competition by object are likely to produce negative 
effects on the market […]. Restrictions by object such as price fixing and market 
sharing reduce output and raise prices, leading to a misallocation of resources [and] 
to a reduction in consumer welfare’.525  
This position is quoted approvingly in the doctrine, as it connects restrictions by object 
to the likelihood of anti-competitive effects (defined according to the goals of EU 
competition law, namely efficiency and consumer welfare), which in turn is presumed 
from agreements like price-fixing and market-sharing – the ‘effects-based approach’ 
epitomised.
 526
 However, the Commission’s position distorts the notion of restriction by 
object given by the Court. Where the Court mentions ‘injurious to the proper 
functioning of normal competition’, as quoted above, the Commission adds a ‘high 
                                                     
523
 It could be argued that a restriction under Article 101(1) is ‘presumed’ to be an infringement unless 
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526
 See Bailey (2012) 562-563 and Odudu (2008) 13. 
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potential of negative effects’. The two are not the same: one is a moral judgment, the 
other a presumption of effects. If the case law had adopted such a presumption, then the 
situations where an ‘object’-type agreement is not considered restrictive would 
correspond to a rebuttal.
527
 Jones and Sufrin comment that, while the economic and 
legal context should be able to provide such rebuttal, ‘this argument appears to have 
been accepted by the General Court, but not the Court’.528 
This section will begin by examining the typology of agreements considered restrictive 
by object and how this has been reflected in the case law of the General Court (i). A 
presumption of effects will then be critically assessed under the case law of the Court 
(ii). This will clear the way for analysing restrictions by object as a moral judgment of 
intent grounded on several principles of EU competition law (iii). The section will then 
discuss the role of context and justifications in this moral judgment (iv). 
 
i. The ‘object box’ and European Night Services 
 
If restrictions by object are considered presumptions, they must be triggered by certain 
stable factors. These factors have been doctrinally developed around a typology of 
agreements, ostensibly influenced by cartel activity. Cartels provide a consensual 
example of restrictions by object. As Whish and Bailey comment, ‘[h]orizontal 
agreements between independent undertakings to fix prices, divide markets, to restrict 
output and to fix the outcome of supposedly competitive tenders are the most obvious 
target for any system of competition law’.529 Thus, as quoted above, when the 
Commission defined restrictions the (non-exhaustive) examples that followed were 
price-fixing and market-sharing.
530
 Such is the opprobrium that cartels carry that it 
seems that the qualification of restriction by object follows automatically from ‘price-
fixing’ or ‘market-sharing’. The General Court and some authors have taken this notion 
of cartels as the template for other restrictions by object, which would aim to achieve 
the same level of definition and censorship. 
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According to this view, the definition of restrictions by object would result from a 
process similar to US antitrust, not in substance but in method, where the case law and 
doctrine would fine-tune the definitions of different types of agreements presumed to 
lead to anti-competitive effects.
531
 As such, Whish and Bailey have proposed an ‘object 
box’ of evolving borders which identifies ‘particularly pernicious types of agreement 
that are overwhelming likely to harm consumer welfare’.532 The majority of the types of 
agreement in this ‘object box’ correspond to variations of cartels activity: ‘to fix prices’, 
‘to exchange information that reduces uncertainty’, ‘to share markets’, ‘to limit output’ 
and ‘to limit sales’.533 The remaining types of agreement pose specific competitive 
problems, particularly if they involve issues of market integration, but may also be used 
to enforce cartels: ‘collective exclusive dealing’, ‘to impose fixed or minimum resale 
prices’ and ‘to impose export bans’.534 
The General Court has expressly adopted the notion of restrictions by object as 
presumptions of effects in its case law. In Glaxo the General Court stated that 
‘agreements intended to limit parallel trade […] may be presumed to deprive final 
consumers of those advantages’.535 Coherently with such presumption, the General 
Court considered on the facts of the case that ‘if account is taken of the legal and 
economic context [of the agreement], it cannot be presumed that those conditions 
deprive the final consumers of medicines of such advantages’.536 As already referred, 
the Court reversed Glaxo on appeal, considering that the General Court committed an 
error of law in not considering the aim to limit parallel trade as restrictive by object 
regardless of effects on consumers.
537
 Nonetheless, an ‘effects-based approach’ 
survived Glaxo because the Court’s judgment can be interpreted as presuming another 
type of effects, namely on the competitive process, instead of rejecting the presumption 
in itself (although the Court gave no indication of this, in particular by outlining how 
this other presumption could be rebutted). In any event, Glaxo shows the perils of 
defining restrictions by object outside consensual cartel activity. 
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It is therefore necessary to analyse the presumptions made by the General Court in 
relation to such activity, and other analogous activities, as ‘obvious restrictions of 
competition’. In European Night Services the General Court stated that there were two 
ways of finding restrictions by object: 
‘account should be taken of the actual conditions in which it functions, in particular 
the economic context in which the undertakings operate, the products or services 
covered by the agreement and the actual structure of the market concerned […] 
unless it is an agreement containing obvious restrictions of competition such as 
price-fixing, market-sharing or the control of outlets’.538 
The significance of the step taken by the General Court must be highlighted. It is one 
thing for the doctrine to catalogue agreements which have been considered restrictive 
under an ‘object box’; it is another to create a legally binding rule that any such 
agreements are presumed restrictive. European Night Services was not appealed, and 
the doctrine has not contested it.
539
 Considering that most of the Article 101 litigation 
before the General Court results from leniency applications involving cartels, one can 
see why this jurisdiction would be accustomed to ‘obvious restrictions of 
competition’.540 From there to establishing presumptions is a small step. The originality 
of the General Court was taking ‘price-fixing’ and ‘market-sharing’, also referred by the 
Commission as leading to a presumption of effects, and grouping them with a vague 
‘control of outlets’, which the General Court does not define. 
The view that restrictions by object represent presumptions based on a typology of 
agreements is compelling. Not only would it align the practice of the US and the EU, it 
would facilitate the application of Article 101(1). For purposes of the present research, 
it would give intent a prominent role. Unlike other contracts, cartels rarely have written 
provisions, so they are usually found based on the intention of the parties. Moreover, the 
purpose of categorising them as ‘obvious restrictions of competition’ is, as can be seen 
from the passage of European Night Services quoted above, to escape having to analyse 
the economic and legal context. This leaves intent as the unifier between different 
individual restrictive schemes. In other words, what makes several agreements fall 
under an agreement in the ‘object box’ – price-fixing, market-sharing, export ban, etc. – 
is their intent to achieve this effect, not whether that effect results from the economic 
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and legal context. However, as discussed next, there is little support in the law of the 
Court for attaching presumptions to a typology of agreements. 
 
ii. The standard set by the Court 
 
It appears that the General Court overstepped its competence in European Night 
Services. There is little, or no, support for the creation by a lower instance of any rule – 
including the qualification as ‘price-fixing’ or ‘market-sharing’ – that bypasses an 
individual analysis of the factors set out by the Court in its case law. This is irrespective 
of the terminology of European Night Services having slipped into KME, where the 
Court stated that effects do not have to be taken into account in restrictions by object, as 
is established in case law, but then added that this ‘applies in particular in the case, as in 
this instance, of obvious restrictions of competition such as price-fixing and market-
sharing’.541 Against the words in KME, not yet repeated by the Court, sits the full 
weight of the case law on restrictions by object. It is recognised in the doctrine that 
many agreements which would qualify as price-fixing, market-sharing or the control of 
outlets were found not to be restrictive under Article 101(1) by the Court. Ibáñez 
Colomo lists price-fixing in Gøttrup-Klim, restriction of output in Tournier, and 
exclusive territorial protection in Coditel II, Nungesser and Erauw-Jacquery.
542
 The 
reasons advanced by the doctrine for doing so are discussed below, but it is consensual 
that this involved a consideration of the agreements’ economic and legal context. 
It is argued that the mere fact that context is taken into account by the Court shows that 
the qualification as a type of agreement is not enough to find a restriction by object. 
Under European Night Services, the finding of price-fixing, market-sharing or control 
of outlets would have been sufficient. The agreements in those judgments, naturally, 
were not ‘obvious restrictions of competition’, but the question is how such a 
conclusion can be reached without considering their economic and legal context. To 
hold that such consideration is necessary would of course defeat the purpose, clearly 
stated by the General Court, of establishing a presumption precisely to ignore context. 
Therefore, the only way to save a presumption of effects is to speak, like Bailey does, of 
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‘context exclud[ing] a prima facie finding of a restrictive object’.543 However, this 
prima facie finding lacks the legal value attributed to presumptions: the case law shows 
no indication of a reversal of the burden of proof.
544
 In fact, the case law does not allow 
for a second assessment based on context after a finding of a restriction by object. 
Hence, the Court has rejected that restrictions by object consist of a rebuttable 
presumption of effects. In the Opinion in T-Mobile, AG Kokott stated that restrictions 
by object ‘may not be interpreted as meaning that an anti-competitive object gives rise 
merely to some kind of presumption of unlawfulness which may be rebutted, however, 
if in the specific case no negative consequences for the operation of the market can be 
demonstrated’.545 According to AG Kokott, considering effects in this manner would be 
contrary to the distinction between object and restrictions by effect.
546
 The Court 
followed the Opinion of AG Kokott, stating that ‘there is no need to consider the effects 
of a concerted practice where its anti-competitive object is established’.547 The cases 
cited show that this was not particularly novel, as the consideration of any effects – 
including their absence – has been precluded since Consten and Grundig.548 Since a 
presumption of effects must be rebuttable by showing the absence of effects, precluding 
the consideration of effects is the same as denying that such a presumption exists.
549
 
By not following European Night Services, regardless of whether it involves a 
presumption of effects or not, the Court has not acted exceptionally but applied a 
standard which it has consistently enforced. The Court has stated that:  
‘[i]n order to determine whether an agreement involves a restriction of competition 
“by object”, regard must be had to the content of its provisions, its objectives and 
the economic and legal context of which it forms a part’.550 
As stated in Chapter II (on judging intent), this indicates the operation of a standard, not 
rules. Restrictions by object cannot be triggered by a type of agreement: the Court is 
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 Bailey (2012) 583-585. 
544
 Whish and Bailey comment that ‘it is possible to argue successfully that restrictions which are 
necessary [for] a legitimate commercial purpose fall outside Article 101(1)’, but do not indicate whether 
the Commission can ignore these arguments if the parties do not provide evidence as they must do to 
obtain an exemption under Article 101(3). 
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 Opinion T-Mobile (fn. 73) 45. 
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 Opinion T-Mobile (fn. 73) 45. 
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 T-Mobile (fn. 73) 30. 
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 See T-Mobile (fn. 73) 29 and the Opinion T-Mobile (fn. 73) 42. 
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 Odudu (2006) 123-124 holds that ex ante presumptions must be rebuttable, while ex post the issue is 
no longer relevant as unsuccessful attempts should also be punished. Whether restrictions by object 
correspond to the equivalent of a legal presumption of the risk of effects, also argued by AG Kokott in the 
Opinion in T-Mobile, is discussed below. 
550
 Allianz Hungária (fn. 103) 36, citing BIDS, T-Mobile, Expedia, Glaxo, Premier League and Pierre 
Fabre. 
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adamant that they involve an assessment of all of the agreement’s provisions, objectives 
and context. Indeed, as noted above, this standard emerged to counter the Commission’s 
pre-‘modernisation’ practice of only considering whether the freedom of the parties was 
restricted – precisely the sort of context-ignoring rule which the General Court 
attempted to create in European Night Services. The standard set by the Court 
necessarily brings the analysis down to an individual agreement. In Chapter I (on the 
concept of intent) it was established that the agreement’s objectives are the parties’ 
intent.  Therefore, the intent to fix prices, share markets or impose export bans is very 
relevant. Nonetheless, the qualification as a putative type of agreement has no legal 
value and is really not the issue. This is overlooked when cartels are used as the 
template for restrictions by object. The adage goes that ‘hard cases make bad law’.551 
Nonetheless, ‘soft cases’ of cartels obscure the fact that a restriction by object is the 
result of a particular context, not of a qualification that bypasses such context.
552
 
The ‘hard cases’ where intent and context are carefully considered, which will be 
analysed in detail below, provide a better representation of restrictions by object. 
Naturally the Court – but not the General Court – is free to institute interpretive rules.  
As will also be seen, the Court has done so within the standard of ‘injurious to the 
proper functioning of normal competition’, by establishing precedent on certain intent 
(the legality of exclusive distribution allowing parallel imports) and context (the 
irrelevance of sector crisis).
553
 Perhaps KME is an indication that the Court will 
consider presumptions for price-fixing or market-sharing, having ignored the ill-
conceived and vague ‘control of outlets’ employed by the General Court. However, this 
would constitute a significant reversal of the Court’s case law. Until this reversal is 
clearly expressed, KME is better read as an accidental reference to which the Court will 
not return (and it has not, so far). KME concerned an appeal from the General Court 
which did not contest the existence of a restriction by object. The reference to ‘obvious 
restrictions of competition’ was made in relation to the increase of the fine by the 
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The conclusion that the presumptions established by the General Court in European 
Night Services are misconceived helps to clarify the notion of restriction by object. The 
doctrine is of course aware of the standard set by the Court, but is currently forced to 
reconcile it with European Night Services. This leads to paradoxical statements such as 
Bailey’s assertion that ‘the case law makes it clear that certain forms of agreement 
cannot be automatically classified as an object restriction in every case’.555 If an 
agreement is classified automatically as an object restriction, by definition it is so 
classified in every case. The doctrinal reconciliation attempted is to apply presumptions 
by analogy to the types of agreement in the ‘object box’, while the Court’s standard is 
only applied to individual agreements in the absence of precedent.
556
 Nonetheless, there 
is no reason to conduct this separation. The Court’s standard also makes use of analogy 
with its previous case law. Furthermore, the Court certainly did not present its standard 
as subsidiary to the General Court’s presumptions. 
The reluctance to question the validity of European Night Services stems from its 
importance for an ‘effects-based approach’, since it is a prominent example of a ‘more 
economics’ approach to EU competition law and the only judicial formulation of 
anything coming close to a presumption of effects.
557
 As already noted, such rules 
would line up neatly with the per se prohibitions of US antitrust. Nonetheless, this 
system does not seem appropriate for EU competition law.
558
 Private enforcement in the 
US leads to a multitude of cases testing the appropriateness of rules, gaining experience 
as jurisdictional steps are climbed. Public enforcement in the EU requires top-down 
rules which guide administrative action from the start.
559
 Therefore, it can be concluded 
that there is no rule under Article 101(1), such as the one proposed by the General Court 
in European Night Services, whereby the qualification as a certain type of agreement 
leads to a restriction by object.
560
 Each agreement must be assessed individually 
according to the factors indicated in the standard set by the Court, even if it can be 
                                                                                                                                                           
state of the market at the moment it is agreed, its lengthy duration can make the structures of that market 
more rigid, reducing cartel participants’ incentive for innovation and development. A return to free 
competition will be all the more difficult and protracted, the longer the cartel continues’. 
555
 Bailey (2012) 561.  
556
 See Bailey (2012) 571-576 and 576-585 on the distinction between ‘identifying object restrictions by 
reference to examples or decided cases’ and ‘ascertaining the objectives of the agreement in its 
surrounding context’. This also corresponds to the alternative proposed in GC European Night Services 
(fn. 538) 136. 
557
 See Odudu (2008) 13, and the difficulty in providing authority for this presumption beyond the above 
quoted Commission position. 
558
 See Jones and Sufrin (2014) 231. 
559
 Bailey (2012) 564 admits that experience plays a comparatively limited role in EU competition law. 
560
 This includes the types given in Article 101(1) itself, see Whish and Bailey (2012) 122. 
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qualified as price-fixing or market sharing.
561
 The interpretation of these factors is of 
course open to analogy with previous judgments, and thus doctrinal classifications such 
as the ‘object box’ remain useful indicators – but only that. 
 
iii. Principles of EU competition law 
 
The standard set by the Court elucidates what factors must be considered for finding a 
restriction by object – the agreement’s provisions, objectives and context – but it does 
not explain how to extract the agreement’s anti-competitive nature from these factors. 
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, an ‘effects-based approach’ connects 
restrictions by object with the likelihood of anti-competitive effects, while the present 
research will argue that restrictions by object are moral judgments of intent placed in its 
context. Intent must always be considered since the agreement’s objectives represent the 
parties’ intent, as discussed in Chapter I (on the concept of intent), and such objectives 
are an indispensable part of the standard set by the Court.
562
 This means that the case 
law that the parties’ intention ‘is not a necessary factor’, but can be relied upon, should 
be limited to the use of internal evidence like documentation and statements, as also 
discussed in Chapter I (on the concept of intent).
563
 As such, if undertakings claim that 
their intent when entering into an agreement was to pursue certain objectives, the 
Commission is forced to examine this claim. If it does not, it will fail to properly 
motivate its decision; if it refuses to examine the claim by holding that intent is 
unnecessary for finding a restriction by object, it will be committing an error of law.
564
 
The first step of finding a restriction by object is to consider whether the intent of the 
agreement falls within the scope of a principle of EU competition law. The moral 
judgment can only take place once context is considered, which is discussed below. 
Although these steps can be separated analytically, they are not in practice. As seen in 
Chapter III (on collusion), the finding that intent has been influenced by another 
                                                     
561
 In cases involving preliminary references the Court often refers to types of agreements, since it is 
prevented from conducting a factual analysis of a single agreement, but the characteristics (as a matter of 
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 See Glaxo (fn. 28) 58. 
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- 126 - 
undertaking goes together with judging such influence, according to its context, under 
the principle of independence of economic action – which can carry through to the 
notion of restriction. However, if there is no influence of the intent, there is no 
judgment. Therefore, intent must first fall within the scope of the principle. Other than 
the principle of independence of economic action, restrictions by object can also be 
grounded on the principles of market integration and competition on the merits. The 
application of these principles confirms the normative value of intent. Whish and Bailey 
state that restrictions by object are ‘clearly inimical to the objectives of the EU’.565 As 
discussed in Chapter II (on judging intent), this does not involve a consideration of 
effects in relation to the goals of EU competition law, which is covered by restrictions 
by effect, but an application of principles which represent the values of the EU. 
The operation of principles explains several characteristics of restrictions by object. 
First, it is only because the Court is making a normative judgment on principles that it 
offers so little explanation on the anti-competitive nature of restrictions by object. That 
nature is extracted from a background of EU law values which are assumed to be known 
and shared. This reasoning would not be possible if, as an ‘effects-based approach’ 
holds, restrictions by object involved a consideration and balancing of effects on EU 
competition law goals. Even though the case law can always be artfully interpreted in 
this manner, it would not be proper for the Court not to make its policy reasoning based 
on effects explicit. Second, principles also justify why restrictions by object do not 
depend on iterative design according to experience but ‘top-down’ definition by the 
Court. Finally, principles explain why, despite restrictions by object and effect being 
presented in the alternative by the case law, object is always considered first.
566
 This 
shows normative precedence, not practical expediency, particularly when reviewing 
Commission decisions that conduct both an object and effects analysis, effectively 
dispensing with the usefulness of presumptions. 
The principle of independence of economic action judges the intent to change 
competitive parameters (price, output, distribution, innovation, etc.). As discussed, this 
principle applies to the finding of collusion. In some situations this ‘pre-substantive’ 
analysis is enough to also find a restriction, namely horizontal agreements or concerted 
practices covering how cartels normally operate: price-fixing, bid-rigging, exchange of 
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information, etc.
567
 However, in other situations the finding of a restriction involves a 
separate analysis. This is necessary when applying restrictions by effect or other 
principles, but may also happen in relation to a more in-depth analysis of contested or 
unclear cases of influence, particularly in vertical relationships (such as resale prices or 
‘hub-and-spoke schemes’). When a restriction is found, as also noted above, the Court 
may use the same language as for the finding of collusion, since the principle remains 
the same. Thus, in BIDS the Court conducted a separate analysis (since an agreement 
was not in doubt) and found that the intent to reduce overcapacity ‘conflicts patently 
with the concept inherent in the [Treaty] provisions relating to competition, according to 
which each economic operator must determine independently the policy which it 
intends to adopt’.568 By definition, the lack of intent to change competitive parameters 
will also lead to the lack of collusion. 
The principle of market integration judges intent such as preventing parallel trade or 
national boycotts. Once collusion has been found, the purpose of the influence is 
assessed in relation to market integration.
569
 This is also a goal of EU competition law, 
so effects on market integration are caught by restrictions by effect. Nonetheless, as 
Bailey comments, ‘[i]t is generally sufficient […] to find that an agreement seeks to 
prevent parallel trade in order for it to have a restrictive object’.570 Therefore, it is the 
intent to restrict parallel trade which is being normatively considered, not its effects. As 
noted in Chapter II (on judging intent), there appears to be a deontological duty against 
such intent. This makes the seminal cases on parallel trade, like Consten and Grundig, 
as much the product of EU law values as an attempt of defining those values by the 
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 Whelam (2013) 559 argues that the moral wrongness of cartels is akin to stealing, but a right to the 
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Court.
571
 The connection between the intent to prevent parallel trade and the principle of 
market integration was made explicit in Glaxo: 
‘With respect to parallel trade, the Court has already held that, in principle, 
agreements aimed at prohibiting or limiting parallel trade have as their object the 
prevention of competition […]. […] 
The Court has, moreover, held […] that an agreement between producer and 
distributor which might tend to restore the national divisions in trade between 
Member States might be such as to frustrate the Treaty’s objective of achieving the 
integration of national markets through the establishment of a single market’.572 
Despite their pedigree, judgments relying on the principle of market integration tend to 
be seen as almost an anomaly by the doctrine. For Bailey, they would constitute policy 
judgments impinging on the economic consensus and experience that would otherwise 
connect restrictions by object to the risk of effects.
573
 For Ibáñez Colomo, they are an 
exception to the lack of an efficiency explanation used to characterise restrictions by 
object.
574
 Nonetheless, a notion of restriction by object which files judgments such as 
Consten and Grundig and Glaxo as exceptions cannot but appear dubious. Instead of 
looking at the principle of market integration as a justification for deviating from an 
‘effects-based approach’, those judgments should be seen as establishing that 
restrictions by object are based on intent. 
As a result of its deontological and foundational character, only rarely will a judgment 
of intent under the principle of market integration be affected by context. For example, 
the intent to isolate a national market was sufficient to find a restriction in Coop de 
France despite the claims of a sector crisis.
575
 This does not however prevent the 
argument that there was no intent, as demonstrated by STM and Javico.
576
 These 
judgments show that the ‘doctrine of double effect’ is a better explanation of the case 
law than a typology of agreements. STM is often quoted in relation to restriction by 
effects, but this is only because the Court found no restriction by object: when 
examining whether exclusivity ‘is to be considered as prohibited by reason of its object 
or of its effect’, the Court considered that the agreement did not intend to limit parallel 
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imports in order to focus on its effects.
577
 Some limitation of market of integration is a 
foreseen effect of exclusivity, but the fact that the agreement expressly allowed for 
parallel imports showed this was unintentional.
578
 Javico dealt with an export ban, a 
type of agreement already considered restrictive in Consten and Grundig. However, 
because the export ban was imposed outside the EU, the Court stated that it ‘must be 
construed as not being intended to exclude parallel imports and marketing of the 
contractual product within the [EU]’.579 Again, the export ban could prevent re-
importation and therefore harm parallel imports.
580
 The Court nevertheless considered 
this as an unintended side-effect of the objective to ‘enable the producer to penetrate a 
market outside the [EU] by supplying a sufficient quantity of contractual products to 
that market’.581 
The principle of competition on the merits applies to the intent to directly harm 
competitors, as discussed in Chapter II (on judging intent), such as denying access to a 
selective distribution network or targeted boycotting. For example, in Pierre Fabre the 
Court considered that a selective distribution network was restrictive by object, the 
same way that in Protimonopolný it agreed with such a characterisation of a targeted 
boycott.
582
 These are all situations where the agreement is intended to inflict some sort 
of direct harm (selective refusal or boycott), which can be distinguished under the 
‘double effect doctrine’ from indirect harm – namely exclusion which is merely 
foreseen to result from arrangements intended to increase sales and improve vertical 
relationships, which are considered compatible with competition on the merits. Chapter 
V (on abuse of dominance) will develop this difference in relation to abuses of direct 
and indirect harm, which is of greater importance than in relation to collusion. First, 
cases where a dominant undertaking intends to harm a competitor are more common 
than agreements to do so. Second, it will be argued that indirect harm is better covered 
by tests of effects, a situation which can already be said to prevail under Article 101. 
For example, the exclusion resulting from aggregated exclusivity obligations was 
examined as a restriction by effect in Delimitis, showing the lack of intent to directly 
harm competitors.
583
 Thus, restrictions by object are limited to situations where the 
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intent to exclude is judged contrary to the principle of competition on the merits. In this 
regard, the production of effects is deemed irrelevant – whether the competitor excluded 
from a selective distribution system or targeted by the boycott is viable has not been 
considered relevant by the Court in finding a restriction by object. 
Classifying intent according to the above principles might prove more useful than a 
typology of agreements such as the ‘object box’. Both classifications are intent-based 
and provide an indication of restrictive nature which must be confirmed according to 
context. However, as noted above, the only link between the agreements in the ‘object 
box’ appears to be cartel activity. Although identified as ‘overwhelming likely to harm 
consumer welfare’, which is contentious both factually and under the goals of EU 
competition law, agreements are allocated to the ‘object box’ on a case-by-case basis.584 
Inside the ‘object box’, they are only linked by their vertical or horizontal character. 
Considering the principles advanced here has several advantages. First, it becomes clear 
what principles link agreements of very distinct characteristics, such as a vertical export 
ban in Consten and Grundig and a horizontal import ban in Coop de France. Second, 
once those links are clear one can avoid casuistic enumerations, such as the ways in 
which cartels can manipulate competitive parameters (price, sales, output, tendering, 
etc.). Third, those links also provide a clear indication of what agreements might in the 
future be considered restrictive, overcoming the recognised limits of an analogy with a 
typology of agreements.
585
 Finally, a classification based on principles can incorporate 
the fact that, even though a restriction might be dismissed based on context, the 
underlying intent is still potentially offensive. For example, the intent to fix purchasing 
prices can still be considered restrictive despite the fact that, as examined below, no 
restriction was found in Gøttrup-Klim. 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
same criteria than under Article 102. However, as developed in Chapter V (on abuse of dominance) and 
contrary to what Monti states, this should not lead to a test of likelihood of anticompetitive effects, but to 
the distinction between direct and indirect harm currently applied by the Court under both Articles 101 
and 102. 
584
 See Whish and Bailey (2012) 121-125; the same can be said of the list provided by Jones and Sufrin 
(2014) 206. 
585
 See Bailey (2012) 574-575. 
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iv. Context 
 
Like the agreement’s objectives, its economic and legal context is also part of the 
standard set by the Court. Thus, it is always considered, even if implicitly. Other times, 
it can be formalised into justifications which apply to both restrictions by object and 
effect. As described above, an ‘effects-based approach’ assumes that certain types of 
agreement are presumed restrictive. Cartels and export bans would set out to directly 
contravene EU competition law, so a legal presumption would be appropriate. These 
agreements are sometimes called ‘naked’ restrictions, since they would not offer any 
countervailing benefit.
586
 However, according to that argument, intent would be 
incapable of explaining more complex situations.
587
 As will be discussed below, only by 
looking at context would it be possible to anticipate a risk of anti-competitive effects or 
consider possible efficiencies. Therefore, restrictions by object would be based on 
effects, except when it is a waste of resources to investigate them (cartels) or they are 
exceptionally precluded by market integration (export bans). It was already seen that no 
such rules apply and that intent must always be considered; it is now necessary integrate 
context, not in an ‘effects-based approach’, but in the moral judgment of intent. 
Context provides the deciding feature of moral judgments. As seen in Chapter II (on 
judging intent), under the ‘double effect doctrine’ the same action and consequences can 
be judged as intentional or not depending on context. Once intent has been found, 
context continues to be relevant in judging it. Different behaviour is expected of 
different entities and of different circumstances. This is particularly clear under Article 
102 in relation to the ‘special responsibility’ of dominant undertakings, as will be seen 
in Chapter V (on abuse of dominance). It also applies under Article 101 where, as 
Bailey states, ‘EU Courts engage in a judgment as to how much the conduct deviates 
from the competitive norm’.588 The case law where types of agreements usually 
considered restrictive, like price-fixing or export bans, were found not to infringe 
Article 101 based on their context will be discussed in detail below. For the moment, it 
should be noted that this conception is reflected in the case law definition of restriction 
by object. By appealing to the ‘very nature’ of the agreement, the Court indicates that 
the restriction is based on intent; by mentioning the ‘proper functioning of normal 
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competition’, it implies that context must be considered.589 What is considered the 
‘proper functioning’ of a market will depend on circumstances and normative choices. 
As such, context is always considered, even if in different guises. A restriction can 
simply be found or rejected, without context appearing to play a role beyond the 
description given, or there can be a two-step reasoning where the potential for intent to 
offend an EU competition law principle is first stated and then assessed in its context. 
Finally, the Court can formalise rules whereby a certain context can dismiss the finding 
of a restriction. When those rules apply both to restrictions by object and effect, they 
will be referred to as ‘justifications’. Moreover, context can appear to alternate between 
the objective and subjective. Legal and economic context is objective, but as discussed 
in Chapter I (on the concept of intent), a strategy necessarily incorporates context. 
Therefore, intent is also characterised by beliefs and desires related to context. For 
example, an undertaking might not merely seek to ban exports, but to prevent an 
existing parallel trade. Context can be seen in the intent in BIDS of ‘remedying the 
effects of a crisis in the sector’.590 
A consequence of context always being considered under the standard set by the Court 
is that, contrary to what some authors hold, there are no so-called ‘naked’ restrictions 
where a restriction by object is found solely on intent. For example, export bans are 
described by Ibáñez Colomo as ‘naked’ restrictions, but in Consten and Grundig the 
Court does not limit its reasoning to intent, stating that: 
‘in order to arrive at a true representation of the contractual position the contract 
must be place in the economic and legal context in light of which it was concluded 
by the parties’.591 
Cartels are the typical ‘naked’ restriction, but as seen in Chapter III (on collusion) a 
‘pre-substantive’ analysis of collusion – which might also determine the existence of a 
restriction – depends on an examination of context. Furthermore, whenever the 
existence of a restriction is contested the Court will also examine context. For example, 
in BIDS, an admitted restriction of output, the Court considered how the agreement 
affected the parties’ profitability.592 The Court will only skip examining context if it is 
procedurally prevented, namely by a reference from a national court or if the point is not 
raised on appeal from the General Court. Therefore, the conclusion that a restriction is 
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‘naked’ is misleading: there is a context which leads to such a strong normative reaction 
to the intent. Whenever an agreement is deemed to be a cartel, a moral judgment is 
made based on context which goes beyond the intent to fix prices or share markets.
593
 
The context of ‘naked’ restrictions is, therefore, implicit. The intent to prevent parallel 
trade presupposes a context of national borders. Materially, these are simply areas of 
distribution which only become normatively relevant in that context.
594
 Changes to 
competitive parameters are also only relevant in a context of competitive relationships. 
It appears trivial to state that cartels only take place between competitors in the same or 
related markets. However, the same parameters also change in agreements between non-
competitors: a sales contract also has the intent ‘to fix prices’ of the sold good.595 The 
established case law that not all limitations of independent economic action will be 
considered restrictive goes hand-in-hand with context.
596
 The need for a competitive 
relationship explains why market definition is important, even for cartels, but also why 
it is not as important as for restrictions by effect.
597
 The same happens with the demand 
under Article 101 that the restriction by object must be significant. The de minimis 
doctrine is of moral origin: the maxim from which it has taken its denomination (‘de 
minimis non curat praetor’) long predates the appearance of competition law. 
Therefore, whether a restriction by object is significant does not concern effects on the 
market, as will be discussed below, but moral appreciability.
598
 
It must also be noted that judging intent in its context does not prevent the Court from 
referencing effects or consequences in its reasoning. As stated in Chapter I (on the 
concept of intent), intent can be characterised by desiring certain effects, and as 
discussed in Chapter II (on judging intent), it can be morally judged on that desire. 
Thus, the reference to effects is part of normal moral discourse. This must not be 
confused with attributing normative value to those effects, as restrictions by effect do. 
Such difference is illustrated in BIDS by comparing the arguments of the parties with 
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the Court’s reasoning. Both mention the consequences of the agreement. The parties 
focused on the economic and legal context in order to exclude any anti-competitive 
effects, arguing that: 
‘if an agreement does not affect the total output on a market or obstruct operators’ 
freedom to act independently, any anti-competitive effect can be excluded. In the 
main proceedings, the withdrawal of certain operators from the market is irrelevant, 
because the stayers are in a position to satisfy demand’.599 
In reply, the Court also mentions the consequences of the agreement but ignores its 
effects. The Court does so by incorporating such consequences in the intent, 
characterised as the desire to achieve a certain outcome. Namely, the Court expressly 
states that the agreements were ‘intended to encourage the withdrawal of competitors’ 
and ‘intended to improve the overall profitability of undertakings’ through specific 
objectives on number of undertakings and production capacity.
600
 As the Court 
summarized: 
‘[The agreements] are intended therefore, essentially, to enable several 
undertakings to implement a common policy which has as its object the 
encouragement of some of them to withdraw from the market and the reduction, as 
a consequence, of the overcapacity which affects their profitability by preventing 
them from achieving economies of scale’.601 
As already remarked, the Court found that intending those consequences would offend 
the principle of independence of economic action.
602
 In doing so, it rejected the context 
of a sector crisis as normatively relevant, stating that such context should instead lead to 
undertakings ‘intensifying their commercial rivalry or resorting to concentrations’.603 
Whish and Bailey have held that this shows that ‘an alternative, lawful, purpose’ is not 
enough to save a restriction by object.
604
 As the Court stated, an agreement might be 
restrictive ‘even if it does not have the restriction of competition as its sole aim but also 
pursues other legitimate objectives’.605 If Whish and Bailey refer to ‘lawful’ in relation 
to other fields of law, their argument is confirmed by BIDS. However, it should be 
underlined that the illegality of the intent in BIDS was clearly established under Article 
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101 taking its context into account.
606
 Other judgments are examined in detail below 
where the opposite result is reached, and context prevents intent from being considered 
a restriction by object.
607
 
Finally, effects are also sometimes expressly stated in relation to justifications, but for 
different reasons. For example, in Wouters the Court stated that: 
‘[for applying Article 101] account must first of all be taken of the overall context 
in which the decision of the association of undertakings was taken or produces its 
effects. More particularly, account must be taken of its objectives, which are here 
connected with the need to make rules relating to organisation, qualifications, 
professional ethics, supervision and liability […]. It has then to be considered 
whether the consequential effects restrictive of competition are inherent in the 
pursuit of those objectives’.608 
As in BIDS, the context in Wouters is taken into account subjectively as pursuing 
certain objectives. However, contrary to BIDS, the Court calls for an assessment of the 
effects of the practice as part of a legal test. It is submitted that this is because the 
justification in Wouters covers both restrictions by object and effect. Hence, in Wouters 
the Court did not even qualify the restriction at issue.
609
 Since restrictions by object and 
effect are true alternatives, they are affected differently by justifications. A restriction 
by object might be wholly cleared based on contextual concerns related to the ‘proper 
functioning of normal competition’. Anti-competitive effects, however, will only be 
cleared if they fall within the scope of the justification. This becomes even clearer in 
Meca-Medina, which underlines the obligation that such effects be proportionate to the 
concerns pursued.
610
 Because justifications involve the normative value of both intent 
and effects, they will not be examined in detail by the present research. 
 
                                                     
606
 The use of the expression ‘legitimate’ by the Court appears to signal that the parties’ objective might 
be viewed favourably under an Article 101(3) exemption or as an attenuating circumstance (or as a reason 
for State action). 
607
 As also discussed below, these judgments are acknowledged by Whish and Bailey (2012) 129 as 
‘commercial ancillarity’. 
608
 Wouters (fn. 596) 97. 
609
 The Court mixes effects-based criteria, such as market concentration, with concerns about the proper 
functioning of the market typical of restrictions by object, see Wouters (fn. 596) 87-94. 
610
 See Case C-519/04 P Meca-Medina [2006] ECR I-06991 42.  
- 136 - 
2. The risk of anti-competitive effects 
 
This section will address the doctrinal view that restrictions by object represent a risk of 
anti-competitive effects. The previous section showed that restrictions by object do not 
depend on a typology of agreements, such as the one attributed to the Commission’s 
position post-‘modernisation’ or the General Court in European Night Services. 
Notably, basing a presumption of anti-competitive effects on such typology of 
agreements has already led to the reversal of Glaxo on appeal and to the statement in T-
Mobile that no such presumption exists. There is however another possibility of 
considering restrictions by object as based on anti-competitive effects. Rejecting the 
presumption in the Opinion in T-Mobile, AG Kokott proposed instead that a potential 
negative impact on competition would be sufficient – that is to say, that an agreement 
would be restrictive by object if it is capable of producing effects in its concrete 
context.
611
 This is the origin of AG Kokott’s analogy with the risk offence of driving 
under the influence of alcohol or drugs, already cited above.
612
 An agreement capable of 
producing effects would be prohibited because of the risk of anti-competitive effects, 
regardless of whether those effects materialise or not. This is the major difference 
between the two ways of considering anti-competitive effects: the absence of such 
effects rebuts their presumption, but does not erase their risk. 
The analogy between restrictions by object and risk offences has been well received in 
the doctrine.
613
 This moves restrictions by object away from the presumptions of effects 
which, as seen in Chapter II (on judging intent), an ‘effects-based approach’ recognises 
but also attempts to avoid. The risk of anti-competitive effects could be extracted from 
the standard set by the Court, namely the agreement’s objectives and context, which 
would then become the standard of likely effects that advocates of an ‘effects-based 
approach’ recommend adopting. There has also been some attempt to reconcile the risk 
of effects with the typology of agreements employed by the Commission and the 
General Court. Bailey presents both as instances of likelihood of anti-competitive 
effects derived from economic consensus and experience.
614
 However, if agreements 
presumed to lead to certain effects are also considered to entail that risk with no 
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possibility of rebuttal, there is a legal presumption – for example, Bailey states that 
‘[h]orizontal price fixing agreements are therefore deemed, by law, to restrict 
competition’.615 The association with risk does not seem to overcome the objections set 
out in the previous section, which go beyond a presumption of effects. It is also not the 
same as the capability to produce effects described in the Opinion of AG Kokott, 
although it does fall close to the analogy made with risk offences. For the present 
purposes, however, it does not matter if the risk is taken from context or from the type 
of agreement, and if the latter is merely indicative or binding. Such risk can simply be 
assumed in order to assess whether it is coherent with the case law of the Court, namely 
the capability to produce effects in T-Mobile (i) and market power in Expedia (ii) 
 
i. The capability to produce effects in T-Mobile 
 
The Court followed the Opinion of AG Kokott in considering that, in finding a 
restriction by object, it is necessary only:  
‘that it has the potential to have a negative impact on competition. In other words, 
the concerted practice must simply be capable in an individual case, having regard 
to the specific legal and economic context, of resulting in the prevention, restriction 
or distortion of competition within the common market’.616 
It is important to frame T-Mobile according to the analysis of previous chapters, which 
have indeed already made reference to this judgment. In Chapter I (on the concept of 
intent) it was stated that intent must be implemented in order to be legally relevant, 
preventing the sanctioning of intentions which are not acted upon. The standard of 
implementation is the capability to produce effects, as shown under Article 101 by this 
passage in T-Mobile. Furthermore, it was seen in Chapter III (on collusion) that 
implementation of concerted practices involves subsequent behaviour in the market. 
Again, T-Mobile was referred to as the source of the presumption that such market 
behaviour will follow a concerted practice.
617
 Therefore, it is argued that when the 
Court states that a restriction has ‘a negative impact’, it is referring to the impact of 
intent which normatively offends the principles of EU competition law.
618
 This is 
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‘potential’ because, as the Court states next, it involves a capability to produce effects in 
an individual case which is presumed in relation to the concerted practices at issue. 
Such an interpretation is more laborious than simply accepting that the Court is 
referring to the risk of anti-competitive effects described by AG Kokott. The reasons 
why the Court did not refer to such risk, or indeed to effects, relate to the case law going 
back as far as Consten and Grundig which precludes the consideration of any effects. 
AG Kokott believes that an analogy with risk offences also respects this case law, but 
risk offences are based on the normative value of effects. Hence, authors arguing for an 
‘effects-based approach’ have understood the Opinion in T-Mobile as another 
expression of need for the likelihood of anti-competitive effects. This is correct: risk 
offences are defined in relation to the probability of the relevant effects. As Dworkin 
states in more general terms: 
‘assignments of probability are indispensable to any genuine consequentialist 
analysis. It would be irrational for a pragmatist to compare two alternatives by 
comparing only the worst possible consequences of each, or only the best, or even 
only the most likely. He must compare the various possible consequences of each 
decision, taking into account their gravity, but discounting each by its 
probability’.619 
In AG Kokott’s analogy, driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs does lead to a 
high risk of an accident. Delicate estimates of probability are required to set the legal 
thresholds of alcohol consumption and a catalogue of prohibited drugs. The acts of 
drinking without driving, or driving without drinking, may also lead to accidents.
620
 
However, those acts are not prohibited. Risk offences do not aim to prevent all risky 
behaviour.
621
 Therefore, it is not the capability to produce a negative effect which is 
relevant, but its probability. If restrictions by object are based on the risk of anti-
competitive effects, they must do likewise. Namely, they must be tailored to capture 
situations with a high risk of anti-competitive effects and to exclude situations with a 
low risk of such effects. 
                                                                                                                                                           
simplement être concrètement apte, en tenant compte du contexte juridique et économique dans lequel 
elle s’inscrit, à empêcher, à restreindre ou à fausser le jeu de la concurrence au sein du marché commun’. 
619
 Dworkin (2006) 97. 
620
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It is nonetheless clear that the capability to produce effects stated in T-Mobile does not 
correspond to a high risk of anti-competitive effects referred to in AG Kokott’s 
Opinion. Despite agreeing that restrictions by object involve the risk of anti-competitive 
effects, Bailey admits that ‘[t]he test of capability appears to set the threshold for 
finding such infringements too low’.622 The solution proposed by Bailey is to demand a 
‘high potential of harm for competition’, tellingly supported by the presumption of anti-
competitive effects stated by the Commission.
623
 Nevertheless, Bailey’s attempt to 
overcome T-Mobile by limiting it to the facts of a concentrated market is unconvincing. 
The language used by the Court is general and likely to be incorporated in other 
judgments, as already happened in Allianz Hungária.
624
 Moreover, the capability to 
produce effects stated in T-Mobile has not been applied as an additional test of 
restrictions by object, but simply presumed – another indication that it does not 
represent the risk of anti-competitive effects but, as discussed in Chapter I (on the 
concept of intent), the implementation of a credible strategy. Thus, the better 
conclusion, and the only one supported by T-Mobile, is Bailey’s initial one that the 
‘potential to have a negative impact on competition’ is not the same as a high risk of 
anti-competitive effects. 
 
ii. Market power in Expedia 
 
In any event, it is argued that the risk of anti-competitive effects is not part of the 
standard set by the Court for assessing restrictions by object. The main factor in the 
analysis of anti-competitive effects, as the case law on restrictions by effect and the 
application of Article 101(3) shows, is the presence of market power. Intent may be 
used as a proxy for anti-competitive effects, but whether there is a risk of those effects 
or not depends on market power. Thus, any conception of restrictions by object as being 
based on a high risk of anti-competitive effects must incorporate market power if it 
wants to stay true to its purpose. The tools to consider such market power are already 
part of the standard set by the Court, namely the economic and legal context which is 
also stated in relation to restrictions by effect. Nevertheless, as Bailey comments, it is 
apparent that context is not used in the same manner: in restrictions by effect there is a 
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‘detailed market analysis’, while in restrictions by object context ‘has tended to be a 
subsidiary tool of analysis’.625 In other words, market power has not been considered 
under restrictions by object, dispelling any notion that these are risk-based. This holds 
true regardless of any typology of agreements. It is uncontroversial that the effects of 
the fiercest price-fixing cartel can be made irrelevant by market forces.
626
 Therefore, if 
restrictions by object were based on the risk of anti-competitive effects, market power 
would be the first and main factor that they would consider. 
The importance of market power for restrictions by object is traditionally attributed to 
the de minimis doctrine. Influenced by the Commission’s De minimis Notice, this 
doctrine was seen as dismissing a restriction by object or effect below certain market 
share thresholds.
627
 However, the Commission excluded the application of its De 
minimis Notice to restrictions by object.
628
 Authors nevertheless saw no other way but 
to use market shares after the Court found in Völk that an agreement with absolute 
territorial protection was not restrictive due to the ‘weak position of the persons 
concerned on the market’.629 The Court recently clarified whether restrictions by object 
could be de minimis in Expedia. Although denying any binding character to the De 
minimis Notice, the Court indicated that it could be considered in finding a restriction 
by effect.
630
 When it came to restrictions by object, however, the Court reaffirmed the 
Consten and Grundig case law that effects are irrelevant.
631
 Hence, the Court held that: 
‘an agreement that may affect trade between Member States and that has an anti-
competitive object constitutes, by its nature and independently of any concrete 
effect that it may have, an appreciable restriction on competition’.632 
The finding a restriction by object has thus been disconnected from the demonstration 
of market power.
633
 An agreement can therefore be found to be restrictive by object 
regardless whether it risks producing anti-competitive effects.
634
 No risk offence would 
exclude considering a factor which indicates the absence of the risk. It is submitted that 
the definition of the de minimis doctrine in Expedia is incompatible with restrictions by 
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object being based on the risk of anti-competitive effects. Even before Expedia, authors 
acknowledged that there was some difficulty in conciliating an assessment of market 
power and the Court’s case law that precludes the consideration of effects.635 The 
solution proposed by Bailey of ‘a limited exception for agreements that would 
otherwise be prohibited’, nevertheless, provides just the sort of presumption rebuttable 
by effects rejected by the Court in T-Mobile.
636
 
This exemplifies the conundrum in which the claim that restrictions by object are based 
on the risk of anti-competitive effects inevitably finds itself: considering any such risk 
equals assessing the likelihood of effects, which is precluded by the Consten and 
Grundig case law. Rightly so, because the likelihood of effects is already covered under 
restrictions by effect, and this would indeed undermine the distinction between the two. 
As the Court stated in Deere: 
‘[Article 101(1)] does not restrict [the assessment of restrictions by effect] to actual 
effects alone; it must also take account of the agreement's potential effects on 
competition’.637 
By excluding the consideration of market power, the tools with which restrictions by 
object are left are incapable of anticipating a high risk of such effects or preventing 
situations of low or absent risk. This is the reason why an ‘effects-based approach’ 
accepts presumptions of anti-competitive effects based on a typology of agreements, 
even though it prefers not to employ rules and those presumptions are not supported by 
the case law: the absence of market power is in any event able to rebut such 
presumptions. By denying rebuttable presumptions, AG Kokott locks restrictions by 
object to a risk of anti-competitive effects based on factors which are not indicative of 
such risk. As discussed in Chapter I (on the concept of intent), rather than risk offences, 
restrictions by object are similar to inchoate offences. Bailey does not distinguish 
between the two, since they both dispense with effects.
638
 Nonetheless, while risk 
offences involve the likelihood of harm, inchoate offences involve intent which is 
implemented. As will be detailed next in relation to the case law, restrictions by object 
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do not depend on an assessment of risk, but on whether they are actually ‘injurious to 
the proper functioning of normal competition’. 
 
3. Moral judgments in the case law 
 
This section will compare different explanations for the case law on restriction by 
object. The moral judgment argued will be confronted with the effects-based 
explanations prevalent in the doctrine, notably ‘commercial ancillarity’ and presumed 
efficiencies. As outlined above, intent which falls within the scope of EU competition 
law principles must still be judged based on its context. Hence, any such intent might 
ultimately be found not be restrictive. This applies to a typology of agreements 
identified in the ‘object box’. In other words, the same intent ‘to fix prices’ or ‘to 
impose an export ban’ might in some cases lead to a restriction by object, and in others 
not, according to context. These ‘hard cases’ provide the best way to test the different 
notions of restrictions by object. If the view held by the present research is correct, these 
will reflect different moral judgments. An ‘effects-based approach’, on the other hand, 
will take from context the likelihood of anti-competitive effects. Thus, different 
explanations have been offered in the doctrine of the how a restriction by object would 
be prevented by showing the likelihood of some positive effect or by dispelling the 
likelihood of anti-competitive effects. 
In the first of these explanations, Whish and Bailey argue that ‘commercial ancillarity’ 
might prevent a restriction being found when such restriction is ‘necessary to enable the 
parties to an agreement to achieve a legitimate commercial purpose’.639 It should be 
noted that Whish and Bailey place commercial ancillarity under the heading of 
restrictions by effect, even though the judgments referred concerned restrictions by 
object.
640
 This appears to be due to such judgments dismissing the application of Article 
101 in its entirety, excluding both restrictions by object and effect. In the same manner, 
Wouters is framed as ‘regulatory ancillarity’ insofar as the restriction ‘was ancillary to a 
regulatory function’.641 As described above, the Court did not qualify the restriction at 
issue in Wouters. Therefore, it appears that Whish and Bailey consider that context can 
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only be considered as a full-fledge justification applying to any restriction, but not 
influencing the normal application of restrictions by object. 
The second explanation, by Ibáñez Colomo, is closer to the present research by 
maintaining that context always plays a role in restrictions by object, even if not 
immediately apparent. Ibáñez Colomo admits that the Courts of the EU have not always 
applied economic theory, but argues that economic concepts can nevertheless help to 
understand the case law insofar as they have been applied intuitively.
642
 Ibáñez Colomo 
thus holds that a restriction by object will be found ‘only to the extent that, and in those 
instances where, [a restraint] is not a plausible source of efficiency gains’.643 Therefore, 
Ibáñez Colomo is also of the opinion that economic context is used to assess effects, 
namely efficiency gains from tackling market failures.
644
 The case law examined next 
would therefore reflect the attempts by the parties to agreements to address those market 
failures. Ibáñez Colomo concludes that the gains which prevent the finding of a 
restriction by object on those occasions require some balancing with anti-competitive 
effects, but that such gains ‘are not expressly quantified, but merely presumed’.645 
Besides these two explanations formulated expressly to justify why restrictions by 
object are not found on some occasions, such occasions can also be explained under the 
‘effects-based approach’ discussed above as a balancing of effects which leads to the 
rebuttal of a presumption or the absence of risk of anti-competitive effects. Before all 
these explanations are assessed in relation to the case law, some considerations should 
be made about the effects on which they depend. It is well known that in Metrópole the 
General Court stated that pro-competitive effects should be considered under Article 
101(3), not under the notion of restriction.
646
 The Court has stated similarly in Consten 
and Grundig that ‘no possible favourable effects of the agreement in other respects, can 
in any way lead, in the face of [the restriction found], to a different solution under 
[Article 101(1)]’.647 These pronouncements, however, require as much confirmation as 
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the statements in the case law that intent is not a necessary factor in finding a restriction 
by object – which turned out not to correspond to the best interpretation. 
It will nonetheless be argued that the case law cannot be explained by an ‘effects-based 
approach’. To a certain extent, the discussion on what effects are being favoured or 
censured by the case law under Article 101(1) will always prove unsatisfactory. As 
noted above, such effects are incorporated in the moral judgment of the intent to achieve 
or prevent them, which allows the Court to treat reasoning lightly. These represent 
‘economic’ intuitions, as Ibáñez Colomo holds, since the moral judgment applies to 
competitive behaviour. However, they are not better explained by economics since they 
depart from an effects-based analysis. If behaviour was truly being judged on its effects, 
as it is under Article 101(3), the parties would as stated by the General Court be 
required, with good reason, to ‘demonstrate that those conditions are satisfied, by means 
of convincing arguments and evidence’.648 The same applies to any other area where the 
normative value of effects has been recognised, such as restrictions by effect or the 
Merger Regulation. Hence, effects preventing the finding of a restriction by object 
should be balanced under the ‘structured framework’ of Article 101(3), as Jones and 
Sufrin comment, not the ‘amorphous framework of Article 101(1)’.649 As will be seen 
next, the Court does engage in a balancing exercise in relation to restrictions by object, 
but based on the moral judgment of intent. Such judgment, contrary to an ‘effects-based 
approach’, is bound to remain ‘amorphous’. 
This section will start by examining the intent to prevent parallel trade and the context 
which explains Consten and Grundig, Erauw-Jacquery and Premier League (i). Then it 
will address the intent to influence the intent over competitive parameters, first directly 
by comparing Gøttrup-Klim and Allianz Hungária (ii), and then indirectly by doing the 
same with T-Mobile and Asnef-Equifax (iii). A table of the case law examined so far 
will also be provided (iv). 
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i. Intent to prevent parallel trade in Consten and Grundig, Erauw-Jacquery 
and Premier League 
 
As commented above, the intent to prevent parallel trade is as a (deontological) rule 
considered offensive to the principle of market integration. In the wake of Consten and 
Grundig, rare are the instances where it has not led to the finding of a restriction. 
Nonetheless, that was the case of Erauw-Jacquery, where the Court found that: 
‘a person who has made considerable efforts to develop varieties of basic seed 
which may be the subject-matter of plant breeders' rights must be allowed to protect 
himself against any improper handling of those varieties of seed. To that end, the 
breeder must be entitled to restrict propagation to the growers which he has selected 
as licensees. To that extent, the provision prohibiting the licensee from selling and 
exporting basic seed falls outside the prohibition contained in [Article 101(1)]’. 650 
Various explanations of Erauw-Jacquery have been offered relying on the intellectual 
property protecting the seeds. Under commercial ancillarity, the restriction was 
necessary to ‘protect the right of the licensor to select his licensees’.651 In terms of 
efficiencies, ‘the financial effort deployed by the licensor to develop a new technology’ 
stated by the Court would lead to a presumption that the intellectual property led to a 
‘net positive impact on competition’.652 Nonetheless, these explanations would not have 
prevented the opposite result reached in Consten and Grundig. That judgment also 
involved intellectual property, a national trademark used, like in Erauw-Jacquery, to 
prevent parallel imports. However, the Court opposed such use of the trademark.
653
 
Moreover, Consten and Grundig also involved a significant investment in the 
trademark, as argued by the parties and AG Roemer to no avail.
654
 
Therefore, it is difficult to reconcile Erauw-Jacquery with commercial ancillarity. It is 
not clear why the right of the licensor to select his licensees is a legitimate commercial 
purpose in Erauw-Jacquery but the intellectual property itself can be set aside in other 
instances. What constitutes a legitimate commercial purpose appears susceptible to ex 
post rationalisations, while purposes which appear legitimate (trademark protection in 
Consten and Grundig or research and development in Glaxo) cannot be anticipated. In 
fact, Erauw-Jacquery is surprising as it is the only purpose admitted so far in relation to 
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the intent to prevent parallel trade. Even when a purpose has been found to be 
legitimate, there is no guarantee that ancillary restrictions will be admitted. Although an 
exclusive national broadcasting licence was considered legal in Coditel II, the Court 
found in Premier League that such legality did not extend to ‘the additional obligations 
designed to ensure compliance with the territorial limitations upon exploitation of those 
licences’.655 Thus, the prohibition to supply satellite decoders outside the territory of the 
licence was found to be restrictive, despite the obvious ancillarity to a legitimate 
broadcasting right. 
An efficiency explanation of Erauw-Jacquery is equally problematic in comparison 
with Consten and Grundig. If the Court had followed the parties’ argument in the latter 
– still economically valid and accepted under US antitrust – that restrictions of intra-
brand competition might improve the (more important) inter-brand competition, its 
concern with efficiency would still be praised today. Instead, the Court was not shy of 
admitting that no ‘net positive impact on competition’ (in the words of Ibáñez Colomo) 
would prevent the finding of a restriction: 
‘Although competition between producers is generally more noticeable than 
between distributors of products of the same make, it does not thereby follow that 
an agreement tending to restrict the latter kind of competition should escape the 
prohibition of [Article 101(1)] merely because it might increase the former’.656 
Market integration might involve a sacrifice of efficiency. If investment protected by 
intellectual property should prevail, there is no reason why it did not in Consten and 
Grundig.
657
 In the same manner, the investment in broadcasting rights in Premier 
League is left unprotected.
658
 
In comparison with these explanations, making a moral judgment of intent according to 
context presents several advantages. To begin with, reasoning in terms of principles will 
show that only an important contextual consideration will trump market integration. It is 
submitted that this is the only valid explanation for Erauw-Jacquery being such a rare 
instance where the intent to prevent parallel imports did not lead to a restriction.
659
 This 
could never result from efficiency or legitimate commercial purposes, since other 
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investments or legitimate purposes should have been found by now. The moral 
explanation is that damage to property is judged differently from harm to investment. 
Erauw-Jacquery, the ‘improper handling’ of seed could alter its genetic characteristics 
and affect its commercial value.
660
 The reference by the Court to the significant 
investment would ensure that the damage was not negligible.
661
 Hence, it was morally 
admissible for the licensor to safeguard the integrity of its intellectual property. 
Considering that the full application of Article 101 was dismissed, and not just a 
restriction by object, this appears to be a non-formalised objective justification. A 
parallel can be made with the objective justification for a refusal to supply intellectual 




ii. Direct influence of intent on competitive parameters in Gøttrup-Klim and 
Allianz Hungária 
 
The importance of context for moral judgments becomes particularly clear when the 
same direct influence of intent on competitive parameters, connected in Chapter III (on 
collusion) to agreements, leads to different findings of a restriction. That is the case if 
one compares the purchasing cooperative in Gøttrup-Klim with a buyer-side cartel. As 
described above, both involve the intent to fix (purchasing) prices.
663
 Significantly for 
the comparison of their context, both Gøttrup-Klim and a buyer-side cartel show a 
similar strategy of preventing individual members from being pressured into 
undercutting the others. As the Court describes in Gøttrup-Klim: 
‘The compatibility of the statutes of such an association with the [EU] rules on 
competition cannot be assessed in the abstract. It will depend on the particular 
clauses in the statutes and the economic conditions prevailing on the markets 
concerned. 
In a market where product prices vary according to the volume of orders, the 
activities of cooperative purchasing associations may, depending on the size of their 
                                                     
660
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membership, constitute a significant counterweight to the contractual power of 
large producers and make way for more effective competition’.664 
The question put to the Court did not concern the legality of the purchasing cooperation, 
but the prohibition of dual membership in its statutes. The Court concluded, explicitly 
taking the context into account, that such prohibition did not ‘go beyond what is 
necessary to ensure that the cooperative functions properly and maintains its contractual 
power in relation to producers’.665 Implicitly, however, the Court admitted that the 
purchasing cooperative did not infringe Article 101(1). If one considers this issue, the 
reference in Gøttrup-Klim to the cooperative’s merits is unconvincing when 
transplanted to other agreements. In many markets the price depends on the volume of 
orders, but this gives no leave to cartelize them. The crucial point appears to be that the 
cooperative is facing ‘the contractual power of large producers’. Nonetheless, 
countervailing market power is not a defence under Article 101(1) – if it were, 
producers would freely cartelize when supplying to large distributors, and collusive 
tendering would be admitted in the face of the unquestionable monopsony of the State. 
The doctrinal explanations of Gøttrup-Klim are equally unconvincing. A supposed 
efficiency would be presumed from the fact that ‘restraints examined could be 
convincingly explained by factors other than the desire to gain market power and extract 
rents from suppliers’.666 However, the cooperative intended precisely to gain market 
power and take back the producers’ margin. There is no indication whatsoever that such 
margin would be passed on to consumers instead of pocketed by the cooperative, which 
would be essential for presuming any efficiency or balancing effects. It must be 
remembered that the cooperative would have to prove such consumer pass-on if it were 
claiming an exemption under Article 101(3), or if a group of small undertakings were 
merging for the same purpose. As for commercial ancillarity, it is simply assumed that a 
purchasing cooperative is a legitimate commercial activity.
667
 This again raises the issue 
of why some activities are legitimate while others are not. 
It is argued that the moral reason why no restriction was found in Gøttrup-Klim was that 
purchasing cooperatives are legal under Danish law, and this led the Court to consider 
that the prohibition of dual membership would also be. This is close to commercial 
ancillarity, but provides a stronger underlying reasoning. Both a restriction by object 
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and effect were dismissed in Gøttrup-Klim, indicating an objective justification. Under 
the principle of independence of economic action not all economic actors are expected 
to compete in the same manner. Thus, the main difference in context between Gøttrup-
Klim and a cartel facing seller-side market power is simply the cooperative structure. 
Danish law advanced the view, which the Court accepted, that purchasing cooperatives 
act as an adequate institutional arrangement to counter market power – or, to put it more 
simply, that such cooperatives are virtuous. This was a moral judgment, and does not 
lead to any valid presumption of efficiency or positive balancing of effects. 
The principle of independence of economic action, therefore, is influenced by national 
law. This might raise some eyebrows, considering that the notion of restriction by object 
is an EU law concept. EU law trumps national perceptions, as demonstrated by the 
rejection of nation-wide crisis solutions in BIDS and Coop de France. Nonetheless, 
those were private arrangements. When assessing ‘the proper functioning of normal 
competition’, EU law may turn to national law.  Indeed, the Court did so even more 
expressly in Allianz Hungária. Examining vertical arrangements between insurance 
providers and dealers, the Court stated that there would be a restriction by object: 
‘where, as is claimed by the Hungarian Government, domestic law requires that 
dealers acting as intermediaries or insurance brokers must be independent from the 
insurance companies. That government claims, in that regard, that those dealers do 
not act on behalf of an insurer, but on behalf of the policyholder and it is their job 
to offer the policyholder the insurance which is the most suitable for him amongst 
the offers of various insurance companies. It is for the referring court to determine 
whether, in those circumstances and in light of the expectations of those 
policyholders, the proper functioning of the car insurance market is likely to be 
significantly disrupted by the agreements at issue in the main proceedings’.668 
As stated in Chapter III (on collusion), vertical relationships are viewed more 
favourably under the principle of independence of economic action, since contacts 
within the relationship are not considered as collusion. In Allianz Hungária the Court 
adjusted this favourable view to the national law context providing (or not) for the 
dealer to be independent and to act in the interest of the policy holder. It is clear that 
these are moral duties, and that they prove decisive for finding a restriction by object. 
Moreover, it should be noted that national law acts not to exclude the application of 
Article 101(1) as a whole, like in Gøttrup-Klim, but only for the definition of 
restrictions by object. This confirms that context is considered simply for finding a 
restriction by object, as argued here, and not as justification directed at anti-competitive 
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effects, as Whish and Bailey assume by framing commercial ancillarity under 
restrictions by effect. The reference to the ‘the proper functioning of the car insurance 
market’ echoes the case law definition of restriction by object, and its moral character is 
disassociated from any verifiable claim of efficiency or positive effects. 
Allianz Hungária is also interesting for another reason: it provides an instance (as far as 
the present research could tell, the only one) where the Court expressly linked a 
restriction by object with the risk of anti-competitive effects, understood properly with 
reference to market power.
669
 In the several restrictive scenarios posed by the Court, the 
following also appears: 
‘Furthermore, those agreements would also amount to a restriction of competition 
by object in the event that the referring court found that it is likely that, having 
regard to the economic context, competition on that market would be eliminated or 
seriously weakened following the conclusion of those agreements. In order to 
determine the likelihood of such a result, that court should in particular take into 
consideration the structure of that market, the existence of alternative distribution 
channels and their respective importance and the market power of the companies 
concerned’.670 
Were it not for the reference to restrictions by object, this passage would read like 
guidance on restrictions by effect. This would be in line with the ‘effects-based 
approach’ of Odudu, which despite arguing for a ‘presumption’ states that ‘account 
must be taken of the effects which are the necessary consequence’.671 Allianz Hungária 
illustrates how, as held in the previous section, the distinction between restrictions by 
object and effect would cease to matter if both depended on the likelihood of effects. 
The contradiction of Allianz Hungária with the case law since Consten and Grundig has 
not passed unnoticed in the doctrine, with Nagy commenting that ‘[t]he notion that a 
comprehensive assessment has to be made in order to ascertain whether the agreement 
is (or qualifies as) anti-competitive by object […] is both conceptually flawed and 
dangerous’.672 It remains to be seen whether this contradiction will be recognised by the 
Court so that, as Nagy suggests, this precedent ‘will remain utmost limited’.673 
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iii. Indirect influence of intent on competitive parameters in T-Mobile and 
Asnef-Equifax 
 
As discussed in Chapter III (on collusion), the influence of intent on competitive 
parameters can also be indirect, namely through the disclosure of information 
constituting a concerted practice. Thus, in T-Mobile the Court found that the exchange 
of information by telecom companies about the rates paid to their dealers constituted a 
restriction by object. Starting with an enunciation of the principle of independence of 
economic action ‘according to which each economic operator must determine 
independently the policy which he intends to adopt on the common market’ in order to 
find a concerted practice, the Court seemingly transitions to the finding of a restriction 
by object:  
‘At paragraphs 88 et seq. of [Deere], the Court therefore held that on a highly 
concentrated oligopolistic market, such as the market in the main proceedings, the 
exchange of information was such as to enable traders to know the market positions 
and strategies of their competitors and thus to impair appreciably the competition 
which exists between traders. 
It follows that the exchange of information between competitors is liable to be 
incompatible with the competition rules if it reduces or removes the degree of 
uncertainty as to the operation of the market in question, with the result that 
competition between undertakings is restricted’.674 
The link between the collusion and the restriction in T-Mobile illustrates the ‘pre-
substantive’ analysis referred to in Chapter III (on collusion). This involves a 
consideration of context, as seen by the reference to oligopolistic markets, and is also 
directed to a moral judgment: the issue is whether the exchange of information leads to 
conditions ‘which do not correspond to the normal conditions of the market in 
question’. Such a statement must be read in conjunction with ‘the proper functioning of 
normal competition’ referred in the definition of restrictions by object.675 
A horizontal exchange of information might appear to be ‘obviously’ anti-competitive, 
since it naturally leads to the alignment of behaviour between competitors, so that an 
‘effects-based approach’ would presume it restrictive. Regardless of such alignment, the 
Court will nevertheless consider whether an exchange of information may be part of 
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normal or desirable market conditions.
676
 That is precisely what happened in Asnef-
Equifax. At issue were also horizontal contacts, but this time between credit 
institutions.
677
 The purpose was to create a register with information about potential 
borrowers and ‘the way in which they have previously honoured their debts’, namely 
outstanding credit balance, default and collateral.
678
 The Court found that: 
‘Such registers, which […] exist in numerous countries, increase the amount of 
information available to credit institutions on potential borrowers, reducing the 
disparity between creditor and debtor as regards the holding of information, thus 
making it easier for the lender to foresee the likelihood of repayment. In doing so, 
such registers are in principle capable of reducing the rate of borrower default and 
thus of improving the functioning of the supply of credit. 
As registers such as that in issue in the main proceedings do not thus have, by their 
very nature, the object of restricting or distorting competition within the common 
market within the meaning of [Article 101(1)]’.679 
It may seem that, despite information being exchanged in Asnef-Equifax, the 
competitive harm is not the same as in T-Mobile. Nonetheless, it is submitted that the 
risk of borrower default is as much a cost of doing business in Asnef-Equifax as are 
dealer commissions in T-Mobile. In both cases there is collusion to prevent customers 
(borrowers or dealers) from moving to competitors which provide better terms. As such, 
in both there is a dispute over a margin, which will either benefit the sellers (credit 
institutions and telecom companies) or the buyers (borrowers and dealers).
680
 The intent 
in Asnef-Equifax and T-Mobile is thus the same: for the parties to the collusion to align 
their offer. Yet, in T-Mobile the Court choses to leave those terms to the market, 
preserving a ‘degree of uncertainty’, while in Asnef-Equifax that uncertainty is 
eliminated so that credit institutions operate in full coordinated fashion. 
In that regard, it is also possible to suggest efficiency explanations for Asnef-Equifax.  
The Court mentions a ‘disparity between creditor and debtor as regards the holding of 
information’, so Ibáñez Colomo argues it accepted correcting an information 
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asymmetry.
681
 However, exchanges of information usually take place precisely because 
of such disparity. In public tendering, for example, the State has all the information 
about competing offers without tenderers being allowed to ‘correct’ such asymmetry. 
Therefore, correcting an information asymmetry cannot lead, by itself, to presumed 
efficiencies. In fact, financial services are the typical example for such asymmetry, but 
in the opposite sense of Asnef-Equifax: as Ibáñez Colomo comments, ‘banks know more 
about the details and implications of the contracts they conclude with end-users’.682 It 
must be observed that no effort is made in Asnef-Equifax to balance overall effects; it 
might be that it succeeds in eliminating the only area where lenders still had an 
information advantage. The stronger claim of efficiency, however, would lie in the 
supply of credit. As the Court described: 
‘if, owing to a lack of information on the risk of borrower default, financial 
institutions are unable to distinguish those borrowers who are more likely to 
default, the risk thereby borne by such institutions will necessarily be increased and 
they will tend to factor it in when calculating the cost of credit for all borrowers, 
including those less likely to default, who will then have to bear a higher cost than 
they would if the institutions were in a position to evaluate the probability of 
repayment more precisely. In principle, registers such as that mentioned above are 
capable of reducing such a tendency’.683 
However, a close reading shows that, like information asymmetry, efficiency arguments 
appear more as reasoning justifications than deciding factors. When examining the 
existence of a restriction by effect, the Court states that it was accepted that the market 
was fragmented.
684
 With no market power, it should be assumed that credit institutions 
would behave competitively: they cannot pass the risk to all borrowers by increasing the 
cost of credit, since the first one to do so will be undercut by the others. That is the very 
reason for credit institutions wanting to exchange information. As such, there is no 
reason not to let market uncertainty work and make each credit institution incorporate 
the risk of borrower default. In T-Mobile, where the market was admittedly 
oligopolistic, there was no argument that the internalization of dealer margins would 
make telecom operators increase the price of their services to regular consumers. 
Moreover, there is no balancing between the supposed increase in credit and the 
reduction from risky borrowers no longer being served. While the latter is certain, since 
some borrowers will inevitably be priced out of a harmonised market despite being 
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solvent, the former is not. The problem is the same as with Gøttrup-Klim: there is no 
indication that the margin gained will be passed on to consumers and not pocketed by 
credit institutions as rents.
685
 The Court admits as much, since it requires a greater 
availability of credit and any other benefits to be demonstrated in order for an 
exemption under Article 101(3) to be granted, as part of the condition that a fair share of 
the advantage is passed on to the consumer.
686
 Since this involves a reversal of the 
burden of proof, it is argued that it cannot be held that an efficient increase in credit is 
presumed to dismiss a restriction by object and, at the same time, demanded for an 
exemption to be granted. The only logical conclusion is that the restriction by object is 
unconnected to any presumed efficient outcome. 
The reasons why Asnef-Equifax was decided differently from T-Mobile have little to do 
with a balance of effects, but are again related to moral judgment on what is ‘injurious 
to the proper functioning of normal competition’ referred in the definition of restriction 
by object. Like the ‘the proper functioning of the car insurance market’ in Allianz 
Hungária, the concern in Asnef-Equifax is with ‘improving the functioning of the 
supply of credit’. The risk of default is not seen as a margin contested between credit 
institutions and borrowers, but something which is morally undesirable in itself. The 
breaking of promises is the quintessential moral dilemma.
687
 The Court’s misgivings 
about the overall supply of credit, its lack of hesitation in turning a competitive market 
into a collusive one, and even the unusual anti-consumer stance all appear to have been 
influenced by the strong moral justification of avoiding defaulting on promises. The 
Court again turns to national law for support, as in Allianz Hungária, stating that ‘such 
registers […] exist in numerous countries’.688 This goes to the core of the definition of 
restriction by object, not to a justification applicable to any type of restriction. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter examined the role of intent in the notion of restriction by object under 
Article 101, where the Commission’s ‘modernisation’ first implemented the ‘effects-
based approach’ advanced in the doctrine. However, the Commission’s stated position 
that restrictions by object are presumptions of the same anti-competitive effects on 
consumer welfare caught by restrictions by effect did not fare well. The Commission’s 
position was initially accepted by the General Court, first by referring to the types of 
agreements indicated by the Commission as ‘obvious restrictions of competition’ which 
dispensed with the need to examine context in European Night Services, and then by 
holding that such presumptions could be rebutted by demonstrating the absence of 
effects on consumer welfare in Glaxo. However, the Court rejected this both the 
Commission and the General Court approach. Not only did it reverse Glaxo on the issue 
of consumer welfare, it went on to say in T-Mobile that restrictions by object do not 
involve a rebuttable presumption of effects. In so doing, the Court simply continued to 
apply the standard that it had long set for restrictions by object, according to which each 
agreement must be assessed on its intent (indicated as ‘objectives’) placed in its context. 
This standard came as a reaction to the Commission’s pre-‘modernisation’ practice of 
finding a restriction relying solely on a typology of agreements restricting contractual 
freedom. The Court rightly perceived that the Commission and the General Court 
merely substituted one typology of agreements for another, but this time based on 
effects on consumer welfare, and held firm. 
The lack of jurisprudential confirmation of a presumption of anti-competitive effects 
has not undeterred the doctrinal support for an ‘effects-based approach’, since its main 
objective – to influence the Commission decision-making – has already been 
accomplished. It does however make it difficult to justify an ‘effects-based approach’. 
Authors have therefore appropriated AG Kokott’s analogy with risk offences in order to 
hold that restrictions by object are legal presumptions based on the likelihood of anti-
competitive effects. This is somewhat ironic, since the same Opinion in T-Mobile was 
instrumental in denying a rebuttable presumption, and it is evident that AG Kokott does 
not favour an ‘effects-based approach’. The need to grasp at any justification makes an 
‘effects-based approach’ difficult to define, as the present chapter attested: authors 
claim that restrictions by object are, at the same time, presumptions of effects rebuttable 
on context (as the Commission holds), legal presumptions which dispense with the need 
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to consider context (as the European Night Services and AG Kokott hold) and 
presumptions of necessary effects reached by applying the standard set by the Court (as 
an ‘effects-based approach’ favours). This has had unfortunate consequences for the 
stability of the Court’s case law, which periodically imports from various sources 
references to an ‘effects-based approach’ which it does not follow: the ‘obvious 
restrictions of competition’ in KME, the ‘potential to have a negative impact’ in T-
Mobile, and the test of being ‘likely that, having regard to the economic context, 
competition on that market would be eliminated’ in Allianz Hungária. 
The position of the Court is quite simple to understand if those references are 
discounted: an ‘effects-based approach’ holds that restrictions by object require (one 
way or the other) the likelihood of anti-competitive effects, and the Court has stated in 
Deere that such likelihood is caught by restrictions by effect. Moreover, the Court has 
held since Consten and Grundig that restrictions by object are an alternative to 
restrictions by effect. That alternative disappears both restrictions are based on the 
normative value of effects, regardless of this normative value being hidden behind 
presumptions, risk or context. The only way to preserve a true alternative is to ground 
restrictions by object on the normative value of intent, morally judged against the 
principles of EU competition law. Restrictions by object are not ‘likely’ or ‘presumed’ 
to infringe Article 101 – they are a present and serious offence against that provision. 
This offence might derive from the ‘pre-substantive’ analysis made when collusion is 
found under the principle of independence of economic action, or from a fresh judgment 
based on the principles of market integration or competition on the merits. Such moral 
judgments are the reason why restrictions by object are associated with legal certainty 
and ease of application despite involving no presumptions: the offensive character of 
influencing competitive parameters, of preventing market integration and of harming 
competitors is clear and intuitive. Some cases might involve a more delicate contextual 
analysis, as the comparisons made in this chapter illustrated. Nonetheless, it was found 
that even in then a moral judgment provides a better explanation of the case law than 
effects, which lack the precise framework of restrictions by effect or Article 101(3) 
under which they are usually examined.  
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CHAPTER V 
Abuse of a dominant position 
 
 
The previous two chapters examined whether behaviour could be deemed anti-
competitive under Article 101 based on intent. It was concluded that Article 101 is 
triggered when collusion is found under the principle of independence of economic 
action, namely when intent is unduly influenced, with restrictions by object involving a 
further moral judgment of such intent in its context according to the mentioned principle 
of independence of economic action or the principles of market integration and 
competition on the merits. The present chapter will complete the analysis of the 
substantive value of intent by examining the notion of abuse of dominance under Article 
102. The case law definition of abuse as an ‘objective concept’ has created obstacles to 
recognising a substantive value to intent.
689
 The Court has nonetheless long employed 
subjective notions such as ‘the purpose to strengthen a dominant position’ or ‘a plan to 
eliminate a competitor’.690 As discussed in Chapter II (on judging intent), the Court 
dispelled any doubts about the legitimacy of the use of intent by stating in Tomra that 
the strategy of the dominant undertaking had to be necessarily considered and that its 
intention could be relied upon to find an abuse.
691
 Therefore, the case law reference to 
an ‘objective concept’ will be understood, as discussed in Chapter I (on the concept of 
intent), as requiring the implementation of intent when it is relied upon, namely through 
the capability to produce effects. 
Article 102 stands apart from Article 101 by the level of controversy it attracts and the 
consequent disparate interpretations. As seen in Chapter IV (on restrictions of 
competition), there is some divergence on how to frame a limited number of judgments 
but overall the case law on restrictions by object is seen as promoting legal certainty. In 
contrast, the remark by Whish and Bailey that ‘[i]t is not controversial to say that 
Article 102 is controversial’ has become established wisdom in relation to abuse of 
dominance.
692
 The Commission has added to this state of affairs by formulating its own 
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interpretation of abuse in the Enforcement Guidance on Article 102 which, as 
acknowledged, diverges from that of the Court.
693
 Authors now cover both the case law 
and the Enforcement Guidance on Article 102, providing ample pickings for turning 
abuse of dominance into the doctrinal battleground for the goals of EU competition law. 
Since that involves awarding priority to or balancing certain effects, as discussed in 
Chapter II (on judging intent), the use of intent has become a casualty of a generalised 
‘effects-based approach’. 
However, an ‘effects-based approach’ overlooks important aspects of Article 102. As 
described in Chapter II (on judging intent), this approach has been opposed to that of 
per se abuses, arguably overlooking that the distinction between effects and intent is 
different from the distinction between rules (such as per se abuses) and standards.
694
 As 
this chapter will show, any combination between the two is possible: some intent is per 
se abusive (to restrict parallel imports) but so are some effects (loss-leading margin 
squeezes), and there are effects-based standards (exclusionary effects) and intent-based 
ones (the purpose to harm a competitor). To make matters further complicated, Article 
102 has a layered structure whereby standards may themselves involve rules (an 
exclusionary effect is presumed from the ‘suction’ effect of some rebates; certain 
below-cost prices are presumed to be intended to harm competitors). From the letter of 
Article 102 to the specific abuses of the case law, rules and standards are interwoven 
with intent and effects in a delicate pattern which the purported simplicity of an ‘effects-
based approach’ ignores. 
A consequence of the misconception of an ‘effects-based approach’ is that it is often 
stated to remedy false positives and negatives.
695
 For example, Whish and Bailey 
mention the case law on rebates as an example of per se abuses, which is distinguished 
from an ‘effects analysis’ demanding that ‘effects should be demonstrated’.696 However, 
as discussed below, the case law on rebates clearly states that it ‘has to be determined 
whether [the] discounts or bonuses can produce an exclusionary effect’.697 In the 
Court’s reasoning, effects are considered as demonstrated. Moreover, an ‘effects-based 
approach’ is by definition not averse to presumptions of effects, and the presumptions 
of exclusionary effects in loss-leading margin squeezes and of the absence of such 
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effects in above-cost selective price cuts are generally welcomed in the doctrine.
698
 
Naturally, Whish and Bailey mention rebates because presumptions do not appear to be 
equally as warranted. Nonetheless, as discussed in Chapter II (on judging intent), over- 
and under-inclusion are inevitable results of the operation of rules. Some presumptions 
of effects are more adequate than others, but this cannot be solved by an ‘effects-based 
approach’ – only good legal technique can.  
The present chapter will therefore focus on what both rules and standards can represent: 
either intent or effects. As observed in Chapter II (on judging intent), this is made 
difficult by the fact that the Court might refer to effects as part of its reasoning but not 
as an operative test. Notably, the purpose to exclude a competitor is often considered 
abusive under the reasoning that it risks leading to such exclusion. However, it is not 
necessary to prove such risk – only intent, regardless of the risk involved – in order to 
establish an abuse. Article 102 lacks the alternative between object and effects of 
Article 101, so theoretically an ‘effects-based approach’ could be applied across the 
board. The reality however, as the present chapter will argue, is that abuse of dominance 
mimics the application of Article 101. Like collusion, abuse also starts from intent 
which is normatively relevant according to EU competition law principles such as 
competition on the merits and market integration. From there, abuse is found based on 
censoring certain strategies, as restrictions by object, or on anti-competitive effects, like 
restrictions by effect. Finally, abuse may also be subject to objective justifications 
which cover both intent and effects. The main difference between Article 101 and 
Article 102 is that the case law has developed around a typology which applies rules 
and standards to specific abuses. In other words, specific abuses have tests for finding 
anti-competitive behaviour, contrary to the restrictions of competition which are always 
examined under an object or effects standard. 
This chapter will argue that abuse of dominance can be defined as methods different 
from normal competition. Behaviour which does not raise concerns in relation to the 
principles of competition on the merits (for exclusion), proportionality (for exploitation) 
and market integration is considered normal competition, while behaviour which 
potentially offends these principles is further subject to the tests of specific abuses (1.). 
The chapter will also examine the relevance of an ‘effects-based approach’ under 
Article 102, finding that abuse cannot be defined as any behaviour which leads to 
certain effects, and that the importance of effects in the tests of specific abuses is 
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currently limited by the case law (2.). The tests of specific abuses will then be examined 
separately. Exclusionary abuses will be divided into direct and indirect harm in 
accordance to whether the purpose is to harm competitors or gain market power. Direct 
harm abuses apply irrespective of the competitors’ efficiency, and will be found to 
depend on intent (3.). Indirect harm abuses relate to the efficiency concerns typically 
connected with exclusion, and will be seen to apply both intent and effects-based tests 
(4.). Market integration abuses, such as national discrimination or preventing parallel 
trade, will also be found to depend wholly on intent (5.). Lastly, a table with the case 
law analysed will be presented (6.). 
 
1. The notion of abuse 
 
This section will examine the case law definition of abuse of dominance and associated 
concepts such as the ‘special responsibility of dominant undertakings’ and ‘competition 
on the merits’. It will be discussed that these notions, dismissed as vague by the doctrine 
in favour of economic theory, perform the important function of determining the scope 
of behaviour which should be subject to the tests of specific abuses. Hence, ‘normal 
competition’ is not the behaviour which passes those tests, but the one which is 
considered compatible with EU competition law principles in a preliminary stage and 
therefore avoids them (i). In turn, methods different from normal competition might 
involve a judgement of intent under different principles. If intent does not correspond to 
the paradigm of ‘competition on the merits’, appears disproportionately exploitative, or 
raises concerns of market integration, the behaviour go on to be examined under the 
tests of specific abuses (ii). 
 
i. Methods different from normal competition 
 
The case law usually defines abuse of dominance as: 
‘an objective concept relating to the conduct of a dominant undertaking which, on a 
market where the degree of competition is already weakened precisely because of 
the presence of the undertaking concerned, through recourse to methods different 
from those governing normal competition in products or services on the basis of the 
transactions of commercial operators, has the effect of hindering the maintenance of 
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the degree of competition still existing in the market or the growth of that 
competition’.699 
However, in Post Danmark the Grand Chamber of the Court stated that Article 102 
applies ‘in particular’ to the conduct in this definition, also adding that the effect on 
competition was ‘to the detriment of consumers’.700 Moreover, the case law definition 
does not follow the traditional division between exclusionary and exploitative abuses. 
While exclusionary abuses can be said to ‘hinder the maintenance of the degree of 
competition’ on the market, exploitative abuses avoid this definition and launch straight 
into the corresponding references to unfair prices and discrimination in Article 102(a) 
and (c).
701
 It is however established law that the paragraphs of Article 102 are mere 




The doctrine has nonetheless concentrated on the above quoted definition, since it 
involves aspects which can be generalised to all findings of abuse. A weakened degree 
of competition is one of those, corresponding to the dominant position necessary for the 
application of Article 102. It will be argued that the case law is right in characterising 
abuses as ‘methods different from those governing normal competition in products or 
services on the basis of the transactions of commercial operators’, or in short, ‘methods 
different from normal competition’. This proves to be the best definition of abuse: 
exclusionary abuses must correspond to such methods in order to be differentiated from 
competition on the merits, while exploitative and market integration abuses must 
involve disproportionate or restrictive methods which do not correspond to the 
normative concept of normal competition. 
The quoted definition in the case law has been criticised as vague, and this criticism can 
also be levelled at the proposed definition as methods different from normal 
competition.
703
 Nevertheless, ‘normal competition’ is also part of the definition of 
restrictions by object under Article 101: collusion which ‘can be regarded, by their very 
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nature, as being injurious to the proper functioning of normal competition’.704 As 
observed in Chapter IV (on restrictions of competition), restrictions by object are 
praised for their legal certainty, since it is normatively intuitive which situations do not 
correspond to normal competition under EU competition law principles. Thus, despite 
its apparent vagueness, ‘normal competition’ provides a good normative criterion under 
Article 101. The reference to normal competition under Article 102 is even simpler, as it 
does not involve a normative assessment of the proper functioning of the whole market 
but only the action by the dominant undertaking.
705
 
The case law has stated in this regard that ‘a dominant undertaking has a special 
responsibility not to allow its behaviour to impair genuine, undistorted competition on 
the internal market’.706 Like the definition of abuse, this statement has been attributed 
little interpretative worth. Nazzini states that it simply prohibits dominant undertakings 
from engaging in behaviour which is considered abusive, and that ‘nothing more can 
and should be read into this concept’.707 This, it is submitted, does not pay proper 
attention to the legal technique employed.
708
 A duty of care always has important 
implications, in particular by making omissions relevant and prescribing certain duties, 
regardless of their consequences and even to the detriment of the duty holder.
709
 In other 
words, the Court is stating that dominant undertakings have special moral properties 
which condition the judgment of their behaviour.
710
 Thus, as will be seen below, this 
special responsibility forces or prevents dominant undertakings from engaging in 
certain strategies in relation to competitors and consumers, even if it involves protecting 
inefficient competitors or customers which attack their commercial interests. 
Another notion which has been connected with methods different from normal 
competition is ‘competition on the merits’.711 The relationship between the two 
concepts, namely whether they are the same, has been clarified recently. In Post 
Danmark the Court stated that: 
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‘Competition on the merits may, by definition, lead to the departure from the 
market or the marginalisation of competitors that are less efficient and so less 
attractive to consumers from the point of view of, among other things, price, 
choice, quality or innovation’.712 
Thus, competition on the merits is concerned with competitors, and therefore does not 
apply to exploitative or market integration abuses. Hence, it is a narrower concept than 
the notion of methods different from normal competition which, as noted above, should 
be understood normatively to also encompass exploitative and market integration 
abuses. In any event, competition on the merits provides a very important precision in 
relation to exclusionary abuses. Post Danmark confirms that, as discussed in Chapter II 
(on judging intent), competition on the merits (and similar references that preceded it) is 
grounded on the competitive paradigm whereby market success is determined only by 
the attractiveness of the offer in the eyes of the consumer. This paradigm may however 
not correspond – and often does not – to the competition which undertakings engage in 
the real world. In order to understand the usefulness of the notion of competition on the 
merits, it is necessary to describe how the notion of abuse operates. 
In this regard, a comparison between Articles 101 and 102 is informative. Under Article 
101, the finding of collusion requires an analysis of intent, considering context, under 
the principle of independence of economic action. Once collusion has been found, the 
standards of restriction by object or effect operate – including, for restrictions by object, 
the carrying over of the ‘pre-substantive’ analysis of collusion. The only substantive 
rules (outside precedent) concern objective justifications, which dismiss both a 
restriction by object and effect if certain conditions are met. Under Article 102, abuse is 
defined as methods different from normal competition. These, however, are not unified 
under a single principle as collusion under Article 101 is, involving contributions from 
notion such as special responsibility, competition on the merits, or the examples in 
Article 102. Furthermore, several rules have been formulated as tests that apply to 
specific abuse and their justification. Thus, contrary to restrictions by object and effect, 
the Court has defined a typology of abuses.
713
 
It appears that it is this typology of abuses which has prevented further doctrinal inquiry 
on the notion of abuse, and not the supposed inherent vagueness if notions such as 
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‘methods different from normal competition’ or ‘special responsibility of a dominant 
undertaking’. Of all fields of law, EU lawyers should be the last to decry such judicial 
constructs considering that the Internal Market is covered by a handful of Treaty 
provisions on free movement and similar open-ended notions. There is nothing in 
Article 102 which requires more ‘scientific’ criteria than free movement or, as already 
seen, restrictions by object under Article 101. Nevertheless, the notion of abuse is less 
attractive doctrinally when there is a ready catalogue of tests of specific abuses to work 
with (and, in particular, to tailor to the pursuit of certain goals). 
As such, the only doctrinal connection between the notion of abuse and specific abuses 
has been to group the latter into exclusionary and exploitative abuses.
714
 This is not 
done by interpreting the notion of abuse (as seen above, a definition which only applies 
to exclusionary abuses is often cited as applying to all abuses) but, as also remarked in 
Chapter II (on judging intent), by applying a distinction relying on economic theory 
between the exclusion of competitors and extracting rents from consumers. There is a 
conceptual gap between the principles of the notion of abuse and the tests of specific 
abuses. Economics cannot fill that gap since the notions of economic exclusion and 
exploitation do not correspond to their case law equivalents. Whish and Bailey quote a 
Commission official as saying that, just as a unified theory eludes physicists, 
economists have yet to find a single explanation for abusive conduct.
715
 It is submitted 
that part of the problem is asking economists in the first place. 
 
ii. Different principles define abuse 
 
This chapter will argue that the key to filling the gap between the notion of abuse and 
specific abuses relies on the same insight discussed in Chapter IV (on restrictions of 
competition) in relation to Article 101: abuses start from intent which is judged under 
EU competition law principles, but instead of one principle, Article 102 depends on 
several. This is why there is a limited overlap between the scope of Article 102 and 
economic theory, or why abuses of market integration are neither exclusionary nor 
exploitative. Abuse can be defined as methods different from normal competition, as 
already stated, by understanding ‘normal competition’ in the normative sense – 
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competition which is compatible with the principles of EU competition law.
716
 This is 
not circular reasoning, since the purpose of assessing whether a method is different 
from normal competition is not to arrive at a definite finding of abuse. EU competition 
law principles only serve to identify behaviour which raises normative concerns. Once 
certain intent has been identified as potentially offensive to such principles, it must still 
be subject to a test in order to find an abuse. That is also why specific abuses are 
defined in terms of intent – to offer rebates, to refuse to supply, to squeeze margins, etc. 
Those methods do not correspond to normal competition (more precisely, as seen 
below, to the paradigm to competition on the merits), but are not considered 
automatically abusive – only if they fail the tests of the corresponding abuses.  
By understanding the notion of abuse in this manner, it is possible to solve a problem 
which has troubled the interpretation of Article 102: how to define ‘normal’ exclusion 
or exploitation. It is held that the goals of EU competition law, in particular consumer 
welfare and efficiency, do not provide a solution for determining the negative scope of 
Article 102, i.e. when it is not abusive for dominant undertakings to exclude 
competitors or possess market power. As will be seen in this chapter, abuse based on 
harm to competitors applies regardless of their efficiency (for example, predatory 
pricing will harm both as-efficient and inefficient competitors), while market power is 
treated differently depending on its acquisition (for example, internal development is 
accepted but mergers are not). The solution is that exclusion and exploitation are 
considered normal competition when they are compatible with EU competition law 
principles, which depends on their intent and not on their effects. As described in 
relation to restrictions by object in Chapter IV (on restrictions of competition), these 
normative judgments are intuitive and a source of legal certainty. 
Exclusionary abuses are assessed through the principle of competition on the merits, as 
noted in Chapter II (on judging intent), which provides the most significant example of 
how the notion of (methods different from) normal competition operates.
717
 Jones and 
Sufrin state in relation to competition on the merits that: 
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‘[w]hile it may be comparatively easy to identify conduct at the extremes of the 
spectrum as being competition on the merits or an exclusionary abuse, the concept 
does not provide a tool for objectively drawing a line between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
conduct in the middle’.718 
The function of competition on the merits is not to draw the stated ‘line in the middle’ – 
that is for the tests of specific abuses. As quoted from Gerber in Chapter II (on judging 
intent), competition on the merits merely indicates potential distortion of competition.
719
 
Therefore, it is not an operational test of abuse, but of normative relevance. This is not 
immediately apparent from the case law, which often mentions competition on the 
merits at the end of the analysis of exclusionary abuses. It is true that a failed test of 
abuse ultimately corresponds to an infringement of this principle, since the test is 
normatively connected to the notion of abuse. However, competition on the merits does 
not operate like collusion, in the sense that it involves a ‘pre-substantive’ analysis which 
carries over to the finding of abuse. It only signals behaviour which corresponds to its 
paradigm – to compete on an offer judged by consumers – and that therefore will not be 
subject to any test of abuse.
720
 As will be seen below, all exclusionary abuses are 
methods which deviate from this paradigm. In Tomra the Court stated that this does not 
correspond to assessing whether the dominant undertaking has ‘an intention to compete 
on the merits’, since beliefs on the legality of the behaviour are irrelevant, as discussed 
in Chapter I (on the concept of intent).
721
 All that is necessary is to compare the 
dominant undertaking’s strategy, as also required in Tomra, with the paradigm of 
competition on the merits.
722
 
In relation to exploitative abuses, as also remarked in Chapter II (on judging intent), it is 
submitted that the principle of proportionality serves the function of determining normal 
competition. Under economic theory, any price above the perfectly competitive level 
will be considered exploitative, since it involves a transfer of consumer surplus to the 
producer(s). Most of the doctrine defines exploitative abuses according to such 
economic theory.
723
 Nevertheless, it is submitted that this cannot correspond to the 
notion of exploitation under Article 102, since a dominant position is defined by acting 
independently from market forces, which includes the ability to price above the 
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competitive level.
724
 If any price above the competitive level was exploitative then 
holding a dominant position would be considered prohibited in itself, since the 
dominant undertaking will normally take advantage of its ability to charge higher 
prices.
725
 This is something which the case law has always denied.
726
 In reality, the case 
law on exploitative abuses is rather limited. The Court has stated that it is abusive to 
charge prices which have ‘no reasonable relationship’ or are ‘disproportionate’ to the 
economic value of the good or service provided.
727
 This indicates that only 
disproportionate exploitation will fall within the scope of Article 102, with specific tests 
then being applied to the unfair prices or discriminatory practices. 
Therefore, the present chapter will argue that the application of Article 102 involves 
three steps: first, the identification of intent which potentially offends EU competition 
law principles; second, the application of the tests of a specific abuse, which can be 
intent or effects-based; third, the verification of whether an objective justification 
applies. The rest of this chapter will focus on the second step, namely how far the tests 
of specific abuses rely on intent, while referencing the conditions which led the test to 
be applied in the first step. For those purposes, exclusionary abuses will be divided into 
direct and indirect harm abuses, representing strategies that are at odds with competition 
on the merits in different ways: the first by targeting competitors, the second by aiming 
to strengthen market power. This corresponds to the application of the ‘double effect 
doctrine’ described in Chapter II (on judging intent). The intent to cause direct harm is 
caught by the first strategies, not by the second. Strategies to strengthen market power 
can also be caught of their own right, but in relation to indirect competitor harm these 
strategies should be judged according to tests of effects. Exploitative abuses will not be 
discussed in detail since, after being selected based on the proportionality of the intent, 
they appear to apply effects-based tests.
728
 Abuses of market integration will be 
examined last, as they also to apply an intent-based test.  
Objective justifications will not be covered in detail since, as also seen in Chapter IV 
(on restrictions of competition) in relation to Article 101, they apply to both intent and 
effects.
729
 An objective justification is constituted by a legitimate purpose and a test to 
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ensure that effects do not go beyond that legitimate purpose. Objective justifications can 
apply to several abuses or already be integrated in the test of a specific abuse: for 
example, efficiencies have been admitted as objective justifications for abusive rebates 
and margin squeezes, while the test of refusal to supply includes as one of its conditions 
the absence of an objective justification.
730
 It may however happen that Court also 
examines as ‘objective justifications’ the arguments that a strategy should not be 
censored under an intent-based standard, or the attempts to rebut a presumption of anti-
competitive intent. For example, in France Télécom the Court spoke of ‘economic 
justifications other than the elimination of a competitor’.731 These are not true objective 
justifications, since they do not include the control of effects, and therefore will be 
examined below as part of their respective intent-based tests.  
 
2. The meaning of an ‘effects-based approach’ 
 
This section will consider the importance of effects under Article 102, without which it 
is impossible to consider the role of intent. As already noted, and in contrast to Article 
101(1), there is no separation between object and effects in abuse. Hence, there is no 
theoretical impediment for abuse to be wholly based on effects, as an ‘effects-based 
approach’ appears to suggest. Two issues will be analysed in relation to exclusionary 
abuses, the main focus of an ‘effects-based approach’. The first is whether the notion of 
abuse as ‘methods different from normal competition’ can be replaced with an effects-
based standard, whereby abuse would correspond to any behaviour liable to lead to an 
anti-competitive effect (i). The second is the standard of effects required by effects-
based tests of abuse: the mere capability to produce effects, similarly to restrictions by 
object, or the likelihood of anti-competitive effects, as also demanded in restrictions by 
effect (ii). This will require a brief evaluation of the implications for intent, which also 
requires the capability to produce effects for implementation, of the current case law 
which presents both standards of effects in alternative (iii). 
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i. A full ‘effects-based approach’ 
 
An ‘effects-based approach’ usually centres on the doctrine criticising the application of 
tests of abuse which do not include anti-competitive effects. Thus, Whish and Bailey 
applaud recent Commission decisions that analyse effects (even though the Commission 
admits it is not legally obliged to do so).
732
 There is however another way to look at an 
‘effects-based approach’: all that would be necessary for an exclusionary abuse would 
be anti-competitive effects. There would be no different tests, nor even different types 
of abuse: the only test would be whether the behaviour resulted in exclusionary 
effects.
733
 This single test might demand effects connected to a particular goal of EU 
competition law, in particular the protection of consumer welfare, or simply effects, 
leaving the balancing goals for another stage.
734
 If this full ‘effects-based approach’ was 
adopted, the notion of abuse would not be based on intent judged according to different 
principles as submitted in this chapter. In other words, ‘methods different from normal 
competition’ would be irrelevant, as only outcomes would matter. 
However, paradoxical as it might seem in light of the discussion over ‘modernisation’ 
and the adoption of the Enforcement Guidance on Article 102, it will be argued that an 
‘effects-based approach’ was already implemented by Continental Can in 1973. In 
Continental Can, the Court considered that a merger was abusive insofar as it 
strengthened a dominant position ‘in such a way that the degree of dominance reached 
substantially fetters competition’.735 This is the definition of abuse employed by the 
case law, excluding the reference to ‘methods different from normal competition’.736 
Indeed, the Court does not consider mergers as contrary to normal competition.
737
 
Rather, it declares that the methods used are irrelevant, since ‘the strengthening of the 
position of an undertaking may be an abuse and prohibited under [Article 102], 
regardless of the means and procedure by which it is achieved, if it has the effects 
mentioned’.738 One could not put an ‘effects-based approach’ more succinctly. 
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Today, Continental Can is remembered for establishing that Article 102 is not limited to 
harm to consumers, but also includes practices that are ‘detrimental to them through 
their impact on the competitive structure’.739 Such practices are framed as exclusionary 
abuses, whereby the structure of the market is affected by the exclusion of competitors. 
This interpretation perverts the original meaning of Continental Can. The Court was not 
particularly concerned with the exclusion of competitors, skipping the examination of 
its market consequences, and focused squarely on the dominant undertaking. It must be 
remembered that the Commission decision argued that ‘even so called “internal” 
measures […] fulfil the conditions for abuse and are thus prohibited’.740 The issue was 
the expansion of the dominant undertaking, not the market consequences of excluding a 
competitor. Thus, when the parties argued that the scope of Article 102 was limited to 
actions with market consequences, the Court replied that ‘any structural measure may 
influence market conditions, if it increases the size and economic power of the 
undertaking’.741 As such, the ‘structural measure’ referred by the Court concerned the 
internal structure of the dominant undertaking, not the competitive structure of the 
market which it only indirectly affected.  
Continental Can therefore opened the door for any action by the dominant undertaking 
which had the effect of strengthening its dominant position to be caught by Article 102. 
Continental Can was followed by the Merger Regulation, which regulated that 
particular action. Mergers, as a reorganisation of the undertaking, do not reflect a 
substantive concern: the only such concern relates to the market power. The 
concentration defined in the Merger Regulation is thus the kind of ‘jurisdictional’ 
concept which, as discussed above, an ‘effects-based approach’ argues for: capturing 
effects but without any meaning in itself. It must be highlighted that Continental Can 
applied to an increase in market power ‘regardless of the means and the procedure’. As 
such, it outlined a ‘jurisdictional’ concept even wider than the concentrations object of 
the Merger Regulation. 
There are many ways by which ‘the size and economic power of the undertaking’ can 
be increased, notably the investment in own productive infrastructure or its acquisition 
in the market – assets, labour, intellectual property etc. – instead of its transfer from 
competitors. Applying this logic, the General Court considered in Tetra Pak that the 
acquisition of an exclusive licence was abusive due to strengthening a dominant 
                                                     
739
 Continental Can (fn. 145) 26. 
740
 Continental Can (fn. 145) ECR 228. 
741
 Continental Can (fn. 145) 21. 
- 172 - 
position, despite not involving a merger.
742
 Ultimately, because Continental Can does 
not distinguish between ‘methods different from normal competition’ and those which 
are not, any factor which leads to an increase in market power could be brought under 
Article 102 – including the success of the dominant undertaking. It is however apparent 
that subsequent case law departed from Continental Can. As the Court summarised in 
Post Danmark, the case law ‘in no way [prevents] an undertaking from acquiring, on its 
own merits, the dominant position on a market’.743 
As such, the current case law on Article 102 concentrates on the ‘means and procedure’ 
considered irrelevant in Continental Can.
744
 This has the curious effect of mergers 
joining the catalogue of methods different from normal competition, when the purpose 
of Continental Can was precisely to avoid such categorisation.
745
 Compared with the 
other forms of exclusionary abuse discussed in this chapter, it is not apparent that 
mergers should be given normative importance under the principle of competition on 
the merits. It is submitted that in Continental Can the Court was not so much concerned 
with exclusion, as currently understood, but with the goal of market integration. The 
Court dedicates the majority of its reasoning to the interplay between the Treaty’s 
competition provisions.
746
 Thus, its main concern appears to be that: 
‘[i]f, in order to avoid the prohibitions in [Article 101], it sufficed to establish such 
close connections between the undertakings that they escaped the prohibition of 
[Article 101], then, in contradiction with the principles of the [internal market], the 
partitioning of a substantial part of this market would be allowed’.747 
Considering how exceptional the full ‘effects-based approach’ of Continental Can is, it 
is better understood primarily as an application of the goal of market integration. 
Parent-subsidiary relationships were viewed favourably in Consten and Grundig, 
despite the effects they might have on market integration, by being exempt from the 
restriction by object described in Chapter IV (on restrictions of competition). It is 
argued that this has elicited a limited reaction at the level of Article 102, bringing 
mergers within its scope because of possible market partitioning effects. Nonetheless, 
those effects can still be achieved if an undertaking expands organically, based on 
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market success and without engaging into any acquisition. Market partitioning can only 
be avoided if Continental Can was applied, as originally intended, to any internal 
measure by a dominant undertaking.
748
 
Despite being motivated by the goal of market integration, Continental Can opened the 
way to regulating the full extent of the market power through the Merger Regulation. A 
similar expansive application could result from the Enforcement Guidance on Article 
102. The Commission follows an ‘effects-based approach’ by stating that it will apply 
Article 102 to any exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings which results ‘in a 
position to profitably increase prices to the detriment of consumers’.749 However, by 
referring to ‘foreclosing competitors in an anti-competitive way’, and subsequently to 
‘anti-competitive foreclosure’ instead of mere foreclosure, the Commission indicates 
that it will consider the character of the behaviour and not merely whether it leads to 
effects on market structure.
750
 The question therefore is to what extent the Commission 
will follow the typology of abuses developed by the Court. The Enforcement Guidance 
on Article 102 indicates that it will mix a general analysis with ‘specific factors’ 
pertaining to the types of abuse identified in the case law, to which considerable 
attention is devoted.
751
 It is nevertheless natural that the Commission will continue to 
extend the application of Article 102 to new types of abuse. It remains to be seen 
whether they will develop from the principles which orientate the current typology, as 
held here, or whether it will apply Continental Can’s full ‘effects-based approach’ to 
behaviour which might appear normatively neutral. 
 
ii. A limited ‘effects-based approach’ 
 
An ‘effects based approach’ is not usually employed in the full sense of Continental 
Can examined above, but in the limited sense of incorporating effects in the tests of all 
specific abuses. This is limited insofar as the notion of abuse derives from EU 
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competition law principles, as methods different from normal competition, and not 
straight from effects. Lianos comments that: 
‘The calls for an ‘effects-based’ economic approach do not question the need to 
classify or create categories of abuses. Do they imply, however, the adoption of a 
unified analytical framework for [Article 102] that could apply to all commercial 
practices? At an abstract level, this may be the case […]. At a more practical level, 
though, an effects-based approach will not preclude classification’.752 
Therefore, a limited ‘effects-based approach’ is not generally seen as a handicap by its 
advocates. As described above, such approach is usually connected with avoiding false 
positives of anti-competitive effects. Even with abuse being defined as methods 
different from normal competition, if anti-competitive effects were always demanded as 
part of the tests of specific abuses those false positives would be limited. Hence, for the 
remainder of the chapter an ‘effects-based approach’ will be referred to in this limited 
sense. The question is whether the case law follows this approach. 
As already stated, Article 102 does not distinguish between object and effects so that, in 
theory, abuse could always require effects in the same way as restrictions by effect do. 
The reverse however is also true: all abuses could be structured around intent, as 
restrictions by object are. It was also noted above that specific abuses have developed 
around a typology with their own tests, while restrictions by object have not. This must 
not obfuscate the choice in the interpretation of Article 102 between intent and effects, 
for which restrictions by object and effect still provide useful reference points. The 
absence of a formal separation between intent and effects in the case law can cause 
some confusion, as the description of a single type of abuse can alternate between 
intending a certain effect and causing it. For example, as discussed below, rebates can 
be found abusive by both intending exclusivity and leading to effects akin to 
exclusivity. In other situations, it is hard to locate the operative test of an abuse, as 
intent might be used subordinate to effects or effects used as mere reasoning for intent. 
All this emphasises the need to properly frame abuses as intent or effects-based.  
Both the analysis of intent and an ‘effects-based approach’ are however made harder by 
the case law of the General Court which assimilates object and effect. The General 
Court stated in France Télécom that: 
‘As regards the conditions for the application of [Article 102] and the distinction 
between the object and effect of the abuse, it should be pointed out that, for the 
purposes of applying that article, showing an anti-competitive object and an anti-
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competitive effect may, in some cases, be one and the same thing. If it is shown that 
the object pursued by the conduct of an undertaking in a dominant position is to 
restrict competition, that conduct will also be liable to have such an effect’.753 
It is argued that the assimilation of object and effect is profoundly misguided. Under 
Article 101, the Court has gone to great lengths to differentiate object and effect. As 
described in Chapter IV (on restrictions of competition), it has consistently precluded 
any consideration of the anti-competitive effects of restrictions by object, since this 
would erode the distinction with restriction by effect. Thus, in T-Mobile the Court 
rejected a rebuttable presumption of anti-competitive effects, and in Expedia it rejected 
submitting restrictions by object to a de minimis requirement of market power. It defies 
comprehension why the General Court would transpose the object and effect dichotomy 
to Article 102 in order to express the exact opposite meaning: where it has always 
signified difference, now it is supposed to signify ‘one and the same thing’. No clue is 
given of the reasons for this change.
754
 The case law cited by the General Court, namely 
that predatory pricing under Akzo I did not require actual anti-competitive effects, does 
not allow extracting that predatory pricing is ‘liable to have such effect’.755 The same 
happens in relation to the assertion, citing Compagnie Maritime Belge, that it is no 
defence that an abusive practice might turn out to be harmless.
756
 Akzo I and Compagnie 
Maritime Belge represent abuses where intent is used, as in restrictions by object, 
regardless of the liability to produce anti-competitive effects. 
However, despite the Court avoiding the adoption of the ‘object and effect’ dichotomy 
under Article 102, the same result will be achieved if abuse is understood as only 
requiring the capability to produce effects. As described in Chapter IV (on restrictions 
of competition), the Court stated in T-Mobile that a restriction by object must be capable 
of having an effect on an individual case.
757
 This effect corresponds to the 
implementation of the agreement, since otherwise mere intentions (not translated into 
action) could be considered restrictive. The difference with a restriction by effect 
producing anti-competitive effects is market power. A restriction by object may be 
implemented (in, at least, an individual case) and produce its effects despite the absence 
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of market power. Such absence, however, will prevent anti-competitive effects from 
being produced. Restrictions by effect, in contrast, require market power or else risk 
being considered de minimis. As seen in Chapter I (on the concept of intent), insofar as 
abuse is an ‘objective concept’ it also must be capable of producing effects as part of its 
implementation. 
The question, therefore, is whether the notion of abuse requires the likelihood of anti-
competitive effects when applying effects-based tests, as an ‘effects-based approach’ 
argues for. The General Court, as the logical continuation of its misguided effort to 
assimilate object and effect, has also considered that the capability to produce effects is 
the same as likelihood of anti-competitive effects. For example, in Clearstream it stated 
in relation to the abuse of refusal to supply that: 
‘[w]ith regard to the condition of elimination of all competition, it is not necessary, 
in order to establish an infringement of [Article 102], to demonstrate that all 
competition on the market would be eliminated, but what matters is that the refusal 
at issue is liable to, or is likely to, eliminate all effective competition on the 
market’.758 
Whether the refusal ‘is liable’ to eliminate all competition corresponds to the capability 
to produce such effects, and is not the same as their likelihood. As Nazzini comments, 
this is true for English and ‘in a number of the languages of the EU’.759 The General 
Court effectively lowers the threshold of effects by assimilating both concepts. This 
goes against the case law of the Court quoted by the General Court, namely Bronner, 
which expressly states the refusal must ‘be likely to eliminate all competition’.760 The 
General Court’s thus appears to use its own notion of abuse, based on the liability of 
effects which, as remarked above, it considers ‘one and the same thing’ as establishing 
an anti-competitive object.
761
 This means that, despite nominally requiring effects, the 
General Court nullifies an ‘effects-based approach’ by adopting the same conditions as 
restrictions by object. 
Without having directly reviewed the notion of abuse advanced by the General Court, 
the Court has nonetheless accepted that Article 102 only requires the capability to 
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produce effects. Reviewing the General Court’s judgment in British Airways, the Court 
states that an abuse will depend on whether ‘the discount tends [i.a.] to bar competitors 
from access to the market’.762 The use of the expression ‘tends’ would appear to 
indicate that the Court refers to the likelihood of effects. Nonetheless, in the following 
paragraph the Court states that it must be determined if the discounts ‘produce an 
exclusionary effect, that is to say whether they are capable [inter alia] of making market 
entry very difficult or impossible for competitors’.763 More recently, the Court has 
framed the capability to produce effects as an alternative to the likelihood of doing so. 
In another judgment on rebates, the Court declared in Tomra that: 
‘[t]he General Court was correct to observe […] that, for the purposes of proving an 
abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 102, it is sufficient to 
show that the abusive conduct of the undertaking in a dominant position tends to 
restrict competition or that the conduct is capable of having that effect’.764 
The Court further stated that it was ‘unnecessary to undertake an analysis of the actual 
effects of the rebates on competition’ since demonstrating the capability to produce 
effects was enough.
765
 Despite not assimilating the capability to produce effects with 
their likelihood, as the General Court has done, the Court effectively lowers the 
threshold of effects to the less demanding of the alternative presented. There is no need 
to demonstrate the likelihood of effects if the mere capability to produce them is 
enough. Moreover, the way the above quote from Tomra is framed – without an express 
reference to rebates – indicates that the standard of capability to produce effects might 
be applicable to abuses in general. 
Even before Tomra, authors had already remarked that the case law was unfavourable to 
an ‘effects-based approach’. The capability to produce effects, as restrictions by object 
indicate, is inherent to the implementation of a practice and (save exceptional 
circumstances) is not checked for when considering such practice as anti-competitive. 
Gormsen distinguishes between demonstrating anti-competitive effects (based on the 
economic and legal context) and merely requiring the capability to produce them (based 
on the practice).
766
 The two would be in opposition, since the latter would involve a 
presumption of effects: 
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‘Where effects are accepted as true, regardless of evidence of lack of effects, the 
assumption of effects is irrebuttable. […] The only way that dominant undertakings 
can defend themselves is by challenging the basic fact that they did not engage in 
the conduct’.767 
In fact, what is surprising is that the advocates of an ‘effects-based approach’ have not 
focused more on this issue. It is apparently assumed that a move away from per se 
abuses is enough for requiring the demonstration of anti-competitive effects, without 
considering that one presumption might be substituted by another. Thus, Whish and 
Bailey quote TeliaSonera as authority for such a move by stating that ‘the practice must 
have an anti-competitive effect on the market’.768 However, despite the Court describing 
situations where such effects are likely, like in Tomra the Court also safeguards that it is 
sufficient that ‘the practice may be capable of having anti-competitive effects’.769 The 
abuse of margin squeeze at issue in TeliaSonera is defined as a spread between 
upstream and downstream which does not allow as-efficient competitors to contest the 
market, with that effect further defined as ‘reduced profitability’.770 It is apparent that 
the capability to produce such effect is inherent in the definition of abuse, establishing 
an effective presumption. The focus of the Court’s analysis of effects is on objective 
justification, with the only viable alternative form dispelling an abuse being to 
demonstrate that it ‘is not in any way economically justified’.771 
 
iii. The capability to produce effects 
 
Whatever can be said about the presumption derived from the capability to produce 
effects, it is apparent that the Court genuinely believes that it adequately captures anti-
competitive effects. In other words, the Court has been convinced that anti-competitive 
effects will follow, within an acceptable degree of false positives and negatives, the 
rebates and margin squeeze defined in Tomra and TeliaSonera. Thus, despite 
Gormsen’s characterisation above holding, there is no conceptual contradiction between 
demanding effects and presuming them. In Chapter IV (on restrictions of competition) it 
was rejected that restrictions by object are based on the risk of anti-competitive effects, 
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since they do not take market power into account; under Article 102, where a dominant 
position presupposes market power, it is perhaps legitimate for the Court to consider 
that the capability to produce effects already implies the risk of anti-competitive effects. 
It is argued that the existence of a dominant position provides the foundation for the 
case law equating the capability to produce effects with the likelihood of anti-
competitive effects. When asked in TeliaSonera about the importance of the degree of 
market power, the Court tellingly dismissed it in favour of the simple existence of a 
dominant position.
772
 If effects were ever in doubt, market power would be paramount 
in determining them, as it happens in relation to restrictions by effect under Article 101. 
However, as remarked above, effects are already presupposed in the definition of 
margin squeeze. Thus, the Court stated in TeliaSonera that ‘market strength is, as a 
general rule, significant in relation to the extent of the effects of the conduct of the 
undertaking concerned rather than in relation to the question of whether the abuse as 
such exists’.773 
Naturally, it is not for the present research to examine whether effects are properly 
captured under Article 102, but this has direct consequences for the role of intent. 
Despite the Court’s confidence in its methods, the doctrine does not appear to agree that 
the case law properly represents the likelihood of anti-competitive effects. Thus, as 
discussed in Chapter II (on judging intent), the case law is often accused of being 
formalist under an ‘effects-based approach’, to the point where it is wrongly associated 
with intent despite the Court’s repeated references to effects. This can only contribute to 
the prevailing lack of attention to the legal techniques employed. Nonetheless, both the 
Court’s methods and the doctrine’s readings are likely to continue since, as Whish and 
Bailey state, ‘the trend towards effects analysis under Article 102 is clearly 
established’.774 
In reaction to an ‘effects-based approach’ or not, the Courts of the EU have strained the 
coherence of their case law by including more references to effects. The General 
Court’s assimilation of object and effect, referencing intent-based abuses which 
dispense the need for such effects, in uncalled for. More to the point, the several 
references to likely effects by Court sit awkwardly with the lower threshold of the 
capability to produce them. For example, there is no reason for the Court to concern 
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itself with the likelihood of effects derived from indispensability or sales at a loss in 
TeliaSonera if the definition of margin squeeze already implies the capability for 
reduced profitability.
775
 The case law of the Court on refusal to supply demands the 
likelihood of eliminating all competition, and yet the General Court chose in 
Clearstream to only demand the capability to do so, showing how the threshold of 
effects naturally veers towards the less demanding of two alternatives. 
Nonetheless, by presenting the capability to produce effects and the likelihood of anti-
competitive effects in the alternative in Tomra, the Court has preserved the freedom to 
apply the latter to effects-based abuses. This might happen in reaction to the future 
application of the Enforcement Guidance on Article 102, namely acting when ‘the 
allegedly abusive conduct is likely to lead to anti-competitive foreclosure’.776 Indeed, 
the risk is that the application of the Enforcement Guidance on Article 102 will end in 
the opposite mistake and associate the likelihood of anti-competitive effects to abuses 
which, as explained next, depend on intent-based tests (similarly to what the General 
Court has done by assimilating object and effect). The capability to produce effects 
remains the correct standard in relation to intent, which requires implementation in 
order not to capture mere intentions.
777
 All that is necessary is to apply the alternative in 
Tomra correctly: such capability to intent-based abuses, and the likelihood of anti-




3. Direct harm abuses 
 
This section will examine direct harm abuses, which start from the intent to inflict harm 
on competitors which is considered objectionable under the principle of competition on 
the merits.
779
 By application of the ‘double effect doctrine’, direct harm abuses can be 
distinguished from normal competition and other exclusionary abuses, discussed below, 
where competitors are indirectly harmed by a strategy with the purpose to strengthen 
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market power. Direct harm is a method different from normal competition because it 
deviates from the principle of competition on the merits. As noted above, competition 
on the merits is grounded on a paradigm: undertakings competing on ‘price, choice, 
quality or innovation’ leading to the exclusion of those ‘that are less efficient and so less 
attractive to consumers’.780 Thus, the intent to harm competitors, rather than relying on 
such harm to emerge naturally from competition, will in principle deviate from this 
paradigm and warrant further investigation under Article 102. Several specific direct 
harm abuses have arisen out of these situations. The tests of these abuses, as described 
below and in contrast with indirect harm, depend solely on intent and not on effects. 
Despite the abundant case law confirming so, the fact that the intent to harm 
competitors can be considered abusive has caused much doctrinal anxiety. It is argued 
by some authors that it is ‘impossible to distinguish the intention to restrict competition 
from the intention to compete vigorously’.781 As often remarked in US antitrust but 
applicable everywhere, competition breeds dislike between competitors.
782
 This leads to 
the concern that, by considering the intent harm to competitors abusive, one would be 
protecting them instead of protecting competition.
783
 It is submitted that these issues are 
connected, but not in the way the doctrine has understood them. If intent is correctly 
interpreted and its legal consequences well applied, it is possible to distinguish the 
intent to harm competitors and that of competing for the market. 
First, it must be determined whether the harm is intended as an end in itself, or as a 
consequence of an increase in market power. This is a typical application of ‘double-
effect’ discussed in Chapter II (on judging intent), and constitutes the difference 
between direct and indirect harm. When undertakings compete vigorously, they are 
attempting to gain market power. Harming competitors in that case is usually an 
inevitable consequence, as one undertaking’s gains are another’s losses.784 This 
contrasts with a strategy that has as its purpose to directly harm competitors.
785
 Whether 
such harm results in strengthening market power might also have been envisaged by the 
dominant undertaking, but this is irrelevant. What is relevant is whether the harm is 
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seen as an indirect consequence or as the purpose of the behaviour. In essence, harm to 
competitors may be prohibited if pursued directly.
786
  
Second, the intent to inflict direct harm is checked under the principle of competition on 
the merits. As already stated, the paradigm of undertakings competing on an offer 
judged by consumers is incompatible with strategies that directly harm competitors – 
indeed, competition on the merits is mostly a device to allow indirect harm. 
Nonetheless, the intent to harm competitors may still be considered normal competition 
when it is necessary or ancillary to a choice on the merits. This corresponds to a 
consideration of the economic and legal context similar to a restriction by object which 
departs from intent potentially offensive to Article 101. Thus, the enforcement of 
intellectual property, even if having the purpose to prevent its use by competitors and 
thereby harm them, will be considered part of normal competition.
787
 However, not all 
uses of intellectual property correspond the paradigm of competition on the merits, in 
which case it will (as normal) be considered abusive if it is intended to harm 
competitors, as discussed below in relation to AstraZeneca. 
Third, if direct harm is considered contrary to competition on the merits it must, as 
normal, be further analysed under the tests of specific abuses. As will be seen below, 
direct harm is mostly judged according to a standard which considers context. 
Therefore, different factors are considered depending on the circumstances. A particular 
competitor being targeted by the dominant undertaking is usually indicative of abuse, 
notably in refusals to supply customers, selective price-cutting or so-called ‘naked 
abuses’.788 Another factor indicative of abuse is the misuse of a legitimate exclusionary 
instrument in order to harm, such as legalised cartels and intellectual property. Finally, 
the case law can also institute rules whereby certain factors presume an abusive intent to 
harm. Thus, below-cost pricing and certain margin squeezes are considered to have no 
other purpose but that. The present section will therefore separate the direct harm abuses 
between applying a standard (i) or such rules (ii). 
This all shows that direct harm abuses can distinguish between the intent to harm and 
vigorous competition, but also that, as some authors feared, their final result is 
                                                     
786
 As seen in Chapter IV (on restrictions of competition), competition on the merits can also be offended 
under Article 101 by similar actions such as organised boycotts: it might have the indirect effect to gain 
market power, but regardless its purpose is to harm the boycotted undertaking. 
787
 As examined in the next section, a refusal to licence is only considered abusive if used as a method to 
strengthen market power and thereby cause indirect harm. 
788
 Nonetheless, as seen below, the fact that competitors are discriminated against is not in itself abusive, 
since it does not automatically imply that there is the intent to harm, see Post Danmark (fn. 138) 30. 
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protecting competitors.
789
 Nonetheless, it is argued that this does not imply a choice 
between competitors and competition, since Article 102 does both. Direct harm abuses 
safeguard competitors from harmful action directed at them, while indirect harm abuses 
establish the acceptable methods to gain market power. The inclusion of ‘naked abuses’ 
in the Enforcement Guidance on Article 102, for which the Commission will not assess 
anti-competitive foreclosure, has finally convinced some authors that competitors might 
be directly protected from harmful intent.
790
 Jones and Sufrin state that this section of 
the Enforcement Guidance on Article 102 ‘turns away from an effects-based analysis’, 
while Nazzini considers this as the prime example of an intent-based test of abuse.
791
 
Regardless of the Enforcement Guidance on Article 102, however, there are already 
decades of case law to the effect that direct harm to competitors is considered abusive. 
 
i. The standard of intending to harm competitors 
 
Direct harm abuses employ a standard which takes context into account. Like 
restrictions by object under Article 101, the case law can be categorised under a certain 
typology – refusals to supply existing customers, selective price-cutting, misleading 
intellectual property representations, etc. –, but there appears to be no rules associated 
with these abuses leading to an automatic finding of an abuse. Therefore, the judgments 
in Commercial Solvents (a), Compagnie Maritime Belge (b) and AstraZeneca (c), as 
well as the ‘naked abuses’ of the Enforcement Guidance on Article 102 (d), will be 
examined individually as an application of a standard. The small number of judgments 
dealing with the same type of abuse does not allow fully excluding the presence of rules 
in these judgments or to properly assess the relative value of the factors considered 
under the standard. The Court is satisfied with censoring the purpose to exclude 
competitors when appropriate, failing to expressly distinguish when that purpose is 
absent or not censorable. Nonetheless, the fact that it examines the same specific abuses 
in other judgments as indirect harm provides an indication of which factors were 
decisive to establish the intent to directly harm competitors. 
                                                     
789
 In Post Danmark (fn. 138) 21 and 27-29 the Court states that Article 102 does not ‘seek to ensure that 
competitors less efficient than the undertaking with the dominant position should remain on the market’, 
but as mentioned below this must be read together with the fact that the Court expressly dismissed the 
intent to harm competitors. Therefore, this statement is limited to indirect harm, as the abundant case law 
on direct harm examined next confirms. 
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 See Enforcement Guidance on Article 102 20. 
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 See Jones and Sufrin (2014) 385 and Nazzini (2011) 188-189, the latter exemplifying with many of 
judgments mentioned below. 
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It should be underlined that direct harm is often mixed with elements from indirect 
harm. The Enforcement Guidance on Article 102, despite covering clear harm to 
competitors in ‘naked abuses’, still speaks of creating no efficiencies or inferring anti-
competitive effects.
792
 Nazzini follows this cue by stating that intent-based tests of 
abuse must have ‘no conceivable redeeming virtue either by way of economic 
efficiencies or otherwise, and is reasonably capable of causing consumer harm’.793 
Nonetheless, as will be seen, these factors are not integrated in the tests of direct harm 
abuses. Whether protecting competitors might have efficiency and consumer welfare 
rationale depends on the definition of the goals of EU competition law. However, like 
restrictions by object under Article 101, such effects are not decisive for direct harm 
abuses (but, as with any abuse, can be considered under objective justifications). 
 
a. Refusing to supply a customer in Commercial Solvents 
 
Commercial Solvents is a particularly important judgment for direct harm, since it came 
immediately after the full ‘effects-based approach’ of Continental Can examined above. 
Had the Court continued following such approach, all that would have mattered for 
finding an abuse would have been the effect of strengthening the dominant position. 
Setting aside that short-lived approach, in Commercial Solvents the Court focuses on 
intent of the dominant undertaking, concluding that it ‘decided to limit, if not 
completely to cease, the supply of [the raw material] to certain parties’.794 This serves to 
establish intent to harm those parties, and to reject the alternative claim put forward by 
the dominant undertaking that the refusal was ‘inspired by a legitimate consideration of 
[…] expanding its production’.795 Such intent can be said to be contrary to competition 
on the merits, which presupposes that the dominant undertaking can only (indirectly) 
harm its customer by competing on the downstream market. 
The Court applies a standard to the intent to harm by stating it will be abusive if ‘an 
undertaking which, with the object of reserving such raw material for manufacturing its 
                                                     
792
 See Enforcement Guidance on Article 102 20. 
793
 Nazzini (2011) 393. This is changed to ‘reasonably causing competitive harm’ in another instance, see 
Nazzini (2011) 188. 
794
 Cases 6 and 7/73 Commercial Solvents [1974] ECR 223 24. 
795
 Commercial Solvents (fn. 794) 23. 
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own derivatives, refuses to supply a customer’.796 This standard implicitly rejects that 
the ‘desire to start manufacturing those derivatives (in competition with its former 
customers)’ would allow the refusal.797 The decisive factor for finding an abuse appears 
to be that the refusal targeted an existing customer, since the same strategy to limit 
supplies ‘in order to facilitate its own access to the market’ has been examined as 
indirect harm in IMS and other judgments on refusal to supply examined below.
798
 Even 
if the Court mentions that the refusal ‘risks eliminating all competition’ in Commercial 
Solvents, it only does so as part of its reasoning and nowhere finds or requires effects. 
On the contrary, the Court refuses to analyse whether the competitor had enough 
reserves of the raw material allowing it to ‘reorganize its production in good time’.799 
 
b. Selective price cuts in Compagnie Maritime Belge 
 
Compagnie Maritime Belge involved direct harm through selective price-cutting by the 
dominant undertaking. Its intent was clear, since it was ‘never seriously disputed, and 
indeed admitted at the hearing, that the purpose of the conduct complained of was to 
eliminate [the competitor] from the market’.800 The standard applied by the Court again 
takes into account several factors, particularly the fact that legislation allowed the sector 
to effectively cartelise, creating a collective dominant position covering almost all of the 
market which its members used to target the competitor with cross-subsidised selective 
prices.
801
 The Court considered that, rather than expressing the matching of prices in 
competition by the merits, this practice ‘eliminate[d] the principal, and possibly the 
only, means of competition open to the competing undertaking’.802 This was 
unaccompanied by an analysis of effects, in particular taking into consideration that the 
prices practiced were still above-cost. 
The finding of an abuse in Compagnie Maritime Belge must be understood in light of 
Post Danmark, which also involved discriminatory above-cost prices. As described in 
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 Commercial Solvents (fn. 794) 25. While preceding the case law definition of abuse as methods 
different from normal competition, the Court makes it nevertheless clear that it is extracting this judgment 
from the principles underlying the competition provisions in the Treaty. 
797
 Commercial Solvents (fn. 794) 24. 
798
 Commercial Solvents (fn. 794) 25. In United Brands (fn. 16) 182 the Court stated that a dominant 
undertaking ‘cannot stop supplying a long standing customer who abides by regular commercial practice’, 
but the refusal to supply did not concern a competitor. 
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 Commercial Solvents (fn. 794) 26. 
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 Compagnie Maritime Belge (fn. 761) 119. 
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 See Compagnie Maritime Belge (fn. 761) 115-119. 
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 Compagnie Maritime Belge (fn. 761) 117. 
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the next section, the Court evaluated the effects of those prices as indirect harm. This 
means that the difference between the tests applied to the same abuse can be wholly 
attributed to the intent to harm competitors, which was expressly excluded in Post 
Danmark.
803
 This also showed that discrimination is not, in itself, liable to indicate the 
intent to harm a competitor.
804
 Therefore, there is no rule whereby discriminatory or 
selective prices are considered automatically abusive. Nonetheless, Compagnie 
Maritime Belge demonstrates that discrimination can be evaluated under a standard. It is 
submitted that the difference can explained by the fact that, as discussed in Chapter I 
(on the concept of intent), intent can only be interpreted from a credible strategy. In 
Compagnie Maritime Belge the cartelised, ‘super-dominant’ position made it clear that 
selective pricing was intended to harm the competitor, even if above-cost, by creating a 
permanent handicap.
805
 In Post Danmark it could not be established that there was such 





c. Misleading representations and deregistration of intellectual property in 
AstraZeneca 
 
AstraZeneca also involved the intent to harm competitors, which was considered 
abusive in two situations: when misleading representations were made to extend 
intellectual property rights over pharmaceutical products, and when those rights were 
deregistered delaying the entry on the market of generic products. Both of these abuses 
were considered to have the purpose of harming manufacturers of generic products, and 
hence against competition on the merits.
807
 Nonetheless, it is submitted that the reading 
of the first abuse is made unnecessarily difficult by the General Court’s formulations, 
which the Court implicitly corrects without reversing the appealed judgment. The 
General Court pursued an erroneous interpretation that abuse as an ‘objective concept’ 
did not allow it to rely on intent, and therefore applied a supposedly objective test: 
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 See Post Danmark (fn. 138) 29. 
804
 See Post Danmark (fn. 138) 30. Price discrimination may have the sole objective of increasing the 
margin of the dominant undertaking, which as discussed below in relation to exploitative abuses can be 
considered compatible with competition on the merits. 
805
 In TeliaSonera (fn. 69) 81 the Court mentions that ‘super-dominance’ was a factor in Compagnie 
Maritime Belge. 
806
 Post Danmark (fn. 138) 29. 
807
 See AstraZeneca (fn. 109) 93 and 130. There was also a question of preventing parallel imports, which 
could also give rise to an abuse of market integration. As mentioned above, several principles might be 
infringed in the same abusive situation. 
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‘the submission to the public authorities of misleading information liable to lead 
them into error and therefore to make possible the grant of an exclusive right to 
which an undertaking is not entitled, or to which it is entitled for a shorter period, 
constitutes a practice falling outside the scope of competition on the merits which 
may be particularly restrictive of competition. […] 
It follows from the objective nature of the concept of abuse […] that the misleading 
nature of representations made to public authorities must be assessed on the basis of 
objective factors and that proof of the deliberate nature of the conduct and of the 
bad faith of the undertaking in a dominant position is not required for the purposes 
of identifying an abuse of a dominant position’.808 
The problem with the ‘objectively misleading’ test set by the General Court is apparent: 
every mistake in applying for an exclusive right – including the common situation of a 
pre-existing right by another undertaking – can be considered abusive. Nazzini 
comments that General Court was wrong in framing the test of abuse as ‘purely 
objective’, as this would lead to unduly wide findings.809 The natural solution would be 
to concentrate on the misleading intent as a strategy to harm competitors. However, the 
General Court further stated that intention might be a relevant factor but was not 
necessary, relying on its case law in GC Aéroports de Paris that abuse ‘implies no 
intention to cause harm’.810 As can be seen from the analysis of direct harm so far, the 
General Court’s position is in direct contradiction with the case law of the Court. 
Nonetheless, the reference to intention playing a possible role managed to preserve GC 
AstraZeneca on appeal.
811
 The Court, after quoting the ample evidence indicating 
misleading intent, concluded that it is not compatible with competition on the merits to 
‘have recourse to highly misleading representations with the aim of leading public 
authorities into error’.812 This centres the test of abuse squarely on intent, disregarding 
the General Court’s statements to the contrary. The Court then deals with the 
(legitimate) critiques of the scope of the abuse set by the General Court, by stating that 
unintended errors were ‘radically different from [the dominant undertaking’s] 
conduct’.813 This is quite unusual, since the Court cannot conduct a factual review. It is 
argued that the Court does so in order to settle the issue of intent, saving the judgment 
under appeal by adding that the General Court had stated that the assessment of 
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 GC AstraZeneca (fn. 173) 355-356, citing Hoffman-La Roche. 
809
 Nazzini (2011) 190. 
810
 GC AstraZeneca (fn. 173) 359. 
811
 This might be at the origin of the standard adopted by the General Court, mentioned above, mixing 
object and effect as ‘the same thing’. By always affirming the presence of intent and effects, the General 
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 GC AstraZeneca (fn. 173) 98. 
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 AstraZeneca (fn. 109) 99. 
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misleading representations depended on the ‘specific circumstances of the case’ – 
including the dominant undertaking’s intention. In any event, this corresponds to the 
standard applied to other judgments of abusive intent to harm competitors. Thus, the 
Court concludes that the abuse consisted in ‘an overall strategy seeking to unlawfully 
exclude [generics manufacturers]’.814 
The second abuse in AstraZeneca was also considered part of an overall strategy to 
harm the manufacturers of generic products, in this case through ‘conduct designed, 
inter alia, to prevent [them] from making use of their right’ to place their products on 
the market.
815
 As described above, the dominant undertaking deregistered 
pharmaceutical patents in several countries in order to delay the introduction of such 
products. Like Compagnie Maritime Belge, the selective character of the practice was 
considered indicative of the intent to harm competitors, the Court rejecting the claim by 
the dominant undertaking that it merely attempted to avoid regulatory costs.
816
 The 
Court nevertheless states that, had such intent been present, it might be considered an 
objective justification.
817
 As noted above, the Court might frame an alternative 
interpretation of intent as an objective justification. It is nevertheless unclear whether 
this is the case in AstraZeneca, or if avoiding regulatory costs is a true objective 
justification (potentially applicable to other abuses and demanding that its effects are 
proportional). 
AstraZeneca also presupposes that deregistration by the dominant undertaking does not 
constitute competition on the merits which, as set out above, allows the normal use of 
intellectual property (even with the intent to harm competitors).
818
 The dominant 
undertaking thus argued that the case law recognised ‘the right to exercise that right at 
any time without having to provide any reasons and without having to take account of 
the interests of manufacturers of generic products and parallel importers’.819 The Court 
did not deny this, but stated that it did not concern deregistration of the right.
820
 
Therefore, at issue was not the normal use of intellectual property for competition on 
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 AstraZeneca (fn. 109) 111. Coherently with the intent-based abuse, the Court states it is irrelevant 
whether such strategy was completely successful. 
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 AstraZeneca (fn. 109) 131. 
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 See AstraZeneca (fn. 109) 135-138. 
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the merits.
821
 This highlights that the ‘misuse’ of legitimate institutes is taken into 
consideration in the standard of direct harm abuse.
822
 The Court indicated that the only 
strategy available to the dominant undertaking, if the enforcement of intellectual 
property is not available, was to attempt to ‘minimise the erosion of its sales’ – under 




d. ‘Naked abuses’ in the Enforcement Guidance on Article 102 
 
The application of the standard of the case law on direct harm abuses appears to have 
been integrated in the Enforcement Guidance on Article 102. The Commission states 
that it may skip the analysis of anti-competitive foreclosure (the scope of which seems 
to coincide with indirect harm) in ‘naked abuses’: 
‘If it appears that the conduct can only raise obstacles to competition and that it 
creates no efficiencies, its anti-competitive effect may be inferred. This could be the 
case, for instance, if the dominant undertaking prevents its customers from testing 
the products of competitors or provides financial incentives to its customers on 
condition that they do not test such products, or pays a distributor or a customer to 
delay the introduction of a competitor's product’.824 
As can be seen, the examples given by the Commission correspond to situations of 
direct harm whereby the products of particular competitors are targeted with strategies 
contrary to competition on the merits. The examples are illustrative enough to 
understand that they represent the application of a standard of direct harm, and not 
individual tests of abuse. Nazzini expressly associates such ‘naked abuses’ with intent 
but, as seen above, also adheres to the Commission’s explanation that this is based on 
the lack of efficiencies.
825
 However, it is submitted that such efficiencies cannot be 
determined if the Commission skips the analysis of anti-competitive foreclosure.
826
 
Therefore, the inference of anti-competitive effects is unjustified: the behaviour might 
very well have positive effects if competing products are inferior or consumers would 
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 As also mentioned above, the enforcement of intellectual property in those circumstances can be 
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be better off by not testing or acquiring them, something which is unrelated to the 
behaviour, yet it does not appear that such considerations would influence the 
application of this part of the Enforcement Guidance on Article 102. If anything, 
efficiency could be considered as justification at a later stage (the Commission 
references indicating that this would be unlikely on the facts), but not for the finding of 




ii. Rules on the intent to harm competitors 
 
The intent to harm competitors can also be formalised into rules as part of the tests of 
specific abuses. Rules which automatically consider certain behaviour as anti-
competitive, as observed above, are the main difference between the application of 
Articles 101 and 102. Pricing practices appear to lend themselves to such rules, as will 
also be seen below in relation to indirect harm. It seems that reducing the many facets of 
the competitive process to the single parameter of price makes it easier to establish rule-
based presumptions of anti-competitive behaviour. Those presumptions can be 
interpreted as capturing either intent or effects. The case law examined below will show 
rules that presume the intent to harm competitors, making their effects irrelevant. Such 
rules have been formulated for predatory pricing, as seen in France Télécom (a) and for 




a. Predatory pricing in France Télécom 
 
The fact that predatory pricing is based on below-cost prices has led some authors to 
characterise the abuse in terms of anti-competitive effects, namely disciplining 
competitors or excluding them from the market.
829
 Nevertheless, uncertainty reigns on 
whether those effects are actually prevented, with predatory pricing being the running 
example of false positives.
830
 Matters have been made more confused by the above 
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 Lianos (2009) 33 admits the possibility of such justification, since it applies to all abuses. 
828
 As will also be seen, only prices below average variable costs are subject to a rule in France Télécom, 
the standard examined above applying to prices below average total costs. It is also possible that rules 
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described assimilation of object and effect by the General Court, formulated precisely in 
relation to predatory pricing.
831
 From this dubious foundation, the General Court 
assumes that the abuse of predatory pricing has two, equally important elements: ‘non-
recovery of costs’ and ‘predatory intent’.832 Nazzini follows a similar two-step 
approach, with the cost test being ‘unequivocally based on the as efficient competitor 
principle’, but having to be corrected by intent since below-cost pricing ‘is not always 
sufficient to infer that the conduct under review is likely to harm social welfare in the 
long term’.833 Indeed, the general conception that results from these views is that the 
abuse of predatory pricing is focused on below cost-prices and their consequences.
834
 
It is argued that this is a mischaracterisation of predatory pricing, which focuses on the 
intent to harm competitors. Below cost-prices provide a presumption of such intent, as 
examined next, not any inference in relation to their possible effects.
 
Therefore, these 
costs values are a subordinated element without any independent value. This 
corresponds to the economic evidence, emphasised in US antitrust, that below-cost 
prices only lead to anti-competitive effects in very limited situations.
835
 Those situations 
require a standard which can incorporate strategic considerations.
836
 In contrast, rules 
which equate below-cost prices with effects on as-efficient competitors are inadequate, 
and rightly raise concerns about false positives. Below-cost pricing is often used on a 
temporary basis (launch of new lines, stock clearance) or even part of many industries’ 
business model (continuous production facilities, two-sided markets, profits in 
aftermarkets).
837
 Such rules, however, are adequate for capturing the intent to harm 
competitors, regardless of whether they are effectively disciplined or excluded. In 
France Télécom, the Court starts by stating that not all price competition can be 
considered competition on the merits, but when it characterises the abuse it does not 
mention below-cost prices (or their effects): 
‘[i]n particular, it must be found that an undertaking abuses its dominant position 
where […] it operates a pricing policy the sole economic objective of which is to 
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 See GC France Télécom (fn. 755) 195. 
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 GC France Télécom (fn. 755) 197. 
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 Nazzini (2011) 202 and 222. 
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 In the wake of the Areeda-Turner test suggested for US antitrust, see Jones and Sufrin (2014) 403-404 
and Whish and Bailey (2012) 740-741. 
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 The Supreme Court stated in relation to such effects that ‘there is a consensus among commentators 
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574 (1986). 
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 See Jones and Sufrin (2014) 407. 
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eliminate its competitors with a view, subsequently, to profiting from the reduction 
of the degree of competition still existing in the market’.838 
As Jones and Sufrin observe, the abuse of predatory pricing is defined by the case law 
as ‘eliminatory intent’.839 The ‘profit’ from reducing competition is not reflected in the 
test instituted, hence it must be considered as mere reasoning for the effect intended – 
right or wrongly – by the dominant undertaking (which, as noted above, often happens 
in relation to references to effects in the case law). That intent is presumed under the 
case law, the Court establishing that: 
‘prices below average variable costs must be considered prima facie abusive 
inasmuch as, in applying such prices, an undertaking in a dominant position is 
presumed to pursue no other economic objective save that of eliminating 
competitors’.840 
The Court then adds that such intent may also be relevant in another situation: 
‘prices below average total costs but above average variable costs are to be 
considered abusive only where they are fixed in the context of a plan having the 
purpose of eliminating a competitor’.841 
Therefore, it can be seen that below-cost prices are not abusive because of their 
potential effects on as-efficient competitors, but because they are seen as credible plans 
to harm competitors.
842
 As the Court stated in TeliaSonera, pricing decisions are 
interpreted from the point of view of the undertaking’s own costs (and other knowledge 
incorporated in its strategy).
843
 Thus, it is reasonable to establish a rule that prices below 
average variable cost are presumed to be intended to harm competitors, since they also 
harm the dominant undertaking. The dominant undertaking may rebut this presumption 
by presenting another explanation, what the Court refers as ‘economic justifications’.844 
As for prices below average total costs, the Court admits that they can indicate the 
intent to harm a competitor, but demands further proof of such strategy. Therefore, in 
contrast with prices below average variable costs, the Court establishes no rule. The 
standard for intent to harm competitors stated above is applied, with prices below 
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average total costs being signalled as a possible relevant factor.
845
 This also means that 
above-cost prices are not referred to because of their effects on as-efficient competitors, 
but simply because they do not constitute credible strategies to harm them. 
Moreover, the value attributed by the Court to recoupment confirms that predatory 
pricing is focused on intent and not effects. In France Télécom the Court rejects that an 
abuse would require proof of ‘the possibility of recoupment of losses suffered by the 
application, by an undertaking in a dominant position, of prices lower than a certain 
level of costs’.846 Demanding such recoupment would equal instituting a rule to capture 
anti-competitive effects, as US antitrust does, since it requires that the dominant 
undertaking strengthens its market power in order to subsequently raise prices.
847
 
Coherently with the test of abuse, the only value of recoupment is in relation to the 
intent to harm competitors, namely disproving that below-cost pricing does not pursue 
this strategy.
848
 Indeed, the possibilities of rebutting the presumption established by the 
Court do not coincide with the absence of recoupment. The situations referred above of 
below-cost pricing (promotions, business model) may lead to such recoupment in the 
long run without being considered predatory, since their intent is not to harm 
competitors directly. 
Alignment of prices with competitors should also be seen in relation to the intent to 
harm competitors, but the particularities of the appeal of the General Court’s judgment 
have obscured this. Jones and Sufrin claim that the right to align prices has been ‘taken 
away’ by the special responsibility of the dominant undertaking.849 However, the Court 
only examined whether the General Court fulfilled the obligation to state reasons when 
denying the right to align prices.
850
 When it came to evaluate whether this was 
substantially valid, the Court rejected the ground of appeal as inadmissible.
851
 
Technically, whether a dominant undertaking is prohibited from aligning its prices is 
still unconfirmed, and there is good reason to believe that the General Court decided 
wrongly. Like recoupment, the alignment of prices might show – in fact, it normally 
will show – that the intent is not to harm competitors. The problem is that competitors 
                                                     
845
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are considered not to have the market power to drive prices below cost, and therefore 
the ‘alignment’ might result from previous strategic action by the dominant 
undertaking. Nonetheless, if this is not the case, and the alignment results from those 
competitors’ market power, then it should not be considered abusive. 
 
b. Margin squeeze in TeliaSonera 
 
Margin squeeze is another abuse where the Court has formulated a rule presuming the 
intent to harm competitors. As already stated, in TeliaSonera the Court established 
several effects-based tests in relation to margin squeeze, which could be triggered by 
either the likelihood of anti-competitive effects or the mere capability to produce 
effects.
852
 This begged the question why the Court bother to preserve the alternative 
(and continued to do so in Tomra) when one standard is much easier to satisfy than the 
other.
853
 It was submitted that, despite the case law presuming that the capability to 
produce effects is enough to assume their likelihood due to the dominant position, a 
better reading would be to demand such likelihood for effects-based tests, as restrictions 
by effect (and an ‘effects-based approach’) do, while the capability to produce effects 
would still be required for the implementation of intent-based tests, like restrictions by 
object also require. As it happens, TeliaSonera also includes an intent-based test, which 
would validate the presence of both standards of effects under this reading (the same 
happening, as will be seen below, in Tomra). 
After establishing an effects-based test in TeliaSonera, the Court was asked whether 
there also had to be a dominant position in the squeezed downstream market. As the test 
concerned the increase of market power in that market, the Court naturally answered 
that an effect was likely, regardless of a dominant position, ‘because of the close links 
between the markets concerned’.854 However, the Court added the following: 
‘Further, in such a situation, in the absence of any other economic and objective 
justification, such conduct can be explained only by the dominant undertaking’s 
intention to prevent the development of competition in the downstream market and 
to strengthen its position, or even to acquire a dominant position, in that market by 
using means other than reliance on its own merits’.855 
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The reading of this passage can only be that a margin squeeze in closely linked markets 
will be presumed to be intended to harm competitors. It is reasonable to establish this 
rule since, as with predatory pricing, a margin squeeze assumes that costs are not being 
covered or that there is reduced profitability (which, due to the dominant position 
upstream, is a permanent handicap). As the Court states: 
‘A margin squeeze, in view of the exclusionary effect which it may create for 
competitors who are at least as efficient as the dominant undertaking, in the absence 
of any objective justification, is in itself capable of constituting an abuse within the 
meaning of Article 102’.856 
The effects ‘may’ be produced because margin squeeze is, ‘in itself’, a credible strategy 
to harm competitors. Indeed, an intent-based test fits a margin squeeze being defined in 
relation to the costs of the dominant undertaking (or, exceptionally, to competitor costs 
which derive from knowable or projectable market conditions).
857
 Hence, as concluded 
in TeliaSonera, the capability to produce effects would be enough to find an intent-
based abuse.
858
 If, on the contrary, the dominant undertaking could provide an economic 
and objective justification – which, as remarked above, is often an alternative 
interpretation of intent –, then the likelihood of anti-competitive effects would be tested 
under an indirect harm abuse. 
 
4. Indirect harm abuses 
 
This section will analyse indirect harm abuses, which start from the intent by the 
dominant undertaking to strengthen its market power in a manner which is 
objectionable under the principle of competition on the merits. These strategies might 
indirectly harm competitors, either as a means or consequence, but their target is the 
market structure. This makes them hard to distinguish from competition on the merits. 
The paradigm of undertakings competing on an offer judged by consumers is used by 
the case law precisely to illustrate that indirect harm is allowed, or as the Court stated, 
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that ‘not every exclusionary effect is necessarily detrimental to competition’.859 As 
such, it not the purpose to strengthen market power which is abusive, but the particular 
methods employed to do so. Indirect harm abuses do not correspond to competition on 
the merits insofar as they do not rely on consumers’ choices for achieving market 
power. Hence, strategies of controlling distribution channels, inputs or connected 
markets are intended to prevent competitors from offering their products altogether or in 
similar conditions to the dominant undertaking. These are the concerns behind the 
specific abuses such as exclusivity, rebates, refusal to supply and margin squeeze. 
As already seen, intent which is objectionable under competition on the merits still has 
to be subject to the tests of specific abuses, which in indirect harm abuses can be either 
intent or effects-based. Tests of intent correspond to censurable strategies to change the 
market structure, regardless of their effects. When applying rules, those strategies are 
considered unavailable to the dominant undertaking. More often, the case law applies a 
test of effects, in order to assess if the strategy is likely to actually affect the market 
structure. This accepts that competition on the merits does not cover the full range of 
the competitive process, and that strategies which deviate from the paradigm are usually 
not censurable in themselves (as long as competitors are not directly targeted). Only if 
these strategies lead to anti-competitive effects will they be considered abusive. This 
section will therefore examine the intent-based tests of exclusivity and loyalty rebates in 
Hoffman-La Roche (i), followed by the effects-based tests applied to rebates, refusal to 
supply, margin squeeze and selective price cuts in British Airways and Tomra, IMS, 
TeliaSonera and Post Danmark, respectively (ii). 
 
i. Intent-based tests of indirect harm 
 
Hoffman-La Roche established the two intent-based tests of indirect harm abuses. The 
first test concerns exclusivity, and states that an undertaking will abuse its dominant 
position if it ‘ties purchasers – even if it does so at their request – by an obligation or 
promise on their part to obtain all or most of their requirements exclusively from the 
said undertaking’.860 The second test applies to rebates, which will be considered 
abusive if they are ‘fidelity rebates, that is to say discounts conditional on the 
customer’s obtaining all or most of its requirements […] from the undertaking in a 
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dominant position’.861 The intent is the same in exclusivity and fidelity rebates: to 
condition distributors to ‘obtain supplies exclusively from a particular undertaking’.862 
This is considered contrary to competition on the merits (‘based on an economic 
transaction’) because they are ‘designed to deprive the purchaser of or restrict his 
possible choices of sources of supply and to deny other producers access to the market’ 
– in other words, they go against the paradigm where market success is dictated by 
choices unconstrained by contractual obligation of financial incentive.
863
 
Not all such exclusivity or rebates are anti-competitive, hence the tests instituted by the 
Court. First, both tests are subject to the acquisition of ‘most or all’ requirements, hence 
limited constraints are admissible. Second, the Court distinguishes between prohibited 
fidelity rebates and admissible quantity rebates, the latter ‘exclusively linked with the 
volume of purchases’.864 Quantity rebates exemplify a strategy that does not correspond 
to competition on the merits (since distributors are still conditioned) but is nevertheless 
allowed. The strategies which are prohibited are the ones which allow the dominant 
undertaking to ‘consolidate this position’.865 This applies a rule whereby, once 
exclusivity and loyalty rebates are found, the intent to strengthen market power through 
methods different from normal competition is presumed. Unlike the presumptions of 
intent to harm competitors in predatory pricing and margin squeeze above, such 
presumption does not appear to be rebuttable. Hence, the Court disregards any other 
rational reasons for pursuing these strategies. 
The Court further defined in Hoffman-La Roche the characteristics of prohibited 
strategies to strengthen market power. The Court declares that such strategies do not 
require the leveraging of existing market power. It was discussed above that such 
causality is an important part of the analysis of anti-competitive effects, as demonstrated 
by restrictions by effect under Article 101. Since exclusivity and fidelity rebates were 
considered abusive regardless of effects, it is logical that such causality is not 
demanded.
866
 It was in this regard that the Court defined abuse as an ‘objective 
concept’. First, intent-based abuses apply regardless of causality, limiting the role of 
effects to the already described proof of implementation as expressed by the capability 
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to produce effects. Second, the ‘objective concept’ addressed the argument that an abuse 





ii. Effects-based tests of indirect harm 
 
Although the present research does not cover the normative value of effects, the case 
law on indirect harm applying an effects-based test will be examined in order, first, to 
dispel the notion that some of the presumptions of effects instituted in relation to rebates 
are triggered by intent and, second, to differentiate the use of intent and effects tests in 
relation to the same type of abuse. 
 
a. Rebates in British Airways and Tomra 
 
The case law on indirect harm has evolved from intent towards effects-based tests. This 
includes the case law on rebates, where intent-based rules now coexist with effects-
based rules and standards. This evolution started in Michelin, but it is best understood in 
British Airways since there the Court squared such evolution with Hoffman-La Roche. 
At issue in British Airways were retroactive target rebates considered abusive by the 
General Court, whereby reaching one of the several targets led to the rebate being 
applied to all sales made before. The Court considered that, like in Michelin, target 
rebates were: 
‘neither discounts for quantity, linked exclusively to the volume of purchases, nor 
fidelity discounts within the meaning of the judgment in Hoffmann-La Roche, since 
the system established by Michelin did not contain any obligation on the part of 
resellers to obtain all or a given proportion of its supplies from the dominant 
undertaking’.868 
The Court therefore realises the limitations of the intent-based tests formulated in 
Hoffman-La Roche for fidelity and quantity rebates: some strategies do not have such a 
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sufficiently defined character to assess their compatibility with Article 102. Thus, the 
effects-based test of Michelin is applied, which states that: 
‘it is necessary to consider all the circumstances, particularly the criteria and rules 
governing the grant of the discount, and to investigate whether, in providing an 
advantage not based on any economic service justifying it, the discount tends to 
remove or restrict the buyer’s freedom to choose his sources of supply, to bar 
competitors from access to the market, to apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent 




This test first mentions that rebates do not correspond to competition on the merits (here 
referred to as ‘an advantage not based on any economic service justifying it’), and then 
establishes several anti-competitive effects which the rebate ‘tends’ to cause. Intent 
(namely the interpretation of ‘the criteria and rules governing the grant of the discount’ 
instituted by the dominant undertaking) plays a subordinate role to assessing such 
effects. The Court focuses on the effects on the market structure, namely rebates that 
‘give rise to an exclusionary effect’.870 This exclusionary effect can be found by 
establishing rules where it is legally presumed or by the application of the quoted 
standard. 
The Court applies both a standard of anti-competitive effects and rules presuming such 
effects in British Airways. First, it establishes that individual target rebates and ‘all or 
nothing’ retroactive will be considered to give rise to an exclusionary effect.871 This 
formalises the rebates found in Michelin into rules. Second, the Court validates the 
General Court’s analysis under the standard of ‘whether the bonus schemes at issue had 
a fidelity-building effect capable of producing an exclusionary effect’.872 The reference 
to ‘fidelity’ should not lead one to conclude that British Airways introduces a variant of 
(intent-based) loyalty rebates. The Court notes that, for finding such fidelity, the 
General Court considered the dominant undertaking’s ‘much higher larger share than its 
competitors’ and the nature of competing offers, a usual part of an effects analysis.873 
An ‘effects-based approach’ might at first seem incompatible with British Airways, but 
there is no doubt that this judgment employs effects-based tests. The Court did not 
review the market analysis conducted by the General Court due to its factual nature, not 
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because the test was intent-based.
874
 Moreover, when considering an efficiency 
justification, the Court makes it clear that it will balance it against the negative effects 
of the rebates.
875
 What seems to bother authors is not that effects are not considered, but 
that an exclusionary effect is legally presumed.
876
 However, that exclusionary effect is 
presumed from other effects, namely how the freedom of choice of distributors is 
affected by particular schemes.
877
 There is no per se abuse, as Whish and Bailey 
suggest, but a relationship of causality between effects. However, the end result is very 
similar: any rebate scheme which is considered to pressure distributors will be 
considered abusive. As such, arguments in Tomra that not all of the market was covered 
by the rebate scheme or that it did not lead to price below costs proved ineffective, since 
they were always considered to lead to an effect on distributors.
878
 
The issue is not the application of effect-based tests but, as discussed above in relation 
to Tomra, the standard that it is only necessary for the rebates to be capable of 
producing such effects.
879
 By examining market power and competing offers, the Court 
is close to the as-efficient competitor considerations in effects-based tests applied in 
other abuses. Nonetheless, the Court’s insistence on the link between the exclusion of 
competitors and the freedom of competitors sets the threshold of abuse quite low, since 
rebates appear always capable of producing effects on the latter. If this link is not sound, 
it should be subject to greater scrutiny by demanding the likelihood of anti-competitive 
effects, as the Enforcement Guidance on Article 102 apparently does.
880
 This would be 
compatible with the Tomra since this judgement also dealt with a loyalty rebate, the 
Court stating that some of the discounts ‘often applied to some of the largest customers 
[…] with the aim of ensuring their loyalty’.881 Therefore, as stated above, the reference 
to the capability to produce effects in Tomra could be explained by the intent-based test, 
reserving the likelihood of anti-competitive effects to the application of effects-based 
tests. As the case law stands, however, both are mixed. 
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b. Refusal to supply in IMS, margin squeeze in TeliaSonera and selective price cuts 
in Post Danmark 
 
The approach to rebates contrasts with the abuses of refusal to supply, in both their 
varieties of physical and intellectual property.
882
 When direct harm is not found, the 
Court has found that a refusal to supply can only be abusive in ‘exceptional 
circumstances’.883 Such exceptionality derives from the fact that enforcing physical or 
intellectual property is usually considered compatible with competition on the merits.
884
 
As the Court stated in IMS, a refusal to licence ‘cannot in itself constitute an abuse of a 
dominant position’.885 Therefore, the licence must be indispensable in order for its 
refusal to be abusive, setting up an effects-based test requiring three additional 
conditions.
886
 The first is preventing the emergence of a new product for which there is 
demand. The second condition is the absence of an objective justification.
887
 The third 
condition is the likelihood of exclusionary effects, which was argued to be the correct 
standard for effects-based tests. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether this last condition is 
due to the exceptionality of finding the refusal abusive. As observed above, the General 
Court did not follow such condition in Clearstream.
888
 In any event, the role of intent is 
subordinate to effects.
889
 Notably, preventing a new product implies that the dominant 
undertaking does not aim to offer such product itself, or that the requesting undertaking 
will not produce a mere duplicate.
890
 
The abuse of margin squeeze is also subject to effects-based tests when direct harm is 
not found, as already observed above in relation to TeliaSonera. The Court quotes the 
standard of exclusion used in rebates, and then introduce particular effects-based tests 
                                                     
882
 These will be understood as being the same except for the condition of preventing appearance of a new 
product for which there is consumer demand, insofar as Bronner (fn. 840) 41-47 considered the 
application of the case law on intellectual property but only discussed the conditions of indispensability 
and likelihood of eliminating all competition. 
883
 See Bronner (fn. 760) 39 and IMS (fn. 662) 35. 
884
 As discussed in relation to AstraZeneca, even if the enforcement of intellectual property is intended to 
harm a competitor it will not be considered a direct harm abuse, requiring an additional element of 
misuse. In the same manner, it was mentioned above that the fact that the refusal affected an existing 
customer seems decisive for finding direct harm in Commercial Solvents. 
885
 IMS (fn. 662) 34. 
886
 See IMS (fn. 662) 38. 
887
 See IMS (fn. 662) 51. 
888
 See GC Clearstream (fn. 758) 148. 
889
 In IMS the product which was refused had been adopted as an industry standard due to the 
involvement of its users in its creation. It thus appears that the Court could have established a direct harm 
if it so wished. However, the Court only considered this as another factor in relation to the 
indispensability of the database. 
890
 IMS (fn. 662) 49. 
- 202 - 
for margin squeeze.
891
 Margin squeeze is defined as the spread between the dominant 
undertaking’s upstream and downstream operations not allowing an as-efficient 
competitor to contest the downstream market.
892
 The Court institutes the rule that if the 
upstream price is higher than the downstream price (i.e. leading to sales at a loss) 
exclusion is probable.
893
 If the downstream price covers the upstream price an 
exclusionary effect will still be possible due to ‘reduced profitably’.894 The Court sets 
another rule that if the wholesale input is indispensable, an anti-competitive effect will 
also be probable in case of reduced profitability.
895
 The role of indispensability points 
towards a standard of likelihood of effects similar to refusal to supply. However, as also 
discussed above, the ultimate adoption of the standard of the capability to produce 
effects lowers the threshold of effects considerably.
896
 As such, margin squeeze is likely 
to operate as rebates, with the only possibility for the dominant undertaking being its 
objective justification. 
Finally, the abuse of selective pricing has also been subject to an effects-based test of 
indirect harm in Post Danmark. The Court again quotes the standard of exclusion used 
in rebates, followed in this instance by the test of predatory pricing.
897
 However, the 
Court notes that ‘it could not be established that [the dominant undertaking] had 
deliberately sought to drive out that competitor’.898 The Court’s opening statement that 
Article 102 does not ‘seek to ensure that competitors less efficient than the undertaking 
with the dominant position should remain on the market’ must therefore be limited to 
indirect harm.
899
 As such, the Court examines indirect harm by applying the costs levels 
of predatory pricing but focusing on their effects on an as-efficient competitor.
900
 In 
relation to prices above average total costs, the Court considers that they cannot have an 
anti-competitive effect, which is coherent with the fact that they have only been 
considered abusive in Compagnie Maritime Belge as a credible plan to harm a 
competitor.
901
 As for prices between average total costs and average incremental costs, 
the Court is reluctant to deny the possibility of exclusionary effects but states that ‘as a 
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general rule’ an as-efficient competitor will be able to withstand them, which again 
indicates that their abusive character depends on the intent to harm competitors found in 
France Télécom.
902
 The Court does not consider prices below average variable costs. 
 
5. Abuses of market integration 
 
This section will deal with abuses of market integration, which start from intent 
considered objectionable under the principle of market integration. Abuses of market 
integration illustrate the importance of EU competition law principles, as specific 
abuses are adjusted to fit concerns of market integration. It was already held above that 
market integration was the main explanation for Continental Can, regardless of 
subsequent developments in merger control, since the acquisition of another 
undertaking by the dominant undertaking does not appear to be normatively relevant for 
competition on the merits. Some instances of exploitative abuses appear to have also 
been influenced by market integration concerns, for example the discriminatory prices 
found in United Brands. In any event, the case law on market integration abuses, like 
direct harm abuses, is intent-based and applies irrespective of effects. National 
discrimination is subject to an intent-based standard which takes into consideration 
factors that are valued or decisive under other abuses, as seen in Portuguese Airports 
(i). Moreover, the case law has stated the rule that aiming to restrict parallel trade is 
automatically considered abusive, as United Brands and Sot. Lélos kai demonstrate (ii).  
 
i. The standard of national discrimination 
 
Portuguese Airports concerned national discrimination, which clearly raises concerns 
under the principle of market integration. The dominant undertaking was a public 
undertaking that managed airports, and the abuse was granting quantity discounts for 
the use of such airports that only benefited national airliners. As noted above in relation 
to indirect harm, the Court has instituted a rule in Hoffman-La Roche that quantity 
rebates are not abusive. In Portuguese Airports, however, the Court inquired as to 
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whether such rebates could lead to discrimination.
903
 The answer, as the Court was 
forced to admit, was that benefiting large purchasers was ‘the very essence of quantity 
discounts’ and that this could not lead to abuse.904 Nonetheless, the Court stated that the 
rebates must be ‘justified by the volume of business they bring or by any economies of 
scale’.905 This might seem like an effects-based test but, as the Court stated in the next 
paragraph, it is the application of an objective justification. Therefore, it was still 
necessary to find an abuse, which the Court based on the rebate only applying to ‘a few 
particularly large partners’ due to its ‘absence of linear progression’.906 It is unlikely 
that quantity rebates are in general subject to these conditions, which have made no 
appearance in the case law on indirect harm. The real issue, as the Court concludes, was 
that ‘the system of discounts appears to favour certain airlines, in this case de facto the 
national airlines’.907 As such, the intent to favour own nationals was subject to a 
standard, which included factors, such as the progression of a quantity rebate, that are 
usually not abusive.  
 
ii. The rule on preventing parallel trade 
 
United Brands dealt with another concern of market integration, preventing parallel 
trade. The first abuse at issue in United Brands involved contractual clauses prohibiting 
the resale of green bananas by distributors which, due to the perishable nature of 
bananas, prevented distributors from exporting them.
908
 The Court interprets the 
contractual obligations and concludes that they had the intent to confine distributors to 
national markets.
909
 This is enough to establish an abuse, the Court then considering the 
justification advanced by the dominant undertaking that its purpose was to guarantee 
product quality, by ensuring that bananas ripened properly and arrived in the market at 
the right moment.
910
 This is a true objective justification, since the Court admits the 
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purpose and controls the proportionality of effects.
911
 Hence, the Court first states that 
‘it is commendable and lawful to pursue a policy of quality’, confirming that the 
dominant undertaking did so.
912
 Then the Court adds that the policy must ‘not raise 
obstacles, the effect of which goes beyond the objective to be attained’.913 As such, 
when it concludes that the policy had the effect of ‘limit[ing] markets to the prejudice of 
consumers and affect[ing] trade between Member States’, the Court rejects that 
pursuing this policy should have the effect of isolating the national markets.
914
 Although 
it was clear in United Brands that the abuse was in the intent to prevent parallel trade, 
further case law was necessary to establish it as a rule. 
Sot. Lélos kai confirms the rule that the intent to prevent parallel trade is prohibited, 
already mentioned in Chapter IV (on restrictions of competition), so that the only 
possibility for the dominant undertaking is to plead an objective justification. At issue in 
Sot. Lélos kai was the refusal by the dominant undertaking to meet the orders of its 
distributors so as to prevent them from engaging in parallel trade. In the Opinion in Sot. 
Lélos kai, AG Colomer stated that it was ‘evident that the intention of [the dominant 
undertaking] is contrary to the objectives of the Treaty’, having no ‘economic motive 
other than the elimination of parallel trade’.915 The Court starts by quoting Commercial 
Solvents and United Brands to assert a refusal ‘to meet the orders of an existing 
customer constitutes an abuse […] where, without any objective justification, that 
conduct is liable to eliminate a trading party as a competitor’.916 This is a somewhat 
liberal reinterpretation of these judgments, since none mention the effect of eliminating 
a competitor, but only the intent to do so. In fact, United Brands establishes a test for 
exploitative refusals to supply (in relation to distributors, not competitors) that a 
dominant undertaking ‘cannot stop supplying a long-standing customer who abides by 
regular commercial practice, if the orders placed by that customer are in no way out of 
the ordinary’.917 
In any event, the Court does not pursue the issue of direct harm further, focusing instead 
on the intent to restrict parallel trade. First, it establishes that this was the intent of the 
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dominant undertaking by refusing to meet the orders of its distributors.
918
 Second, it 
frames this intent under the following general rule: 
‘[i]n respect of sectors other than that of pharmaceutical products, the Court has 
held that a practice by which an undertaking aims to restrict parallel trade in the 
products that it puts on the market constitutes an abuse of that dominant 
position’.919 
As a demonstration of the automatic application of this rule, the Court refuses to 
consider the factor, pleaded by the dominant undertaking, that the parallel trade had a 
minimum impact on the final consumers.
920
 Therefore, the dominant undertaking could 
only plead the objective justification of protecting its commercial interests.
921
 In this 
regard, it pointed to the State regulation of the pharmaceutical market, which imposed 
on the dominant undertaking both fixed prices and distribution obligations. This made 
the dominant undertaking’s only available defence against parallel trade ‘not to place its 
medicines on the market at all in a Member State where the prices of those products are 
set at a relatively low level’, which the Court acknowledged as a legitimate concern.922 
Admitting that there was a legitimate purpose, the Court then establishes a criterion for 
the dominant undertaking to ‘take steps that are reasonable and in proportion to the need 
to protect its own commercial interest’.923 This represents the proportionality judgment 
to which objective justifications are subject to. It has also been described above that 
exploitative abuses are grounded on the principle of proportionality. This allows the 
Court to creatively borrow from the test established in United Brands for exploitative 
refusals to supply, and set the criterion for a proportionate protection of commercial 
interests at ‘whether the orders of the wholesalers are out of the ordinary’.924 In order to 
apply this criterion, the Court indicates ‘the size of those orders in relation to the 
requirements of the market […] and the previous business relations between that 
undertaking and the wholesalers concerned’.925  
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situations from where the intent to prevent parallel imports can be objectively interpreted. 
920
 See Sot. Lélos kai (fn. 344) 52-57. 
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 See Sot. Lélos kai (fn. 344) 50. 
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 Sot. Lélos kai (fn. 344) 68. 
923
 Sot. Lélos kai (fn. 344) 69. 
924
 Sot. Lélos kai (fn. 344) 70. In United Brands the Court did not examine whether the orders were out of 
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commercial interests. 
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6. Case law table 
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7. Conclusion 
 
Behind the simplicity of the two conditions of Article 102 – dominant position and 
abuse – hides a system which continues to challenge doctrinal explanations and case 
law categorisation. The typology of abuses established by the Court has eased this 
difficulty, allowing authors to focus their discussion on particular tests. Nevertheless, 
the path for arriving at these tests has not received sufficient attention. Under Article 
101 it is only necessary to establish one of the forms of collusion mentioned there, as 
seen in Chapter III (on collusion), judging intent according to the principle of 
independence of economic action. Under Article 102, the ‘special responsibility’ of a 
dominant undertaking makes it subject to multiple duties according to several 
principles. While ‘normal competition’ provides a normative indication which is 
relatively easy to follow in relation to the paradigm of a competitive markets, ‘methods 
different from normal competition’ are varied: exclusionary, exploitative and market 
integration abuses are all considered to deviate from that paradigm. Therefore, the 
notion of abuse starts by a judgment of intent according to, respectively, the principles 
of proportionality, of competition on the merits and of market integration. 
An ‘effects-based approach’ has also been argued under Article 102 relying on a 
typology of abuses, overlooking that such an approach was attempted by the Court in 
relation to notion of abuse in Continental Can. By holding in Continental Can that any 
measure that has the effect of strengthening a dominant position can be considered 
abusive, the Court drew a wide ‘jurisdictional’ concept which allowed any behaviour to 
be caught and its effects considered. The replacement of this ‘jurisdictional’ concept by 
the principle of competition on the merits shows the difficulties of an ‘effects-based 
approach’. Temple Lang comments that ‘economists sometimes seem to forget that a 
policy cannot be based on “economic effects” unless there is a test for distinguishing 
effects due to legitimate competition from effects due to exclusionary conduct’.926 A 
wide ‘jurisdictional’ concept foregoes such a test, which may otherwise be provided 
under specific abuses. 
It is the principle of competition on the merits that does so in relation to exclusionary 
abuses. With this principle operating in the background, an ‘effects-based approach’ has 
concentrated in arguing that every test of specific abuse should incorporate effects. 
                                                     
926
 Temple Lang (2012) 153, arguing that this should be the effects mentioned in the letter of Article 
102(b) (which, admittedly, does not correspond to the case law). See also Eilmansberger (2005) 149-150.  
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Nonetheless, it has also been unsuccessful there, with more serious consequences. 
Seemingly attempting to incorporate an ‘effects-based approach’, the General Court has 
applied tests of effects under the standard of the capability to produce them, which 
corresponds not to the likelihood of anti-competitive effects but to implementation of 
intent. At the origin of this is the confusion between the underlying premises of 
restrictions by object and effect, but the General Court has managed nonetheless to 
influence the case law of the Court. In Tomra the Court stated that an abuse could be 
found on either the likelihood or the capability to produce effects. The capability to 
produce effects is presumed from the definition of the abusive behaviour, so this is 
unlikely to satisfy an ‘effects-based approach’. Moreover, intent-based abuses are likely 
to be confused with low-threshold effects-based ones. There is hope, however, that the 
Court will apply the alternative in Tomra along the lines of the two different tests.  
Exclusionary abuses can be divided into direct harm and indirect harm, with the first 
being subject to a test of intent and the second to both intent and effects-based tests. An 
‘effects-based approach’ has argued that margin squeeze (which involves both direct 
and indirect harm) and predatory pricing should be subject solely to a test of effects. 
However, there is good reason to believe that the current intent-based tests are correct. 
These are credible strategies to harm competitors, warranting a presumption of intent 
and benefiting from the legal certainty of rules. It is more doubtful whether they are 
equally credible strategies to strengthen market power, particularly if margin squeeze is 
defined as widely as reduced profitability. The Enforcement Guidance on Article 102 
has taken nevertheless this route, demanding likely foreclosure in predatory pricing and 
indispensability for margin squeeze.
927
 Even if this is adopted by the Court, these 
strategies will continue to be covered by the standard of direct harm to competitors. 
As for indirect harm, one can observe that the Court has moved away from the intent-
based rules instituted in Hoffman-La Roche to several effects-based rules and standards. 
This leads to the question of whether the intent-based rules on exclusivity and loyalty 
rebates are still adequate. That question cannot be answered by the likelihood of anti-
competitive effects, since they do not aim to capture such effects. It must instead be 
analysed, first, if the presumption of the intent to strengthen market power is adequate, 
and second, whether these strategies should be censored in themselves. The 
presumption does not appear to be a problem, since are usually offered to with the 
purpose to retain customers; the main issue is whether they should be considered anti-
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 Enforcement Guidance on Article 102 63 and 81.  
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competitive. It is relevant to note that the Court chose not to institute similar rules for 
other strategies where such intent could have easily been presumed, such as the refusal 
to supply an indispensable input or margin squeeze leading to sales at loss. This signals 
a more nuanced view that, just because a method does not correspond to the paradigm 
of competition on the merits, it should not automatically be considered unavailable to 
dominant undertakings. 
It is argued that indirect harm abuses should be limited to effects-based tests. This is not 
just a question of the coherence of the case law, or of its evolution according to an 
‘effects-based approach’. Contrary to direct harm, exclusivity and loyalty rebates are 
not accompanied by an intent-based standard in relation to rebates.
928
 In other words, 
the intent to strengthen market power has not been considered abusive in itself in a 
relevant number of situations which deserve their formalisation into rules. On the 
contrary, the standard which has been consistently quoted in relation to pricing abuses is 
effects-based. Therefore, intent should only be used to signal the situations which 
potentially depart from competition on the merits, leaving their final assessment to 
whether they cause anti-competitive effects. Exclusivity and loyalty rebates in Hoffman-
La Roche could be reinterpreted as effects-based rules, namely the presumptions of 
effects stated in British Airways and Tomra.
929
 This is preferable to mixing intent and 
effects and only requiring the capability to produce effects. 
  
                                                     
928
 A standard was applied for tying in Tetra Pak (fn. 702) 35-37, taking into consideration the 
relationship between the products and aftermarkets, but it is unclear whether it concerned direct harm, as 
part of a strategy to harm competitors, or indirect harm. 
929
 In GC Michelin (fn. 753) 60 the General Court even preferred an effects analysis to such rules, by 
investigating a rebate system which it qualified as quantitative and therefore, under the case law of the 
Court, should have been considered as not being abusive. 




The present research set out to establish the substantive value of intent in the case law 
applying Articles 101 and 102, which was otherwise overlooked by the doctrinal 
emphasis on effects. A theoretical framework was outlined, whereby intent was defined 
based on the actions of undertakings as rational agents, as described in Chapter I (on the 
concept of intent), and intent was recognised an autonomous normative value which 
allows moral judgments, as discussed in Chapter II (on judging intent). The case law on 
Articles 101 and 102 was then analysed according to this framework, proving the 
descriptive claim that intent is judged according to the principles of independence of 
economic action, of market integration, and of competition on the merits. In Chapter III 
(on collusion), the notion of collusion was seen to be based on intent, namely how 
influence over such intent is judged according to the principle of independent economic 
action. In Chapter IV (on restrictions of competition), restrictions by object were found 
to involve a moral judgment of intent in its context, either continuing the ‘pre-
substantive’ analysis of collusion or making a fresh judgment. Finally, in Chapter V (on 
abuse of dominance), abuses were also seen to involve a two-step application, first by 
identifying methods different from normal competition based on the judgment of intent 
according to several principles, and subsequently applying a test of intent or effects of 
specific abuses. The substantive value of intent having been confirmed, this Conclusion 
will attempt to summarily expand the normative claim made in Chapter II (on judging 
intent) – that intent is necessary for the coherence and stability of the case law – into 
inferences for the wider character of EU competition law. 
Such inferences for the character of EU competition law require taking into account 
certain aspects which were only covered indirectly by the present research: the 
normative value of effects and the role of the Commission. In relation to first, it was 
acknowledged that effects have a normative value derived from a consequentialist view 
of the goals of EU competition law, to which intent often plays as subordinate role. The 
substantive value of effects enables the definition of the relevant market, allows finding 
restrictions by effect, permits the granting of exemptions under Article 101(3), grounds 
the application of an effects-based test of abuse, regulates the assessment of 
concentrations under the Merger Regulation, and contributes to the application of 
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objective justifications. In relation to the second, the present research did not cover the 
decisional practice of the Commission. However, at every step of this research the 
Commission has been the source of, and provided support for, an ‘effects-based 
approach’. Authors accept the notion of restrictions by object as a presumption of anti-
competitive effects advanced by the Commission post-‘modernisation’. An ‘effects-
based approach’ is also argued by the doctrine for abuse of dominance relying on the 
standard of anti-competitive foreclosure stated by the Commission in its Enforcement 
Guidance on Article 102. An administrative agency like the Commission is ‘designed to 
achieve the kinds of goals which competition law seeks to attain’, as Monti comments, 
and according to institutional theory it is also best placed to assess effects for that 
purpose.
930
 It suggested that the doctrinal ‘effects-based approach’ is the result of the 
considering of EU competition law from the perspective of – and, as noted in Chapter II 
(on judging intent), an effort to influence – the Commission. 
The main inference that can be drawn from the present research is that there are two 
sides to EU competition law: the one investigated, which is judicial, grounded on 
principles, and intent-based, and another side, which is administrative, policy orientated 
and effects-based. The two sides view Articles 101 and 102 differently. This research 
made no pretence that EU competition law should be exclusively based on the 
normative value of intent, and the Courts of the EU are equally tasked of judging on the 
issues where effect has normative value. An ‘effects based approach’, on the contrary, 
does not recognise any other perspective but its own policy orientation. This insistence 
is programmatic and well-intentioned, but short-sighted. From a legal interpretation 
perspective, it does not help to comprehend or anticipate the full extent of the case law 
of the Court. From a philosophical point of view, it assumes an answer to age old 
questions which remain unsettled. Limiting EU competition law to consequentialism 
isolates the phenomenon of competition from a richer historical, social and intellectual 
background. In contrast, the normative claim advanced in Chapter II (on judging intent) 
that the use of intent could lead to a ‘reflective equilibrium’ between competitive 
intuitions and moral reasoning attempted a consensus of all moral views, including 
consequentialism. That consensus is based on the paradigm of competitive markets, 
which always allows undertakings to unintentionally influence market conditions and 
harm competitors by ‘winning’ the competitive game. Even if this negative scope is less 
visible than the instances where Articles 101 and 102 are applied, such as the effects-
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based examples given above, it shows that the foundation of EU competition law lies 
with judgments of intent. 
There is no guarantee, however, that EU competition law will not adopt a full ‘effects-
based approach’ in the future. Commission practice and doctrinal push cannot but have 
their effects on the case law. The present research has shown the General Court to be 
particularly sensitive to these influences, going as far as making significant effects-
based pronouncements unsupported by the case law of the Court. Even the case law of 
the Court has shown novel elements which can develop towards fundamental changes. 
The reference in Allianz Hungária to the likelihood of anti-competitive effects could 
eliminate the distinction between restrictions by object and effect that can be traced 
back to Consten and Grundig. If both notions of restriction are based on anti-
competitive effects, this might cause the notion of collusion to change into a 
‘jurisdictional’ concept capturing any behaviour which can lead to those effects. The 
statement in Post Danmark that competition on the merits does not prevent the 
exclusion of inefficient competitors, although currently conditioned by the facts of that 
case, could be developed to eliminate abuses of direct harm to competitors. Although 
this might seem to limit the scope of abuse of dominance, it can move the principle of 
competition on the merits towards sole efficiency concerns, which would weaken its 
intuitive constraint. If so, abuse will come to signify any exclusion assessed as 
inefficient – much in the way as Continental Can defined abuse as any strengthening of 
market power before being limited by competition on the merits. 
It was seen throughout this research that advocates of an ‘effects-based approach’ hold 
such moves to be beneficial, namely by eliminating ‘formalistic’ constraints on 
achieving the outcomes prescribed by the goals of EU competition law. These authors 
can point to the consequences of Continental Can: although concentrations did not 
appear to be contrary to competition on the merits, concentrations are now subject to the 
scrutiny of the Commission under the Merger Regulation. This evolution appears to 
have been generally welcomed by all actors, and could indicate that similar moves 
would be equally well received. A brief detour into the debate over the regulatory 
character of EU competition law illustrates this. There is an overlap between the effects-
based side of EU competition law and regulation, namely the administrative-
technocratic enforcement and the mandate of ‘best’ solutions.931 Authors readily admit 
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 See Dunne (2014) 415-433. Other characteristics of regulation mentioned by Dunne, namely ex ante 
enforcement, prescriptive doctrines and regulatory remedies are not as relevant, since consequentialism is 
concerned about outcomes, not particular ways to achieve them. 
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that EU competition law is (at least partially) regulatory.
932
 However, due to following 
an ‘effects-based approach’, it becomes difficult for those authors to place limits on 
such regulatory character.
933
 In this regard, Ibáñez Colomo warns that EU competition 
law risks being ‘instrumentalised to meet the objectives of sector-specific regimes’, 
defined as the Commission departing from what could be expected under existing 
precedent.
934
 Nonetheless, such a move would be coherent within the usual debate over 
the goals of EU competition law and how to best achieve them. Dunne states that ‘the 
policy choice to incorporate such regulatory components might be defended on the basis 
that this provides a practicable means by which to address market problems that 
comprise the core concern of antitrust’.935 For an ‘effects-based approach’, that is the 
beginning and the end of the debate. 
Perhaps a better perspective can be gained by stepping outside the terms set by an 
‘effects-based approach’ itself, and considering some of the traditional arguments 
levelled against consequentialism. The first, Anscombe’s original critique when coining 
the expression, is that consequentialism does not rule out anything in advance of 
deliberating how to reach an outcome.
936
 Naturally, EU competition law is not as 
unconstrained as the field of philosophical possibility, so an ‘effects-based approach’ 
will always be limited existing legal provisions and external constraints, notably 
fundamental rights. The regulatory character of competition law has also been said to be 
limited by external constraints.
937
 Nonetheless, if a full ‘effects-based approach’ were 
adopted, EU competition law would not be internally limited in distinguishing between 
behaviour with the same consequences. As such, regardless of external constraints, 
parallel behaviour would be considered the same as a cartel; direct harm to competitors 
the same as indirect one through competition on the merits; and the acquisition of 
market power by merger the same as internal growth or market success. 
The second traditional critique is that, as consequentialism dispenses with intent, it can 
also dispense with agenthood. If the purpose is to achieve a certain outcome, it should 
not be dependent on being triggered by action. This is illustrated by wide 
‘jurisdictional’ concepts, such as the limitation of contractual freedom employed by the 
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 See Dunne (2014) 434, Ibáñez Colomo (2010) 263-264 and Monti (2007) 243. 
933
 Temple Lang (2012) 150 argues that this regulatory character results from an ‘effects-based approach’, 
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 Ibáñez Colomo (2010) 277. 
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 Dunne (2014) 435 and 440-441, referring to commitment decisions under Article 9 of Regulation 
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936
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 Thus, for example, Dunne (2014) 436-437 refers the separation of powers and the rule of law, and 
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Commission pre-‘modernisation’ (which can be said to have been adopted to promote 
the goal of market integration), the reduction of uncertainty proposed by Odudu 
discussed in Chapter III (on collusion), or the increase of market power in Continental 
Can. Under an ‘effects-based approach’, meaningful action is discarded in order to 
simply capture any situation where effects are possible. However, if the characteristics 
of the action are substantively irrelevant, then the action itself soon is. Thus, regulation 
usually covers all market subjects, and does require specific actions to be triggered. If a 
full ‘effects-based approach’ were adopted, wide ‘jurisdictional’ interpretations would 
eventually dispense with the collusion and unilateral action required by the letter of 
Articles 101 and 102. 
Finally, it is traditionally accepted in the formulations of consequentialism that agents 
are not in the best position to assess consequences.
938
 This should done by an external 
observer, which has been recognised in moral philosophy to easily stray into elitism, 
since only a few observers can be said to be in a position to do so effectively. Somewhat 
mirroring this, not only has an ‘effects-based approach’ focused on the role of the 
Commission, but the process of ‘modernisation’ itself can be characterised a unilateral 
re-definition of the balance of the goals of EU competition law. Nevertheless, it is a 
short step from assessing the relevant effects to balancing such effects if both operations 
rely on the same normative value and technical expertise. If a full ‘effects-based 
approach’ were followed to its logical consequence, the Court should defer not only to 
the expertise of the Commission in ‘complex economic assessments’, as it currently 
does, but also in complex balancing exercises of different goals. The role of judicial 
review would then be confined to procedural irregularities and external constraints. 
Of course, none of described arguments have proven decisive in rejecting 
consequentialism in moral philosophy, and equally good ones have been made on its 
side which are not mentioned here. As set out in the introduction to this research, the 
purpose is not to settle any such controversy, nor to make any conclusion depend on it. 
The purpose is merely to illustrate some possible developments if EU competition law 
moves toward relying solely on the normative value of effects, once the intuitive and 
moral constraints posed by intent are removed. As already stated, it may be that a full 
‘effects-based approach’ will succeed in doing so, but EU competition law will no 
longer resemble what it is today. 
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